Request By:
Mike Nance
804 Valley View Drive
Beaver Dam, KY 42320Jonathan James, Chief
McHenry Volunteer Fire Department
City of McHenry
P.O. Box 100
McHenry, KY 423541Amanda Perkins, City Attorney
McKnown Law Office
119 E. Center Street
P.O. Box 213
Hartford, KY 42347Dennis Chinn, Mayor
City of McHenry
P.O. Box 47
McHenry, KY 42354
Opinion
Opinion By: Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General; Michelle D. Harrison, Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Decision
At issue in this appeal is whether the actions of the City of McHenry/McHenry Volunteer Fire Department 1 relative to the request of Mike Nance for copies of "all response reports" and "minutes of all meeting[s]" of the MVFD 2 from 2002-present, and a "copy of the personnel list, listing all personnel of the [MVFD] (active, inactive, suspended, or on any type of leave)," and related requests submitted by his son, Jeremy Nance, violated the Kentucky Open Records Act. Based on the following, it is the decision of this office that the City's disposition of the subject requests was partially inconsistent with the Open Records Act both procedurally and substantively speaking.
Our analysis necessarily begins with the sequence of events which prompted this appeal. By letter dated February 18, 2004, 3 the MVFD notified Jeremy Nance that he was "placed on suspension until the March fire department monthly business meeting" during which time all of his "membership privileges [would be] revoked." In closing, MVFD Chief Jonathan James requested that Jeremy be present at the meeting "to discuss [his] suspension, before the members decide[d on] further action[.]" Enclosed with the notification were "the motion letter and the article of suspension [.]"
Upon being notified of his suspension, Jeremy immediately requested that he be returned to active status in a letter directed to City Attorney Amanda Perkins on February 20, 2004. If the matter was going to proceed, Jeremy requested that Ms. Perkins treat his letter as an open records request for copies of "the by-laws for the [MVFD], the name of the complain[ant], the names, address[es], [and] phone numbers of all the witness[es] of the [alleged] incident, [the] date of the [alleged] occurrence, location of the [alleged] occurrence, statements of all [the] witness[es] of the [alleged] occurrence and [a] description of the [alleged] occurrence in detail." In a letter dated March 9, 2004, Ms. Perkins advised Jeremy "that Article V of the [enclosed by]-laws allow[ed] [him] as the defending member to be present at the meeting on March 11 to present [his] side." Also enclosed was a copy of the motion regarding his suspension. Dissatisfied with this "incomplete" response, Jeremy resubmitted his request on March 10, 2004, and also requested the "additional information" listed below:
. A copy of all fire incidents of the [MVFD] for [2002-2003]
. A copy of all [minutes from MVFD] meetings for [2002-2003]
. A copy of the membership [list containing] the current member[s] of the [MVFD]
On March 24, 2004, Mike Nance requested copies of "all fire department responses for the [MVFD]" and "all minutes [of] meeting[s] of the [MVFD]" for "[the] calend[ar] year[s] of 2002, 2003, [and] 2004 to [the] present" as well as a "copy of the membership [list] of the [MVFD]" to Toni McDonald, McHenry City Clerk, via electronic mail. 4 In response, Ms. McDonald indicated that she is "not responsible for obtaining this information for Jeremy" unless and until Ms. Perkins informs her otherwise and strongly encouraged Mike to let Jeremy resolve the situation himself. On the next day, Ms. Perkins advised Jeremy that neither she nor Ms. McDonald "are the custodians of any records of the [MVFD]." Because she was uncertain as to how much longer she would be representing the City, Ms. Perkins suggested that Jeremy submit his request directly to the MVFD at "P.O. Box 100, McHenry, KY 42354 with attention to one of the officers." Because Jeremy's requests had seemingly "been ignored," Mike followed this suggestion and included copies of Jeremy's request, his duplicative request, and all related correspondence with his letter to Chief James dated March 29, 2004, presumably acting on Jeremy's behalf.
