Opinion
Opinion By: Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General; Amye L. Bensenhaver, Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether Garrard County Memorial Hospital, Inc., violated the Open Records Act in the disposition of David Wilson's June 14, 2004, request for financial and operational records relating to GCMH as well as records relating to its board of directors. For the reasons that follow, we find that GCMH failed to discharge its duties under KRS 61.880(1). Further, we find that GCMH failed to meet its statutory burden of proof in denying Mr. Wilson's request on the basis of KRS 61.872(6). Having so determined, however, we find that GCMH has no obligation to respond to any future open records requests, or related correspondence, directed to it at its former address by Mr. Wilson, and that Mr. Wilson's continued use of this address will lend support to GCMH's position that those requests are intended to disrupt its essential functions within the meaning of KRS 61.872(6). Moreover, we find that although the record before us does not contain sufficient evidence to support GCMH's argument that Mr. Wilson's requests have become unreasonably burdensome within the meaning of KRS 61.872(6), GCMH may, upon presentation of clear and convincing evidence, build a successful case under that provision should he elect to submit future requests.
By letter dated June 21, 2004, but apparently mailed on June 14, 2004, Mr. Wilson requested copies of:
(1) the minutes of all meetings of the board since the corporations [sic] inception[;]
(2) the resignation letters of members of the board of directors[;]
(3) any filings or reports to the IRS regarding the corporations [sic] tax exempt status including the exemption application form and the exemption ruling letter[;]
(4) any correspondence notifying Amerisource Corp. of the change of status of Garrard County Memorial Hospital to a nonprofit corporation and any reply from Amerisource Corp.[;]
(5) the bank statement from April 2003 to May 2004: any accounts which were normally drawn upon to pay creditors.
Mr. Wilson transmitted his request by certified mail to:
Garrard Co. Memorial Hospital Inc.
Custodian of Records
308 West Maple Avenue
Lancaster, KY 40444
On June 16, 2004, an employee of the current occupant of the building formerly occupied by GCMH and located at 308 West Maple Avenue, Christian Care Centers of Lancaster, Inc., signed for the certified letter. Having received no response to his request from GCMH, Mr. Wilson initiated this appeal on June 24, 2004, characterizing GCMH's inaction as a de facto denial of his request.
In correspondence directed to this office following commencement of Mr. Wilson's appeal, William A. Bausch, counsel for GCMH, challenged the appeal asserting that the complainant failed to provide proper notice of his request and that his repeated requests have become unreasonably burdensome on the agency and are intended to disrupt its essential functions. Mr. Bausch explained:
Mr. Wilson indicates in his June 24, 2004 Notice of Appeal that he forwarded correspondence to Garrard County Memorial Hospital, Inc., dated June 21, 2004 (apparently in error as he now alleges June 14, 2004) requesting certain documents. Mr. Wilson was notified, through documents filed with this office, that Garrard County Memorial Hospital, Inc. (GCMH) ceased operations on August 29, 2004 and that the hospital has no employees, including any individuals located at 308 West Maple Avenue, Lancaster, Kentucky. This information is of record with the Office of the Attorney General, in response to a prior Appeal from an Open Records Request by Mr. Wilson, located in log # 200400120.
In the current circumstance, much like Mr. Wilson's prior attempts to bait the Office of the Attorney General into his personal fight, Mr. Wilson sent correspondence to Christian Care Centers Of Lancaster, Inc., which is the entity now operating at 308 West Maple Avenue, Lancaster, Kentucky. Mr. Wilson has knowingly sent his request to a recipient that is not in operation and that has no employees. Mr. Wilson managed to obtain the signature of an unwitting or unknowing employee of Christian Care Centers of Lancaster, Inc., on the return receipt. Mr. Wilson then appealed to the Office of the Attorney General as a " de facto denial" of his Open Records Request.
It was GCMH's position that "Mr. Wilson is abusing both the process of the Open Records Laws and the services of the Office of the Attorney General, in the enforcement of those laws." In support, Mr. Bausch attached the affidavits of the employee of Christian Care Centers, who inadvertently signed for the certified letter, and the United States Postmaster for Lancaster, Kentucky, who verified that a request for forwarding all mail to GCMH to Post Office Box 610 was submitted on March 12, 2004. Noting that "despite the fact that improper notification continues to be given by Mr. Wilson," GCMH has made every effort to furnish him with the records and information he seeks, Mr. Bausch advised that "[t]he proper address for notification of Open Records Request is:"
Garrard County Memorial Hospital, Inc.
