16-OMD-129

16-OMD-129

June 27, 2016

In re: The Advocate-Messenger/Boyle County Fiscal Court

Summary:        Boyle County Fiscal Court violated the Open Meetings Act in failing to comply with all notice requirements codified at KRS 61.815(1)(a) prior to holding a closed session during its March 3, 2016, regular meeting and in discussing matters that were not properly announced contrary to KRS 61.815(1)(d). Conflicting evidence presented as to whether final action was taken during the closed session contrary to KRS 61.815(1)(c) prevents a conclusive determination. Fiscal Court violated KRS 61.846(1) in failing to issue a written response to complaint.          

Open Meetings Decision

        Staff Writer Pamela Wright, The Advocate-Messenger, initiated this appeal challenging the inaction of the Boyle County Fiscal Court (“Fiscal Court”) upon receipt of her April 1, 2016, complaint, submitted to Judge-Executive Harold McKinney in his capacity as presiding officer, in accordance with KRS 61.846(1). Ms. Wright further argued that the Fiscal Court violated KRS 61.815(1)(a), (c), and (d) on March 3, 2016, during its regular meeting.¹  In her April 1 complaint Ms. Wright specifically alleged that the Fiscal Court failed to announce the general nature of the business to be discussed in closed session and the reason for the closed session per KRS 61.815(1)(a) prior to entering into a closed session during its March 3, 2016, regular meeting, in discussing matters that were not publicly announced prior to convening the closed session contrary to KRS 61.815(1)(d), and in taking final action during that closed session contrary to KRS 61.815(1)(c).  To remedy these alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act, Ms. Wright proposed that the Fiscal Court “discuss at a future meeting, in an open and public session, those matters that were discussed at the improperly called closed session on March 3, 2016.”  Having received no written response on behalf of the Fiscal Court per KRS 61.846(1), Ms. Wright initiated this appeal by undated letter that was received on May 13, 2016.

        Upon receiving notification of Ms. Wright’s appeal, Boyle County Attorney Richard H. Campbell responded on behalf of the Fiscal Court, denying the alleged violations of KRS 61.815(1)(a),(c), and (d); however, the Fiscal Court offered no explanation for its failure to issue a written response to Ms. Wright’s April 1, 2016, written complaint within three business days of receipt per KRS 61.846(1). Before addressing the substantive issues presented, this office is compelled to address the procedural violation. Pursuant to KRS 61.846(1), the “public agency shall determine within three (3) days, excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the receipt of the complaint whether to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint and shall notify in writing the person making the complaint, within the three (3) day period, of its decision. . . .”  This office has consistently recognized that KRS 61.846(1) “does not contemplate immediate action. It requires that the agency notify the complainant within three days of its decision on what will or will not be done about the complaint. Hence, requests that the agency take action in the future must be responded to within the three-day period.”  03-OMD-116, p. 2. As with KRS 61.880(1), the parallel provision of the Open Records Act, “[t]he language of the statute directing agency action is exact.”  Edmondson v. Alig, 926 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. App. 1996); 04-OMD-029. Simply put, KRS 61.846(1) requires a public agency to issue a written response within three business days of receiving a complaint and the Fiscal Court’s inaction violated the Act. Id. 97-OMD-43; 11-OMD-114.  The undisputed facts also confirm the Fiscal Court’s failure to comply with all but one of the notice requirements codified at KRS 61.815(1)(a) prior to convening the March 3 closed session.

        The Fiscal Court advised on appeal that item “I” on the agenda listed “Project Tito: Jody Lassiter” as the subject matter. When Judge McKinney announced that “Project Tito” was the next agenda item that would be addressed, he called Mr. Lassiter, “Chief Executive Officer of the Economic Development Partnership [‘EDP’] (a partnership of county and city governments and a variety of public agencies), the name of which signifies its purpose and mission, to the podium.”²  Judge McKinney then requested that Mr. Lassiter and the County Attorney “have some dialogue on what’s the basis for doing this in a closed session, executive session,” in response to which Mr. Lassiter asked the Fiscal Court to enter into a closed session under KRS 61.810(1)(g) and “proceeded to quote that particular statute.”  At Judge McKinney’s urging, counsel advised, “Magistrate Mayes offered a motion that the Court go into executive session and Magistrate Sammons offered a second to the motion.”  The minutes of the meeting reflect that the motion was “passed with all members voting in favor.”  The Fiscal Court maintained that because “Project Tito” was an item listed on the agenda in association with Mr. Lassiter, “it was apparent that ‘Project Tito’ was an economic development effort[.]”  