In a letter dated April 1, 2004, McHenry Mayor Dennis Chinn advised Jeremy that Ms. Perkins had forwarded his letter requesting copies of the responses, meeting minutes and present membership of the MVFD to the City for response. According to Mayor Chinn, the City had been in contact with Chief James "in order to obtain these records" and the Chief indicated that it would take "30 business days to gather all of [the requested] information." Therefore, Mayor Chinn advised Jeremy that the City would forward all of the requested information to him "via certified mail on or before May 12, 2004." 5 In response, Jeremy clarified that the records to which Mayor Chinn had referred in his letter "are the records that [his] father, Mike Nance, ask[ed] for." 6 As described by Jeremy, the records to which he had requested access are:
1) the name of the complain[ant]
2) the names, address[es], [and] phone numbers of all the [alleged witnesses]
3) date of the [alleged] occurrence
4) location of the [alleged] occurrence
5) statements of all witness[es] of the [alleged] occurrence and [a] description of the [alleged] occurrence in detail
6) leaves, suspension [s] [of] any members of the [MVFD] in the last 6 months
7) actions taken against Paul Sheperd
8) actions taken against Clay Gaither
Upon receiving this request, Mayor Chinn advised Jeremy, in relevant part, as follows:
We are acknowledging receipt of your letter dated "Date 18, 2004" [which we are treating] as your first request for the following information that I am enclosing: 1) a copy of the motion that was made on February 17, 2004 to suspend you from the [MVFD] which also states the reason why; 2) a copy of the MVFD by-laws Section IV, Article V that pertains to suspension/ termination of a fire fighter; 3) a copy of the minutes from the February 17, 2004 meeting [at] which you were suspended; 4) a copy of the letter sent to you dated February 18, 2004 advising you of your suspension and asking you to attend the March meeting; and 5) a copy of the March 11, 2004 minutes [from the meeting at] which you were ultimately terminated from the department. MVFD waited until the investigation and proceedings [] at the Beaver Dam Volunteer Fire Department were completed on this matter in order to avoid you having to defend yourself to two different departments at the same time.
In Mayor Chinn's estimation, Jeremy "also requested information [] which [he is] not entitled to," namely, "# 6-leaves, suspensions, [of] any members of the [MVFD] in the last 6 months; # 7-actions taken against Paul Sheperd; and # 8-actions taken against Clay Gaither." Mike now appeals from the City's general "failure to comply" with the Open Records Act in responding to the requests that he and Jeremy submitted. According to Mike, "the amount of time [estimated] for the records to be obtained in [and of itself] is inexcusable" since these records must be maintained "for inspection. "
In a supplemental response received by this office on June 24, 2004, Mayor Chinn elaborates on the City's position. As explained by Mayor Chinn:
After advising the Nances that neither she nor the city clerk were the custodians of the [MVFD] records and that they should contact the fire department officials directly, our city attorney, Mandy Perkins, chose to recuse herself from this matter, based on the fact that Mike and Jeremy Nance are relatives of her husband. We then contacted the Kentucky League of Cities [which] advised us to send Jeremy a letter giving him a date that the requested information would be mailed (letter dated April 1, 2004) addressed to Jeremy a copy of which you have).
In his letter to your office of May 27, 2004, Mike makes mention of the fact that he was "an experienced investigator and was contracted to investigate the a ledged (sic) complaint." We would refer you to the letter from Jeremy to Dennis Chinn, Mayor, of "Date 18, 2004," which indicates to us that Jeremy was pursuing this matter himself. In particular, Jeremy states: "Having received your letter in response to my open records request I find that it is in error. The records you referred to are the records that my father, Mike Nance, ask[ed] for." If, in fact, Mike was acting outside of Jeremy's authority, (Jeremy not being a minor), Mike should not have been supplied with the requested information on Jeremy's behalf. Jeremy has been supplied with all of the information he requested in his letter of "Date 18, 2004" that would have been required under the Kentucky Open Records Law, and, therefore, Mike's appeal would not be well taken. [It is the City's contention that Items 6, 7, and 8 would not be [subject to disclosure] pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a), as they contain personal information that if disclosed would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy] .
In short, it is the "City's position that [it] has supplied Jeremy with everything [to which] he is legally entitled under the Kentucky Open Records Law." 7 Consistent with the following authorities, we respectfully disagree.