P. O. Box 610
Lancaster, KY 40444
Attn: Records Custodian
On these bases, GCMH asked that Mr. Wilson's appeal be dismissed.
Additionally, GCMH invoked KRS 61.872(6), asserting that Mr. Wilson's repeated requests are unreasonably burdensome and intended to disrupt essential functions of the public agency. Mr. Bausch explained that GCMH "has no resources with which to comply with Mr. Wilson's continuing efforts to undermine the closure of the facility," and that the Board members who are effectuating the closure are not compensated or reimbursed for their expenses. Continuing, he observed:
Mr. Wilson has attempted, at every opportunity, to disrupt the essential function of GCMH. GCMH's sole essential function at this time is to comply with federal and state regulatory agencies for the filing of final reports and do such other actions incident to the closure of a 50 year old healthcare facility. This is its only function.
Mr. Wilson has been repeatedly informed that GCMH closed its doors on August 29, 2003. He has also been repeatedly informed that GCMH has no employees and does not operate any facility, including one located at 308 West Maple Avenue. Despite this, as late as June 2004, Mr. Wilson, in another of his many letters to the editor, writes:
Mr. Wilson is not only attempting to individually burden the essential remaining function of GCMH, but is encouraging other individuals to harass or in some manner interfere with the closure of GCMH. . . .
GCMH, prior to its closure, operated an acute care facility, including radiology and laboratory departments. As the business of GCMH was to provide healthcare and related services, all of its books, records and reports, including those requested by Mr. Wilson, contain protected health information, pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), as well as information protected under state law. Additionally, GCMH must protect, under both federal and state law, employee records and personal information relating to former employees (collectively hereinafter referred to as "Protected Information"). Every Open Record Request made by Mr. Wilson asks for information or reports that contain Protected Information. Therefore, in order to respond to Mr. Wilson, each request must first be analyzed to determine what records include Protected Information and ensure the detailed process of redaction of documents under federal and state law is undertaken. The consumption of time for this endeavor is only exacerbated by the prompt response time limitations prescribed by the Open Records Statute and by definition, detracts from any effort to prepare and respond to the federal and state filing demands described previously.
Mr. Bausch noted that the cost of responding to Mr. Wilson's requests "has already depleted money and resources of the Hospital, money and resources that have been specifically authorized for regulatory compliance, arguing that "[o]n the basis of economic considerations alone, . . . [those requests] have created a tremendous burden upon GCMH."
Further, he noted, the requests have taken a "physical toll upon the voluntary Board members who are trying to perform a public service," and in particular on the Chairman and Records Custodian who "was hospitalized and has only recently been able to resume his activities." In sum, Mr. Bausch asserted, "[t]he Open Records Act cannot be interpreted to require the expenditure of limited resources that are needed to comply with statutory and regulatory federal and state requirements, and certainly cannot require that individuals, who volunteer to perform a public service, be put in a position of suffering health consequences trying to work through Mr. Wilson's burdensome and harassing abuse of the Open Records Act. " Referencing a series of letters to the editor authored by Mr. Wilson in which he calumnies GCMH, using information obtained through open records requests and statements appearing in open records decisions issued by the Attorney General, Mr. Bausch urges this office to affirm his client's reliance on KRS 61.872(6) and dismiss Mr. Wilson's most recent appeal. While we are fully cognizant of the unique dilemma GCMH faces in discharging its statutory duties under the Act, we cannot agree, at this injuncture, that Mr. Wilson's present appeal should be dismissed on the grounds of improper notification, undue burden, or an intent to disrupt.
To begin, we cannot impute knowledge of the correct mailing address for GCMH, and its custodian of records, to Mr. Wilson based on earlier exchanges with this office. Our review of the materials submitted to the Attorney General in conjunction with the appeals that gave rise to 04-ORD-080 and 04-ORD-084 confirms that Mr. Wilson was advised that GCMH no longer operates at the 308 West Maple Avenue address, but does not confirm that he was advised to what address his request should be submitted. Indeed, he was not placed on actual notice of the correct mailing address until Mr. Bausch responded on behalf of the public agency following commencement of this appeal. Why his requests were not forwarded by the postal authorities, per the request for forwarding filed by GCMH on March 12, 2004, is unclear, but this error or omission cannot be imputed to Mr. Wilson.
