Request By:
Sean S. Land, counsel to Board of Education of Daviess County
Opinion
Opinion By: ANDY BESHEAR,ATTORNEY GENERAL;Taylor Payne,Assistant Attorney General
Opinion of the Attorney General
On behalf of the Board of Education of Daviess County, attorney Sean S. Land requests an opinion from this office as to whether a spouse of a school board member may be employed as a substitute teacher by the school district. We advise that the spouse of a school board member may be employed as a substitute teacher in the school district in accordance with the provisions set forth in KRS 160.380(2)(h).
In 1990, as part of the Kentucky Education Reform Act, the legislature enacted an anti-nepotism statute for school board members, KRS 160.180. OAG 92-160. That statute provides, in part: "No person shall be eligible for member-ship on a board of education: . . . (i) Who has a relative as defined in this subsection (1) of this section employed by the school district . . . ." KRS 160.180(2)(i). Under the Act, the legislature also "removed the school board from direct personnel involvement and placed the employment decisions in the hands of the superintendent. " OAG 92-160 (citing KRS 160.270 and KRS 160.380(1)(a)). To that end, the legislature also prohibited a superintendent of a school district from employing a relative of a school board member. See KRS 160.380(2)(f).
During the 2017 General Session, the General Assembly amended KRS 160.380(2), adding subsection (h), which states:
A relative that is ineligible for employment under paragraph . . . (f) . . . of this subsection may be employed as a substitute for a certified or classified employee if the relative is not:
H.B. 269, Ch. 37, Gen. Assembly, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017) (emphasis added). Thus, KRS 160.380 now permits a superintendent to employ a relative of a school board member as a substitute, yet KRS 160.180(2)(i) may be interpreted to disqualify the board member from holding office if a relative, such as a spouse, were employed in such a capacity by the school district. 1 This could not have been the legislature's intent. 2
"Where there is an apparent conflict between statutes or sections thereat it is the duty of the court to try and harmonize the interpretation of the law so as to give effect to both sections or statutes if possible."
Commonwealth v. Halsell, 934 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Ky. 1986). The goal of any statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature.
Commonwealth v. Kash, 967 S.W.2d 37, 43-44 (Ky. App. 1997). Courts are instructed to "reject a construction that is unreasonable and absurd, in preference for one that is reasonable, rational, sensible and intelligent." Id.
Here, we find the legislature's intent in the 2017 amendment to KRS 160.380 to be clear: it sought to loosen the KERA anti-nepotism restrictions on board members. This interpretation is further supported by other recent amendments by the legislature. Also during the 2017 Regular Session, the legislature amended KRS 160.180(1) to remove "aunt, uncle, son in law and daughter in law" from the definition of relative for purposes of anti-nepotism in hiring decisions of school districts. See H.B. 277, Ch. 192, Gen. Assembly, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017). Then, in 2018, the legislature correspondingly amended the definition of relative in KRS 160.380 to no longer include "aunt, uncle, son in law and daughter in law [.]" See S.B. 101, Ch. 105, Gen. Assembly, 2018 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018).
Furthermore, two canons of statutory construction are particularly relevant: the rule that the more recent statute governs, see, e.g.,
Williams v. Commonwealh, 829 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Ky. App. 1992), and the rule that the more specific statute governs. See, e.g.,
Withers v. Univ. of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ky. 1997). As to the recency of each statute, both KRS 160.180 and KRS 160.380 were amended and reenacted by S.B. 101 in the 2018 Regular Session. See KY. CONST. § 51 (any law that is revised, amended, extended or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length). The amended versions of each statute went into effect on April 4, 2018. See S.B. 101, Ch. 105, Gen. Assembly, 2018 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018). However, as to the subsections in conflict, KRS 160.380(2)(h) was originally enacted in 2017, while KRS 160.180(2)(i) was originally enacted in 1990. 3 See H.B. 940, Ch. 476, Gen. Assembly, 1990 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1990). As to the specificity of the statutes, as they speak to relatives of board members employed by the school district, KRS 160.380(2)(h) is the more specific statute. Thus, KRS 160.380(2)(h) controls as the more recent and more specific statute.
In sum, we advise that a spouse of a school board member may be employed as a substitute teacher by the school district pursuant to the restrictions set forth in KRS 160.380(2)(h). To the extent KRS 160.180(2)(i) was previously interpreted to disqualify a school board member whose spouse was hired as a substitute by the school district, we advise that such a reading is subverted to the clear expression of legislative intent found in KRS 160.380(2)(h). Thus, a board member would not be disqualified if his or her spouse is hired as a substitute by the school district.
ANDY BESHEAR
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Taylor Payne
Assistant Attorney General
Footnotes
Footnotes
1 Mr. Land also points to KRS 160.180(2)(g) as a potential conflict. That subsection prohibits a person from serving on a school board if he or she is directly or indirectly interested in services for which school funds are expended.
2 For instance, a superintendent could lawfully force the disqualification of a school board member by hiring a relative as a substitute for one day of the school year.
3 Then as subsection (2)(h).