As a public agency, the MVFD is required to comply with both the procedural and substantive provisions of the Open Records Act regardless of the requester's identity or his purpose in requesting access to the records. 8 KRS 61.880(1) dictates the procedure that a public agency must follow in responding to a request submitted under the Open Records Act. In relevant part, KRS 61.880(1) provides:
Each public agency, upon any request for records made under KRS 61.870 to 61.884, shall determine within three (3) days , excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with the request and shall notify in writing the person making the request, within the three (3) day period of its decision. An agency response denying, in whole or in part, inspection of any record shall include a statement of the specific exception authorizing the withholding of the record and a brief explanation of how the exception applies to the record withheld . The response shall be issued by the official custodian or under his authority, and it shall constitute final agency action. (Emphasis added).
In construing this provision, the Attorney General has consistently observed:
"The value of information is partly a function of time." Fiduccia v. U.S. Department of Justice, 185 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). This is a fundamental premise of the Open Records Act, underscored by the three day agency response time codified at KRS 61.880(1). Contrary to [the City's] apparent belief, the Act contemplates records production on the third business day after receipt of the request , and not simply notification that the agency will comply. In support, we note that KRS 61.872(5), the only provision in the Act that authorizes postponement of access to public records beyond three business days, expressly states:
(Emphasis added). Additionally, we note that in OAG 92-117 this office made abundantly clear that the Act "normally requires an agency to notify the requester and designate an inspection date not to exceed three days from agency receipt of the request." OAG 92-117, p. 3. Only if the parameters of a request are broad, and the records implicated contain a mixture of exempt and nonexempt information, and are difficult to locate and retrieve, will a determination of what is a "reasonable time for inspection turn on the particular facts presented." OAG 92-117, p. 4. In all other instances, "timely access" to public records is defined as "any time less than three days from agency receipt of the request." OAG 84-300, p. 3; see also 93-ORD-134 and authorities cited therein. Pursuant to KRS 61.872(5), "any extension of the three day deadline for disclosure must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the cause for delay, and a written commitment to release the records on the earliest date certain." 01-ORD-38, p. 5.
01-ORD-140, pp. 3, 4.
It is undisputed that Ms. Perkins did not respond to Jeremy's initial request dated February 20, 2004, on behalf of the City until March 9, 2004. Also untimely was her response of March 25, 2004, to Jeremy's revised request of March 10, 2004. Although the delay was relatively minimal in each instance, the fact remains that the City failed to respond within the designated time period of three business days on both occasions which constitutes a procedural violation of the Open Records Act. Acting on behalf of the City, however, Ms. Perkins forwarded Jeremy's revised request to the MVFD, notified him that neither she nor the city clerk are custodians of the requested records, and provided him with the mailing address of the MVFD thereby discharging her statutory duty, albeit belatedly. 9
In general, a public agency cannot postpone or delay this statutory deadline. "The burden on the agency to respond within three working days is, not infrequently, an onerous one. Nevertheless, the only exceptions to this general rule are found at KRS 61.872(4) and (5)." 02-ORD-165, p. 3. Unless the person to whom the request is directed does not have custody or control of the records, or the records are in active use, in storage, or are not available, the agency is required to notify the requester of its decision within three working days, and to afford the requester timely access to the requested records. Id., citing 93-ORD-134.
If, on the other hand, any of those conditions exist, as is the case here, the agency must " immediately so notify" the requester, and designate a place, time, and date for inspection "not to exceed" three days from receipt of the request, " unless a detailed explanation of the cause is given for further delay and the place, time and earliest date on which the public record will be available for inspection ." KRS 61.872(5) (Emphasis added); 02-ORD-165. In other words, KRS 61.872(5) dictates that "any extension of the three day deadline for disclosure must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the cause for delay, and a written commitment to release the records on the earliest date certain ." 01-ORD-38, p. 5. (Emphasis added).
