16-OMD-178
August 25, 2016
In re: R. Keith Cullinan/City of Mockingbird Valley
Summary: The City of Mockingbird Valley violated KRS 61.820(1) by holding public meetings in the Mayor’s home and in her driveway. Where it is impossible to hold meetings “convenient to the public” within the City’s jurisdictional boundaries, the City must schedule its meetings elsewhere, but at public locations that are convenient to the public it serves.
Open Meetings Decision
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the City of Mockingbird Valley violated the Open Meetings Act by holding Commission meetings in the home of the mayor and in the driveway of the mayor’s home.
Mr. R. Keith Cullinan wrote to the “Mayor and Council, City of Mockingbird Valley,” on July 20, 2016, stating that “[i]t appears that meetings of the Mockingbird Valley Council are held at the Mayor’s home, either in her home or outside in her driveway.” Mr. Cullinan submitted that these locations do not meet the requirements of the Open Meetings Act and suggested that the city use a nearby church, club, or other such locations. Responding by letter dated July 21, 2016, on behalf of the City, attorney Tom Halbleib stated that he would ask the City Commission to consider Mr. Cullinan’s request at its next meeting and asked that Mr. Cullinan let him know what specific concerns he had about the space requirements, seating capacity and acoustics of the present site of the meetings.
Mr. Cullinan appealed the city’s response by letter dated July 29, 2016, stating that the city’s response does not meet the statutory requirements of the Open Meetings Act as it did not address his “proposed remedy for the violations, seeks to delay any action, and endeavors to place the burden on me to provide additional concerns.” The City, by counsel, timely responded to Mr. Culinan’s appeal. In that response, the City admitted that it holds its meetings in the home of the mayor, and recently held one meeting in chairs around the front porch of the Mayor’s house.
Mayor’s House as a Convenient Place for Meetings Under KRS 61.820(1).
The statute applicable to this controversy is KRS 61.820(1). That statute requires that “[a]ll meetings of all public agencies of this state, and any committees or subcommittees thereof, shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public. In considering locations for public meetings, the agency shall evaluate space requirements, seating capacity, and acoustics.” The issue of a city holding its official meetings in the home of its mayor has been addressed by this Office in a previous decision. In 13-OMD-186, the City of Spring Mill was found to have violated the Open Meetings Act when its commissioners and mayor conducted meetings in the home of the mayor. That Open Meetings decision cited City of Lexington v. Davis, 310 Ky. 751, 221 S.W.2d 659 (1949), wherein the former Court of Appeals addressed the question under an earlier law which merely required that “[a]ll meetings shall be public.”1. In City of Lexington, the facts concerned a city meeting conducted in the home of the mayor who was ill, but the court also spoke to the issue of whether it would be proper to have the meeting in the mayor’s home, even if the mayor had not been ill:
In the second place, in the absence of invitation, even though the Mayor had been a well man, would there be freedom upon the part of the public to go into his home merely on the announcement that the regular session would adjourn to the Mayor's home? The objective upon the part of the Commissioners was commendable but we conclude that to permit such procedure would create a situation that might furnish opportunity to set up a facade for secrecy and possibly even legislation in executive session. Such a meeting is not a public meeting as contemplated under the statute above. (Emphasis added.)
City of Lexington v. Davis, 310 Ky. 751, 755, 221 S.W.2d 659, 661–662 (1949).
The analysis in 13-OMD-186 found that the current statute applies even more clearly under these circumstances than the statute cited in City of Lexington, as the statute now specifically requires a meeting to be held at a place “convenient to the public.” Even in City of Lexington, the court found that public meetings must be held in “a place from which no part of the citizens … may be excluded by reason of not feeling they may freely attend.” City of Lexington v. Davis, 310 Ky. at 754, 221 S.W.2d at 661 (quoted in O2-OMD-78 and 13-OMD-186). Conducting City meetings in the mayor’s home, or around the front porch of, the mayor’s home, are not places “convenient to the public” as required by KRS 61.820(1), and the City of Mockingbird Valley violated the statute by doing so.
Impossibility as a Reason to Conduct Meetings Outside Jurisdictional Boundaries
The City states that there are no clubs, churches or other facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the City where the meetings could be held and thus private residences must be used. The City cites a prior decision of the Attorney General’s Office, 02-OMD-78, for the proposition that KRS 61.820 requires city commissions, and other local government agencies, to conduct their meetings within the jurisdictional limits of the governmental units they serve. In 02-OMD-78, the Covington City Commission conducted a retreat in Lexington, Kentucky, rather than within Covington’s incorporated limits. The Attorney General’s Office found that Lexington was a meeting site not within the City of Covington’s jurisdictional limits “thus inhibiting the ability of the citizenry directly concerned to attend.”
However, in Mr. Halbleib’s response to this Office, he refers to the Kentucky League of Cities’ City Officials Legal Handbook (2015 Edition), wherein 02-OMD-78 is discussed as having been overruled by the Kenton Circuit Court:
[T]his opinion was overruled by the Kenton Circuit Court. Now, determining whether public agencies can conduct meetings outside of their jurisdictional limits depends on the necessity of the situation. If it is impossible to hold the meeting inside the jurisdictional limits, the public agency may be able to schedule a public meeting elsewhere.
While it is possible to hold the Commission meetings inside the City of Mockingbird Valley’s jurisdictional limits, it appears that it may be impossible to hold those meetings inside the City’s limits at a place that is “convenient to the public.” Mr. Halbleib’s letter states that “there are no clubs, churches or other facilities – with the exception of private residences – within the jurisdictional boundaries of the City…” Because there are only private residences within the City of Mockingbird Valley, and such private residences may not be convenient to the public for the reasons set forth in City of Lexington v. Davis, it may be impossible to conduct the City’s meetings within its jurisdictional boundaries. The language of the City Officials Legal Handbook (2015 edition), appears appropriate where it states that “[i]f it is impossible to hold the meeting inside the jurisdictional limits, the public agency may be able to schedule a public meeting elsewhere.” (Emphasis added.) To the extent that it is impossible to conduct the City’s public meetings inside its jurisdictional boundaries at a place convenient to the public, the City must schedule its meetings elsewhere. In doing so, the City must adhere to the requirement of KRS 61.820(1) that the meetings “shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public.” Such locations shall be convenient to the public served by the City of Mockingbird Valley. Locations that would meet the convenience requirement could be the meeting room of a public library branch near the City, the closest available neighboring city’s courthouse, or a neighboring public school library or auditorium.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings.
Andy Beshear
Attorney General
Gordon R. Slone
Assistant Attorney General
#315
Distributed to:
R. Keith Cullinan
Elizabeth Davis
Tom Halbleib
[1] KRS 89.550.