In 00-ORD-73, this office held that the Kenton County Fiscal Court did not violate the Open Records Act in refusing to honor a request directed to the Kenton County Judge/Executive some time after the requester was formally notified that the agency's records custodian was a named Assistant County Attorney and provided with the correct mailing address for open records requests. At page 5, we reasoned:
Under ordinary circumstances, if an open records request is inadvertently submitted to other than the official custodian, whether through ignorance or misdirection, agency employees are expected to promptly reroute the request to the official custodian so that a timely consideration of the request is insured. 98-OMD-64. However, in the instant case, [the requester] was notified of the name and address of the official custodian and the Kenton County Fiscal Court's policy that all open records requests should be sent to [the custodian] . [The requester] can claim neither ignorance nor misdirection. Despite the fact that he was given personal notification of the identity of the agency's official custodian, [he] submitted his request to the Kenton County Judge/Executive. This failure to follow the policies and procedures established by the agency suggests a lack of good faith cooperation on [the requester's] part.
In sum, we held that the requester "should not frustrate the process put in place by the agency to accommodate his open records requests." 00-ORD-73, p. 6, citing 00-ORD-8.
Shortly thereafter, we were embroiled in a similar controversy involving the same parties and the requester's continued refusal to submit his request to the designated records custodian. 00-ORD-94. Notwithstanding personal notification to the requester of the custodian's name and address, and the posting of a KRS 61.876 1 compliant rules and regulations governing access to public records, the requester again submitted his request to the County Judge/Executive, prompting this office to observe:
Regardless of whether [the requester's] refusal to properly address his requests affects the validity of those requests, we suggest that he consider how his actions have frustrated his access to the records he seeks. By refusing to address his request to the formally appointed and previously identified custodian of records, . . . [the requester] has impeded his own right of access. In the appeal before us, [the County Judge] discharged his KRS 61.872(4) duties by again furnishing [the requester] with the name and location of the official custodian of the Kenton County Fiscal Court's public records. Had [the requester] addressed his request to [the custodian of records], he might now be in possession of the records identified in that request, rather than litigating an arcane procedural issue.
00-ORD-94, p. 4; see also 04-ORD-106 (despite having been provided with name and address of Louisville Metro Corrections Department's records custodian, requester submitted his request to another individual thereby evincing a "disregard for policies and procedures established by the agency . . . [and] a lack of good faith").
In contrast to the cited decisions, the record in the appeal before us does not reflect that Mr. Wilson received personal notification of the proper mailing address for GCMH until sometime after the appeal was commenced, or that GCMH has complied with KRS 61.876 relative to the adoption and posting of rules and regulations governing access to public records. 2 This being the case, we cannot assign error to him for failing "to properly serve the custodian of the records of the correct entity from which he is seeking information." Nor can we dismiss his appeal on this basis. Nevertheless, the record before us contains the correct mailing address for GCMH, and knowledge of that address can now be imputed to Mr. Wilson. Should he mail any future open records requests, or related correspondence, to the 308 West Maple Avenue address, GCMH will have no obligation to honor those requests or respond to that correspondence.
We next address GCMH's reliance on KRS 61.872(6) and its argument that Mr. Wilson's requests impose an unreasonable burden on that agency and are intended to disrupt its essential function. KRS 61.872(6) provides in full:
If the application places an unreasonable burden in producing public records or if the custodian has reason to believe that repeated requests are intended to disrupt other essential functions of the public agency, the official custodian may refuse to permit inspection of the public records or mail copies thereof. However, refusal under this section shall be sustained by clear and convincing evidence.
KRS 61.872(6) is intended to afford relief to public agencies where there is a pattern of harassing records requests aimed at disrupting essential agency functions, or, alternatively, where a single records request [or a series of requests] is such that production of those records would place an unreasonable burden on the agency. To prevent agencies from exploiting this provision as a means of circumventing the requirements of the Open Records Act, the legislature has provided that refusal under this section be sustained by clear and convincing evidence, prompting this office to observe:
Repeated requests to inspect records of a public agency alone do not, in our opinion, amount to harassment. Every request to inspect a public record causes some inconvenience to the staff of the public agency. No doubt some state, county and local agencies have found it necessary to employ additional staff since the enactment of the Open Records Law in order to comply with the provisions of the law. We believe that a public agency should only invoke the excuse of harassment in extreme and abusive circumstances. We believe it is the legislative intent that public employees exercise patience and long-suffering in making public records available for public inspection.
OAG 77-151, p. 3. We have also recognized, however, that:
State agencies and employees are the servants of the people as stated in the Preamble to the Open Records Act, but they are the servants of all the people and not only of persons who may make extreme and unreasonable demands on their time.