        Although the Fiscal Court asserted that Mr. Lassiter’s request for a closed session “included, essentially word for word, a recitation of” KRS 61.810(1)(g), the minutes indicate only that Mr. Lassiter “requested a closed meeting on Project [Tito] based on KRS 61.810 section (1) subsection [(g)].”  Contrary to Ms. Wright’s allegation, the Fiscal Court asserted, it “met every requirement” for going into closed session during its regular meeting on March 3, “as notice of the general nature of the business to be discussed in closed session was afforded the public; the reason, i.e., the situation itself, described in the authorizing statute, for the closed session was provided; and the specific statutory provision authorizing the closed session was enunciated.”  This office respectfully disagrees that any of the requirements codified at KRS 61.815(1)(a) were complied with aside from citing the specific provision that purportedly authorized the closed session, KRS 61.810(1)(g), which, standing alone, did not satisfy KRS 61.815(1)(a), regardless of whether the language of that exception was also quoted or not.

        In construing KRS 61.815, Kentucky’s highest courts have recognized that “the failure to comply with the strict letter of the law in conducting meetings of a public agency violates the public good.”  Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1997)(citation omitted). Consequently, “the courts of the Commonwealth [and this office] must narrowly construe and apply the exceptions so as to avoid improper or unauthorized closed, executive or secret meetings.”  Id.  Decisions issued by the Attorney General over the years regarding compliance with KRS 61.815(1) are consistent with Ratliff. Rejecting the Board’s argument that it had substantially complied with requirements for conducting a closed session, in Ratliff the Court reasoned that “prior to going into an executive session, the public body must state the specific exception contained in the statute which is relied upon in order to permit a secret session. There must be specific and complete notification in the open meeting of any and all topics which are to be discussed[.]”  Id. at 924. In other words, KRS 61.815(1)(a) “contemplates more than agency recitation of language of the exception authorizing the closed session, but less than a detailed description of the matter to be discussed.”  00-OMD-64, p. 6 (emphasis added); see also 10-OMD-059 (agency failed to demonstrate, both initially and on appeal, how publicity would “directly affect the public’s interest financially,” the “threshold requirement for invocation of KRS 61.810(1)(b)”); 12-OMD-102 (a public agency complies with KRS 61.815(1)(a) and 61.810(1)(f), “by announcing, during open session, the general nature of the business to be discussed in closed session (appointment, discipline, or dismissal of an individual employee(s)/member(s)), the specific reason for the closed session (which of these particular actions is contemplated), and which of the exceptions codified at KRS 61.810 is being invoked (KRS 61.810(1)(f))”).

        Relying upon Ratliff, above, this office has consistently recognized that “[i]n view of the disparate nature of the [fourteen] exceptions, there can be no bright line test for determining if specific and complete notification has been given.”  00-OMD-64, p. 6. However, the notification “must include both a statement of the exception authorizing the closed session and a description of the business to be discussed couched in sufficiently specific terms to enable the public to assess the propriety of the agency’s actions.”  Id. (Emphasis added.); 03-OMD-221.  Merely quoting the language of the provision “does not satisfy the standard of ‘specific and complete notification’ nor does it constitute a ‘sufficiently specific’ description of the business to be discussed[.]”  07-OMD-029, p. 8.  Likewise, this office has rejected the argument that referencing a meeting agenda containing a citation to the statutory exception authorizing the closed session is adequate. See 10-OMD-017; 15-OMD-057. The agenda of record lacks even a statutory reference. In any event, “[p]lacement of the notice of closed session in the agenda does not count as notice ‘in regular open session’ for the purposes of KRS 61.815(1)(a); the notice must be announced in the meeting itself.”  15-OMD-057, p. 7.  The Fiscal Court violated KRS 61.815(1)(a) in failing to publicly announce the general nature of the business to be discussed in the March 3 closed session and the specific reason for it. Regardless of whether discussion(s) was actually restricted to a subject permissible under KRS 61.810(1)(g) here (which is unclear from the limited information provided), any discussions between the Fiscal Court members “concerning matters not identified in the open meeting with proper notice [were] a violation of the Open Meetings Act and constitute[d] illegal conduct. Ratliff at 924.  See 06-OMD-211; 07-OMD-029; 08-OMD-040; 15-OMD-120.