Noticeably absent from the Mayor's timely response to Jeremy's revised request on behalf of the City is the detailed explanation required to justify a delay of 30 days in providing the requester with access to nonexempt records. From a procedural standpoint, therefore, the City's response to Jeremy's request for the "fire incidents," minutes from meetings, and current membership list of the MVFD was deficient. 10 As repeatedly recognized by this office, the procedural requirements of the Open Records Act "are not mere formalities, but are an essential part of the prompt and orderly processing of an open records request." 03-ORD-125, p. 5. Absent such an explanation, the City should immediately make all existing records in its custody that are responsive to Jeremy's revised request available to him for inspection and copying consistent with KRS 61.874(1) as it originally agreed to do "on or before May 12, 2004." 11
Turning to the substantive issues presented by this appeal, Jeremy's request is properly characterized as a request for information rather than a request for reasonably described public records, at least as to the five items disclosed by the City. 12 As long recognized by the Attorney General, a public agency is not required to honor a request for information as opposed to a request for specifically described public records. "The purpose of the Open Records Law is not to provide information but to provide access to public records which are not exempt by law." OAG 79-547, p. 2. In 95-ORD-131, this office observed:
Requests for information, as distinguished from records, are outside the scope of the open records provisions. See, e.g. OAG 89-77. Our position is premised on the notion that "[o]pen records provisions address only inspection of records . . . [and] do not require public agencies or officials to provide or compile specific information to conform to the parameters of a given request."
Id., p. 2. Information will necessarily be gleaned from an inspection of the records, but "the duty imposed upon public agencies under the Act is to make public documents available for inspection and copying." 02-ORD-236, p. 3. That being said, any issue relative to these records is now moot. Pursuant to 40 KAR 1:030, Section 6: "If the requested documents are made available to the complaining party after a complaint is made, the Attorney General shall decline to issue a decision in the matter." 04-ORD-046; 03-ORD-087. If access to the public records that the requester is seeking to inspect or copy is initially denied but subsequently granted, the propriety of the initial denial becomes a moot issue. Id; OAG 91-140. Consistent with the foregoing, further discussion involving the records already disclosed by the City is unwarranted. In light of this determination, the remaining question is whether the City properly denied Jeremy access to "leaves, suspension [s] [of] any members of the [MVFD] in the last 6 months[,] actions taken against Paul Sheperd[,] and actions taken against Clay Gaither[.]"
On appeal, 13 the City argues that "Items 6, 7, and 8" are not subject to inspection pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a), which excludes from the purview of the Open Records Act: "Public records containing information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would clearly constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [.]" Noticeably lacking from the City's response is an explanation of how the cited exception applies to the records withheld. In Edmondson v. Alig, Ky. App., 926 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1996), the Kentucky Court of Appeals observed:
The language of [KRS 61.880(1)] is exact. It requires the custodian of records to provide particular and detailed information in response to a request for documents . . . . [A] limited and perfunctory resonse to [a] request [does not] even remotely compl[y] with the requirements of the Act . . . .
With respect to the records still at issue, therefore, the City's response was both procedurally deficient and substantively incorrect. Although we are aware of no authority interpreting KRS 61.878(1)(a) in the present context, the Attorney General has previously addressed the issue of whether the personnel files and disciplinary records of public employees are subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act. While being mindful that "the question of whether an invasion of privacy is 'clearly unwarranted' is intrinsically situational, and can only be determined within a specific context, Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists v. The Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., Ky. 826 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1992), this office has generally held that the privacy interest of public employees who have been disciplined for charges of misconduct or exonerated of such charges in the course of their employment is outweighed by the public interest in monitoring agency action. 02-ORD-231, p. 2. As we observed in 96-ORD-86:
In analyzing the propriety of release of records relating to complaints against public employees and public employee discipline, the courts and this office have consistently recognized that "disciplinary action taken against a public employee is a matter related to his job performance and a matter about which the public has a right to know." OAG 88-25, p. 3; [S]ee also, City of Louisville v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., Ky. App., 637 S.W.2d 658 (1983); Kentucky State Board of Medical Licensure v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co. Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 953 (1983); Kentucky Board of Examiners, [supra]; OAGs 81-127, 81-291, 83-41, 84-315, 85-126, 85-136, 89-13, 89-73, 89-74, 91-33, 91-45, 91-62, 91-81, 91-90, 92-34, 94-ORD-27, 95-ORD-47.
