24-OMD-083
March 22, 2024
In re: Tanyqua Oliver/Louisville Metro Department of Codes and Regulations
Summary: The Louisville Metro Department of Codes and Regulations
(“Metro”) violated the Open Meetings Act (“the Act”) when it failed to
issue a written response to a complaint within three business days. The
Office cannot resolve the factual dispute between the parties as to
whether Metro required a member of the public to sign in and identify
herself as a condition of attending a meeting or whether the condition
was imposed for her to speak at the meeting.
Open Meetings Decision
On March 4, 2024, Tanyqua Oliver (“Appellant”) submitted a written complaint
to the presiding officer of the Board’s March 1, 2024, meeting, in which she alleged
the Board violated KRS 61.840 when it required her to sign in and identify herself,
and prohibited her from speaking at the meeting. Having received no response from
the Board, the Appellant initiated this appeal on March 11, 2024.1
1
On appeal, the Appellant raises various legal questions and issues unrelated to any alleged
violations of the Act, such as her ongoing dispute with her landlord. An open meetings appeal is not
the appropriate forum to resolve issues unrelated to alleged violations of the Act. See KRS 61.846. The
Appellant also raises a new issue on appeal: that Metro violated KRS 61.820(2) when “Case #24-C-
001692 was discussed” but “was not listed on the provided schedule of the regular meeting held March
1, 2024.” There are two types of meetings under the Act, regular meetings and special meetings. Under
KRS 61.820(2), a public agency “shall provide for a schedule of regular meetings by ordinance, order,
resolution, bylaws, or by whatever other means may be required for the conduct of business of that
public agency.” A meeting that was not previously scheduled under KRS 61.820(2) is a “special
meeting,” which has its own notice requirements. KRS 61.823. Notice of a special meeting must be
issued no less than 24 hours before the special meeting, and such notice must include a copy of the
agenda because “[d]iscussions and action at the meeting shall be limited to items listed on the agenda
in the notice.” KRS 61.823(3). However, no such limitation applies to regular meetings, for which no
agenda is required at all. Because public agencies are not required to provide an agenda for regular
meetings, the Office has long held that public agencies do not violate the Act if they provide an agenda
for a regular meeting but do not limit their discussion to the matters listed on the agenda. See, e.g.,Upon receiving a complaint alleging a violation of the Act, a “public agency
shall determine within three (3) [business] days . . . after the receipt of the complaint
whether to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint and shall notify
in writing the person making the complaint, within the three (3) day period, of its
decision.” KRS 61.846(1). On appeal, Metro admits it did not respond to the
Appellant’s complaint concerning the March 1, 2024, meeting. Thus, Metro violated
the Act.
Regarding the merits of the Appellant’s allegations against Metro, the
Appellant alleges Metro violated the Act when it required her to sign a roster and
identify herself to attend the March 1, 2024, meeting. She also claims Metro violated
the Act by not allowing her to speak at the meeting.
The purpose of the Act is to ensure the formation of public policy “shall not be
conducted in secret.” KRS 61.800. It is for this reason that “[n]o condition other than
those required for the maintenance of order shall apply to the attendance of any
member of the public at any meeting of a public agency.” KRS 61.840. The Office has
previously noted that KRS 61.840 “vests the public with a virtually unconditional
right to attend all meetings of a public agency.” 00-OMD-169. However, the Act only
provides a right for the public to attend meetings, not a right to speak or participate
in the proceedings. See, e.g., 95-OMD-99. Thus, while a public agency shall not
require a member of the public to sign a roster or otherwise identify herself simply to
attend a meeting, a public agency may impose such conditions before allowing a
member of the public to speak at the meeting. See, e.g., 19-OMD-135; 11-OMD-020.
Here, the Appellant claims she was required to sign a roster and identify herself
to attend the March 1, 2024, meeting. On appeal, Metro does not dispute that it asked
the Appellant to sign a roster and identify herself. However, Metro claims its request
was a condition for the Appellant to speak as a witness, not to attend the meeting.
Accordingly, there is a factual dispute between the parties about whether the
condition was imposed for the Appellant to attend or if it was imposed so she could
speak. The Office is unable to resolve factual disputes such as these in this forum.
See, e.g., 22-OMD-236; 19-OMD-187; 12-OMD-080. As a result, the Office is unable
to find Metro violated the Act by imposing a condition on attendance. Further,
because the Act does not guarantee a member of the public the right to speak at a
11-OMD-132; 01-OMD-175. Here, it is undisputed that the March 1, 2024, meeting was a regular
meeting.meeting, the Office cannot find that Metro violated the Act by not allowing the
Appellant to speak.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ Matthew Ray
Matthew Ray
Assistant Attorney General
#158
Distributed to:
Tanyqua Oliver
Alice Lyon
Nicole Pang
Natalie S. Johnson
Annale Taylor