OAG 76-375, p. 4. In determining whether an open records request is unreasonably burdensome, and thus warrants invocation of KRS 61.872(6), we must weigh two competing interests: that of the public in securing access to agency records, and that of an agency in effectively executing its public function.
96-ORD-155, p. 3, 4.
The purpose and intent of the Open Records Act is to permit "the free and open examination of public records. " KRS 61.871. However, this right of access is not absolute. As a precondition to inspection, a requesting party must identify with "reasonable particularity" those documents which he wishes to review. OAG 89-81. Where the records sought are of an identified, limited class, the requester satisfies this condition. If an agency then invokes KRS 61.872(6) to authorize nondisclosure of the requested records, it bears the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the request places an unreasonable burden on it. This burden is not sustained by the bare allegation that the request is unreasonably burdensome. Thus, in OAG 89-79, we held that the Department of Transportation violated the Open Records Act by failing to document, by clear and convincing evidence, how the subject request placed an unreasonable burden on it. There we held that mere invocation of the cited exception does not sustain the agency's burden.
Only if the agency has adduced evidence which would warrant this office in finding that the burden is indeed an unreasonable one, will the Attorney General uphold its action. In OAG 89-88, we ruled that the Department of Insurance had sustained this burden. The Department indicated that the requested records consisted of some 800 documents, and explained the difficulty of separating confidential from nonconfidential material. Similarly, in OAG 91-58 we held that the Louisville/Jefferson County Office of Economic Development properly denied a request for "all notes, letters, memos, and studies which might contain information about the exchange of information between the OED" and various offices and agencies, and that it sustained its burden of proof under KRS 61.872(6). The agency explained that the requested documents might be located in six different offices throughout the city and county, and again described the difficulty in separating exempt from nonexempt materials.
Finally, in 96-ORD-42, the Attorney General affirmed the Workforce Development Cabinet's denial of a request for P-1's reflecting promotions in the Department for Employment Services between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995, on the basis of KRS 61.872(6). In an attempt to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, the unreasonably burdensome nature of the request, the Cabinet explained:
The Workforce Development Cabinet does not have a list of DES employee's [sic] who received promotions during this period. The only manner in which the Cabinet could determine which DES employees received promotions during the time in question is to physically examine the 1,167 personnel files transferred to the Cabinet from the Cabinet for Human Resources ('CHR') at the time of the reorganization. The Division of Personnel Services ('the Division') estimates that it would take an average of fifteen (15) minutes to examine each personnel file. It would take staff of the Division, with an average salary of $ 16.49 per hour, 291.765 hours to determine which employees received promotions. It is estimated that it would cost $ 4,810.96 just to make this initial step to comply with your request.
After the individuals who received promotions during the time covered by your request are identified, the Division would have to remove the P-1's from their files; copy the P-1's, redact the copies to protect personal information such as the employee's home address, home telephone number, social security number, etc.; replace the original P-1 back into the personnel file; and copy the redacted P-1's for your inspection. The Division estimates that it would take an average of fifteen (15) additional minutes to complete these procedures for each employee who received a promotion.
It is this degree of specificity which KRS 61.872(6) envisions. See also, 97-ORD-88 (affirming Cabinet for Health Services denial of open records request on the basis of KRS 61.872(6)); compare, 99-ORD-4 (holding that proof of four requests in a four and one-half week period did not establish an unreasonable burden or an intent to disrupt essential agency functions); 00-ORD-72 (holding that proof of thirty requests in a twenty month period was not indicative of an undue burden though proof of six duplicative requests in that period constituted compelling evidence of an intent to disrupt agency's essential functions); 02-ORD-230 (holding that requester's broadly worded request, coupled with his past pattern of conduct and his conviction for harassing communications related to activities aimed at "causing annoyance and harm to [agency employees]," supported agency's position that request was intended to disrupt its essential functions); see also 04-ORD-028; 04-ORD-050; 04-ORD-066).
In seeking dismissal of Mr. Wilson's request on the basis of undue burden and an intent to disrupt GCMH's essential functions, GCMH focuses on its unique status as a public agency which exists solely for the purpose of insuring compliance with statutory and regulatory federal and state requirements as it oversees the closure of the fifty year old healthcare facility. Specifically, GCMH describes the costs to the agency in both money and manpower associated with fulfilling his requests, the problems associated with producing records which might contain protected health and employee information, and Mr. Wilson's written assault on the agency using records and information already disclosed. While this description suggests an undue burden and an intent to disrupt essential functions of a kind, we cannot agree that it confirms "Mr. Wilson's burdensome and harassing abuse of the Open Records Act" within the meaning of KRS 61.872(6).