Disclosure of such records is not, in general, prohibited by KRS 61.878(1)(a) as a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. This view is premised on the notion that:
02-ORD-231, pp. 2, 3, citing 96-ORD-86, pp. 3, 4; See also Palmer v. Diggers, Ky. App., 60 S.W.3d 591 (2001).
At issue in 02-ORD-231 was whether the Justice Cabinet had violated the Open Records Act in denying a reporter's request for access to "sexual harassment complaints, grievances or informational correspondence alleging misconduct against" former State Police Commissioner Jerry Lovitt, the "results of the investigations into those complaints/grievances or allegations" and the "response and actions taken" by the Cabinet regarding same. "Recognizing that sexual harassment complaints 'are of a uniquely sensitive nature,' we nevertheless concluded that 'conduct giving rise to such complaints can only be characterized as misconduct of the most egregious character, and a matter in which the public has at least as great, if not a greater, interest than other forms of misconduct. '" Id., pp. 3, 4, citing 96-ORD-86, p. 4. If inherently sensitive records such as sexual harassment complaints must be disclosed, it stands to reason that "actions" against named public employees as well as "leaves [and] suspension [s]" are also subject to disclosure. Because the reasoning contained in 02-ORD-231, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference, is equally determinative on the current facts, the same result necessarily follows. As to which personnel records are exempt from disclosure under the Open Records Act, 03-ORD-213, a copy of which is also attached for the parties' reference, is controlling. Consistent with these decisions, the City should immediately furnish Jeremy with copies of nonexempt records that are responsive to his request for "actions taken against Paul Sheperd [and Clay Gaither]" and "leaves, suspension [s] by any members of the [MVFD]" during the last six months. Pursuant to KRS 61.872(3) and KRS 61.874(1), the City may require advance payment of reasonable copying fees, not to exceed ten cents per page, and postage charges. Friend v. Rees, Ky. App., 696 S.W.2d 325 (1985); 01-ORD-136.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.
Footnotes
Footnotes
1 Throughout this decision, the City and the MVFD will be referred to collectively as "the City" except when otherwise specified.
2 Although it is unclear from the evidence of record whether the MVFD qualifies as a "public agency" under KRS 61.870(1), the MVFD has not challenged Mr. Nance's implicit assumption regarding its status. Accordingly, further elaboration as to this threshold issue is unnecessary. 96-ORD-120 and 94-ORD-16 are instructive as to the analysis employed by this office in determining whether a volunteer fire department such as MVFD qualifies as a public agency under KRS 61.870(1)(h) when there is sufficient evidence of record upon which to base that determination.
3 At a "call meeting" held on February 17, 2004, "a motion of suspension made by members of the [MVFD] was presented and acted upon."
4 Mike also requested "responses" and minutes from "2004 to present."
5 By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mayor Chinn and Chief James notified Jeremy that the active, certified members of the MVFD had further discussed his suspension at the meeting on March 11, 2004, and voted to remove him as a volunteer from the department. As a result of those proceedings and in accordance with the MVFD by-laws, the letter served as notice that his services were "no longer required" at the MVFD.
6 As subsequently observed by the City, Jeremy's letter is dated "Date 18, 2004" which necessarily precludes us from determining whether the City's response was timely. Because Mike has not raised this issue on appeal, however, we assume the City complied with the Act in this regard.
7 Attached to Mike's letter of appeal are copies of the records that the City has disclosed to Jeremy.
8 Contrary to the City's assertion, the identity of therequester is irrelevant. As observed by this office:
In an early opinion, the Attorney General recognized that "the exemptions [codified at KRS 61.878(1)] may be invoked according to the nature of the records, and not according to the person who is requesting the inspection or the stated or suspected purpose of the inspection. " OAG 82-233, p. 3; see also OAG 89-76. Twelve years later, [the] Kentucky[] Court of Appeals confirmed this position in Zink v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1994), observing:
Our analysis does not turn on the purpose for which the request information is made or the identity of the person making the request. We think the legislature clearly intended to grant any member of the public as much right to access to information as the next.