        The record on appeal is devoid of any context from which to determine whether any discussion of “Project Tito” was permissible in a closed session held under authority of KRS 61.810(1)(g). Prior to 1992 the presence of a representative of the industrial prospect was required for the agency to properly invoke KRS 61.810(1)(g). See OAG 80-530; 05-OMD-148. However, KRS 61.810(1)(g) now permits discussions “concerning a specific proposal,” with or without a representative, “but only if open discussion would jeopardize the business entity’s undisclosed interest in siting, retention, expansion, and/or upgrading of the business.”  05-OMD-148, p. 9.  KRS 61.810(1)(g) “does not embrace [closed session discussions of] everything tangential to the topic,” OAG 80-530, p. 3 (citation omitted), but is expressly confined to discussions concerning a specific proposal and then only if open discussion would jeopardize the siting, retention, expansion, or upgrading of a business.  05-OMD-148.  However, open discussions “cannot jeopardize the siting, retention, expansion, or upgrading of a business entity if the entity has made public its intentions.”  05-OMD-148, p. 10.  Nowhere in the record is there any indication of which, if any, of these options would be jeopardized if “Project Tito” (the nature of which is also not even generally explained) was openly discussed or how, nor does the record contain any insight as to whether some information has already become public knowledge.  Merely invoking, or even quoting KRS 61.810(1)(g), and relying on the general inference that can be drawn from the name of EDP does not suffice. Applying the analysis contained at pages 7-11 of 05-OMD-148 (copy enclosed), and in the absence of more detailed information, this office finds that the Fiscal Court’s invocation of KRS 61.810(1)(g) reflects “a liberal interpretation of that provision that is legally unsupportable in this context.”  05-OMD-148, p. 11; 13-OMD-026.          

        The remaining question presented is whether the Fiscal Court violated KRS 61.815(1)(c) by taking final action during its March 3, 2016, closed session; the conflicting evidence on appeal does not lend itself to a conclusive determination. See 12-OMD-102. The minutes of the meeting establish that upon the Fiscal Court’s return to regular session, a motion was made “to authorize Jody Lassiter to proceed along the guidelines set out in the executive session. The motion passed with all members voting in favor.”  This action by the Fiscal Court, Ms. Wright alleged, “seems to indicate a decision was made behind closed doors.”  However, on appeal the Fiscal Court observed that “no evidence supporting that contention has been submitted by her, primarily because no final action of any kind was taken by the Court during such session.”  Although Ms. Wright “surmises that the wording of the motion” by Magistrate Hendricks implies that action was taken, the Fiscal Court explained, “the fact that [it] was offered confirms that no ‘final action’ was taken until the Court had returned to open session.”³   There is not adequate proof in the record on appeal to dispute the agency’s position that no final action was taken. Under these circumstances, the Attorney General is unable to conclude that a violation of KRS 61.815(1)(c) was committed.  See 08-OMD-113; 10-OMD-059.

        Either party may appeal this decision by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court per KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings.

                                                Andy Beshear        

                                                Attorney General

                                                Michelle D. Harrison

                                                Assistant Attorney General

#202

Distributed to:

Pamela Wright

Harold McKinney

Richard H. Campbell