As noted above, we are mindful of GCMH's unique status as a public agency, but a public agency it is. As such, it is statutorily obligated to comply with the Open Records Act in all particulars, including the allocation of resources for honoring legitimate records requests and fully appreciating that "free and open examination of public records is in the public interest . . . even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others." KRS 61.871. "The duty to respond to an open records request and afford the requester timely access to the records identified in his request," we have observed on numerous occasions, "is as much a public servant's legal duty as any other essential function." See, e.g., 00-ORD-117, p. 5.
Our review of Mr. Wilson's earlier requests establishes certain salient points:
1. The requests which culminated in this office's decisions in 04-ORD-080 and 04-ORD-084 could properly have been denied as requests for information, or, alternatively, as requests for nonexistent records.
2. GCMH is, pursuant to KRS 61.874(3), entitled to "prescribe a reasonable fee for making copies of nonexempt public records requested for use for noncommercial purposes which shall not exceed the actual cost of reproduction, including the costs of the media and only mechanical processing cost incurred by the public agency, but not including the cost of staff required." The financial impact on GCMH could therefore be greatly reduced if the agency elected to impose a reasonable copying charge on Mr. Wilson. Like any other public agency, GCMH is not required to absorb the costs of reproducing public records other than the personnel costs associated with the reproduction process.
3. It appears that only the first of the three open records requests Mr. Wilson presented to this office on appeal implicate records containing protected health information and therefore trigger mandatory redaction. Mr. Wilson's second request relates to attorney billing 4 and his third, at issue in this appeal, relates to GCMH's financial and operational records. With regard to the third request, we can envision no circumstances that would warrant redaction of the requested records. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has noted, in an unpublished decision, that an agency "has no right to deny access to nonexcepted documents simply because it mixes those documents with excepted documents." Revenue Cabinet v. F. Keith Brown, No. 96-CA-0843-MR (Ky. App. 1997). 5
4. The Open Records Act does not prescribe the uses to which nonexempt public records requested for a noncommercial purpose can be put. 6 Although there are no open records decisions directly on point, in OAG 93-19 the Attorney General was asked whether the recipient of information contained in public records could be restrained by the public agency from disclosing that information to others. Citing OAG 79-275, we noted that because the exceptions codified at KRS 61.878(1)(a) through (l) "are convenience shields which public officials may use when they desire to do so, not restraints to keep them from opening up any records in their custody," OAG 93-19, p. 3 citing OAG 79-275, pp. 3-4. Taking this principle one step further, se concluded that even if the information contained in the public records was exempt from disclosure under KRS 61.878, the recipient of the records could release it to others without violating the Act. Thus, neither the public agency, nor someone asserting a privacy interest, could "prevent release of the information once it is in [the recipient's] hands." OAG 93-19, p. 3, see also 95-ORD-77 holding that the Board of Education could not restrict dissemination of public records disclosed to open records requester) . Although it disserves the public interest to misquote, or take out of context, portions of records released under the Open Records Act, or portions of open records decisions issued by this office, Mr. Wilson cannot be prohibited from editorializing in the local newspaper. While we agree that the tenor of his letters to the editor is evidence of the animosity he bears toward GCMH, we cannot agree that it is clear and convincing evidence of an intent to disrupt GCMH's essential functions.
Bearing in mind these salient points, we turn to the request that gave rise to this appeal.