01-ORD-8, p. 4. Inasmuch as the requester's purpose in seeking access to public records is irrelevant, and KRS 61.872(2) narrowly defines the information that a public agency may require a requester to provide, this office has held:
The public agency may require, if it desires to do so, that a request or application be in writing. If a written request or application is required, the statute is satisfied if the written application . . . contains the following:
1. Applicant's signature
2. Applicant's name printed legibly
3. Description of records to be inspected
94-ORD-101, p. 3. In sum[,] we concluded that "[a] public agency cannot demand or require more in regard to a request to inspect public records than is required by KRS 61.872(2)."
In arguing that Mike was not entitled to receive copies of the requested records "because he is not a member of the fire department" and his appeal should not be "well taken," therefore, the City misinterprets the Act.
9 As this office held in 00-ORD-12:
Where public records are in the custody and control of the agency to which a request is directed, but the recipient of the request is not the agency's official custodian, the recipient must immediately forward the request to the agency's official custodian. 98-OMD-64. Where the public records are not in the custody and control of the agency to which the request is directed, the agency discharges its duty under the Open Records Act by so notifying the requester and furnishing him with the name and location of the official custodian of the agency in whose custody the records reside. KRS 61.872(4).
10 To clarify, the specified records are subject to inspection absent a statutory provision to the contrary (the MVFD has not cited any such authority nor has our research revealed any) as explained in 94-ORD-133, p. 14 (". . . a policy of blanket exclusion relative to the names and identifying information of persons requesting fire service is inconsistent with the Open Records Law."), 01-ORD-153, p. 3 (". . . no statutory basis exists for denying access to all or any part of the minutes of an open, public meeting."), and 02-ORD-65, p. 6 (If a membership list exists, the agency should arrange for the requester to inspect and copy the list notwithstanding the fact that it may contain inaccuracies).
11 Because Mike's initial request is nearly identical to Jeremy's revised request, the same reasoning applies. Accordingly, the City must provide Mike with copies of all existing records in its custody that are responsive to his request dated March 29, 2004.
12 Although the records submitted for our review do not appear to be entirely responsive to Jeremy's request, our analysis proceeds on the assumption that the City has disclosed any records in existence which are responsive to Jeremy's request with the exception of those still at issue. To the extent that Jeremy requested information as opposed to records, however, the City was obligated to respond but was not obligated to honor his request. As consistently observed by this office, "a public agency is not obligated to compile a list or create a record to satisfy an open records request." 03-ORD-025, p. 7 (citations omitted). It is elementary that a public agency "cannot afford a requester access to records that it does not have or which do not exist." 02-ORD-236, p. 3, citing 93-ORD-134. Because the inability of an agency to produce requested records "due to their apparent nonexistence is tantamount to a partial denial" of a request, however, it is incumbent on the agency to so indicate in "clear and direct terms." 02-ORD-145, p. 3, citing 01-ORD-38. Accordingly, the City was obligated to inform Jeremy if any of the requested records did not exist -- no more, no less.
13 Although the City ultimately invokedKRS 61.878(1)(a) as a basis for denying Jeremy access to these categories of records, the City initially failed to cite the applicable exception and provide a brief explanation of how that exception applies to the records, or portions thereof withheld, as explicitly required by KRS 61.880(1). Therefore, we remind the City that a response issued pursuant to 40 KAR 1:030, Section 2 should be viewed as an opportunity to supplement rather than supplant its denial. The Open Records Act presumes that the agency's initial response pursuant to KRS 61.880(1) "is complete in and of itself." 02-ORD-118, p. 3; 04-ORD-046. As recognized by the Attorney General:
While neither this office nor the Kentucky courts have ever required an itemized index correlating each document withheld with a specific exemption, such as that required by the federal courts in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 977 (1974), we believe that [an agency] is obligated to provide particularized justification for the withholding of documents, or groups of documents, which are properly excludable [footnote omitted], and to release any documents which do not fall squarely within the parameters of the exception and are therefore not excludable.
97-ORD-41, p. 6. In short, a vague reference such as information "you are not entitled to" does not contain the specificity envisioned by KRS 61.880(1). "Because the [MVFD] failed to cite the statutory exception upon which it relied in denying [the] request as to the records at issue, and explain how the exception applies to those records, its response was procedurally deficient" in this regard as well. 04-ORD-44, p. 4.