In his June 21 request, Mr. Wilson asked that GCMH provide him with minutes of board meetings, resignation letters submitted by board members, tax exempt status filings, correspondence to and from Amerisource Corporation relating to GCMH's change of status to a nonprofit corporation, and bank statements for a period of thirteen months. 7 Mr. Wilson thus satisfied the requirement that he describe with "reasonable particularity" the records he wished to access by identifying a limited class of records. Such records can generally be characterized as GCMH's financial and operational records. The Attorney General has consistently recognized that such records must be made available for public inspection. See, e.g., OAG 76-648, p. 2 (holding that "wherever public funds go, public interest follows"); OAG 82-169, p. 3 (holding that "the contracts, vouchers, and other business records of a public agency are open to public inspection under the Kentucky Open Records Law"); OAG 90-30, p. 3 (holding that "amounts paid from public coffers are perhaps uniquely of public concern"); OAG 91-7, p. 3 (holding that "records of bills paid, payroll check stubs or cancelled checks, and all other records which show funds received and disbursed are public records" ). Among the numerous records requested by Mr. Wilson, we are unable to identify any which would not be subject to disclosure if contained in one or more existing records. 8
Given the fact that GCMH was not necessarily obliged to honor the first two requests submitted by Mr. Wilson, that the costs it bears are the costs borne by any public agency in honoring legitimate open records requests and that it may recover a substantial portion of these costs pursuant to KRS 61.874(3), that the uses to which public records are put have no bearing on the validity of the requests that produce them, and that, ultimately, the records Mr. Wilson seeks in his most recent request are of a discrete, limited class and have traditionally been treated as nonexempt public records, we find that the record on appeal contains insufficient empirical evidence to support a claim under KRS 61.872(6). The record demonstrates that Mr. Wilson submitted three requests in a two month period, 9 but does not reflect the personnel hours expended or estimated costs incurred in fulfilling those requests. As noted above, it is this degree of specificity which KRS 61.872(6) envisions. For this reason, we find that GCMH's reliance on KRS 61.872(6) was misplaced.
We do not mean to suggest that GCMH could not at some point build a successful case that Mr. Wilson's requests have become unreasonably burdensome or intentionally disruptive, only that it has not done so in the appeal before us. As we observed in 96-ORD-193:
Although there is no limitation on the number of requests and subsequent appeals that an applicant may submit, there is certainly a point at which the applicant's repeated use of the law becomes an abuse of the law within the contemplation of KRS 61.872(6). It is for the public agency to build the case.
96-ORD-193, p. 5 (emphasis added). Although it advances its KRS 61.872(6) argument in good faith, to date GCMH has failed to build such a case.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.
David Wilson402 Danville StreetLancaster, KY 40444
Joe MillerGess, Mattingly & Atchison, P.S.C.201 W. Short StreetLexington, KY 40507-1269
Jeff MossGarrard County Attorney102 Stanford Street, Suite OneLancaster, KY 40444
William A. BauschGess, Mattingly & Atchison, P.S.C.201 W. Short StreetLexington, KY 40507-1269
Footnotes
Footnotes
1 KRS 61.876(1) and (2) provide:
(1) Each public agency shall adopt rules and regulations in conformity with the provisions of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 to provide full access to public records, to protect public records from damage and disorganization, to prevent excessive disruption of its essential functions, to provide assistance and information upon request and to insure efficient and timely action in response to application for inspection, and such rules and regulations shall include, but shall not be limited to:
(a) The principal office of the public agency and its regular office hours;
(b) The title and address of the official custodian of the public agency's records.
(c) The fees, to the extent authorized by KRS 61.874 or other statute, charged for copies.
(d) The procedures to be followed in requesting public records.
(2) Each public agency shall display a copy of its rules and regulations pertaining to public records in a prominent location accessible to the public.
2 It is understood that GCMH has no facility, permanent or temporary, in which to post its rules and regulations. As an alternative GCMH should post its KRS 61.876 compliant rules and regulations in the building where the board meets, and make them available to the public upon request.
3 Following issuance of 04-ORD-084, GCMH asserted that it received neither Mr. Wilson's request nor this office's notification of his appeal.
4 Such records may, of course, implicate the attorney-client privilege thereby triggering permissive redaction.
5 Although Revenue Cabinet v. F. Keith Brown is an unpublished opinion that, in accordance with CR 76.28(4)(c) cannot be cited or used as authority in any other case in any court of this state, it is indicative of the view the courts might adopt in a later published opinion relative to the duties of public agencies to redact per KRS 61.878(4).
6 The only restrictions on secondary use of public records in the Open Records Act are found at KRS 61.874(5) and relate to unauthorized commercial use of a public record.
7 In a final letter to this office, GCMH agreed to release minutes of board meetings, resignation letters, "if any," and "available bank statements," but continued to deny the remainder of Mr. Wilson's request since the remaining requested records "either [do] not exist, or [have] been packed into storage boxes that cannot be accessed without the expenditure of considerable time and energy."
8 Although letters of resignation are generally characterized as open records, portions of those letters may be withheld if they relate to medical conditions or purely personal factors prompting resignation. 94-ORD-108; 97-ORD 121; 00-ORD-104; 03-ORD-213.
9 In correspondence directed to this office, following commencement of this appeal, Mr. Wilson appealed Garrard County Long Term Care Facility's disposition of a subsequent records request.