Opinion
Opinion By: Jack Conway,Attorney General;Michelle D. Harrison,Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Decision
Noel Mark Botts initiated this appeal 1 dated September 21, 2015, challenging the City of Burgin's (City) disposition of his August 18, 2015, request for a "copy of the letter/form a potential tenant of August Properties, LLC was asked to sign on or about August 6, 2015 regarding water service to be provided to 207 Russell Street." Mr. Botts also challenged the alleged inaction of the City in response to his August 28, 2015, request for "[a] list of all the times August Properties has been denied water service for alleged past due water bills from January 1, 2015 through the date of this request" in addition to "[a] list of all the times payment has been demanded for any alleged past due water bills from January 1, 2015 through the date of this request." Attached to Mr. Botts' appeal was a copy of the City's written response directed to Mr. Gray on August 19, 2015, in which Assistant City Clerk/Water Department Clerk Mary Jo Lawson advised Mr. Gray that she was enclosing a "copy of the report that Jessica Webb refused to sign." Ms. Lawson further explained that, "I just asked her if what I had written down, per our phone conversation was correct. She then declined to sign it. Her not signing the letter did not interfere with her getting water in her name." Also enclosed with Mr. Botts' appeal was a copy of the written statement/ letter by Ms. Lawson dated August 6, 2015, summarizing the conversation that she had with Ms. Webb; this document appears responsive to Mr. Botts' August 18, 2015, request.
Upon receiving notification of Mr. Botts' appeal from this office, Burgin City Clerk Michelle Russell responded on behalf of the City and this office has confirmed that she copied Mr. Botts on her written response including attachments. Ms. Russell advised that four pages were omitted from the documentation that Mr. Botts attached to his appeal, copies of which Ms. Russell attached to her September 25, 2015, appeal response. Included among said correspondence was a typed statement by Ms. Lawson dated July 22, 2015, summarizing an incident during which a man came into the agency to inquire about having water service turned on at 207 Russell Street, purportedly on behalf of someone named Heather Cross, but ultimately acknowledged that Mr. Gray was actually the individual requesting to have water service turned on for that address. Ms. Lawson further advised that she received a telephone call that same day from someone who identified himself as Mark Gray and they had a discussion regarding the policy relating to water service for an owner as opposed to a renter, etc. The statement contained Ms. Lawson's handwritten signature near the bottom and was dated September 25, 2015, below that. However, this record is not responsive to either of the subject requests and therefore is not directly relevant.
Ms. Russell also enclosed a copy of a letter that Ms. Lawson directed to Mr. Botts on September 1, 2015, which appears to respond to his August 28, 2015, request, although not expressly. With regard to his first "question" or Item 1 of the request, Ms. Lawson advised that her office had "not denied any of Mark Gray/August Properties['] renters water service at any time." In other words, no responsive list would have been created or exist. With regard to Mr. Botts' second "question" or Item 2 of the request, Ms. Lawson explained that her office had sent him "the water bills due after the last appeal. And we sent you a letter on 04/01/2015. We have not sent you anything else about past due bills." Ms. Lawson also provided this office with a copy of a separate letter directed to Mr. Botts on September 1, 2015, advising that she has "not denied anyone renting from Mark Gray access to water." The letter also summarizes the conversation that Ms. Lawson had with a female prospective renter (presumably Jessica Webb) of Mr. Gray's pertaining to water service at 207 Russell Street. Ms. Lawson reiterated to Mr. Botts that service has not been denied to any of Mark Gray/August Properties because of past due bills and confirmed that a copy of her written statement regarding the conversation that she had with Ms. Webb had already been provided to him.
By separate letter directed to Mr. Gray on September 1, 2015, Ms. Lawson advised that, "Per your request for open records, [w]e sent you the water bills due after the last appeal. We also sent you a letter sent 04/01/2015, which is enclosed in this letter. We have not sent you anything else about the past due bills." In other words, the City has provided Mr. Botts with the only existing documents responsive to his request for lists "of all the times August Properties has been denied water service for alleged past due water bills" and "of all the times payment has been demanded for any alleged past due water bills...." 2 Finally, a copy of the referenced April 1, 2015, itemized list of water bills directed to "August Properties c/o Mark Gray" referenced in the September 1, 2015, letter to Mr. Gray was included among the correspondence attached to Ms. Russell's appeal response.
By letter dated October 6, 2015, Mr. Botts alleged that the City "still has not provided a copy of the letter presented to a tenant requested in the Open Records Request. The letter is referenced in the September 1, 2015, correspondence to Noel Mark Botts." 3 Mr. Botts further alleged that the City "has not provided a statutorily recognized explanation for its failure to provide a copy of the letter nor its failure to respond to the August 28, 2015, Open Records Request." However, the record on appeal refutes Mr. Botts' position as he received all related correspondence, including the letter directed to Mr. Gray on September 1, 2015, in response to his appeal even assuming that he did not previously receive it; he implicitly disputed that all existing responsive documents have been provided or challenged the content of those documents. Neither issue can be resolved in the context of an Open Records Appeal. This office has consistently recognized that "it is not, in general, within our statutory charge to resolve questions of fact or to otherwise act as a trier of fact." 09-ORD-120, p. 4; 12-ORD-110.
As indicated above, this office declines to make a finding as to any purported violation of KRS 61.880(1) given the confusing nature of the procedural history. If the City failed to either provide Mr. Botts with timely access to any existing documents responsive to his August 18 and August 28 requests or cite a statutory basis for withholding such records, in whole or in part, in a timely written response on each occasion, as required under KRS 61.880(1), it violated the Act. See 12-ORD-211, pp. 4-8, for a summary of the well-established law regarding application of KRS 61.880(1). However, inasmuch as the record on appeal indicates that the City provided Mr. Botts (or Mr. Gray) with copies of all existing documents responsive to his requests, either initially or in response to his appeal, nothing else is required under existing legal authority in the absence of any irrefutable proof that additional documents were created or exist. 12-ORD-231, pp. 2-3; 12-ORD-183. "Simply stated, it is beyond the scope of our statutory authority to determine whether records disclosed under the Act are accurate and complete." 10-ORD-178, p. 3.
Notwithstanding any dispute regarding the alleged violation of KRS 61.880(1) by the City, the record on appeal contains no basis upon which to find that a substantive violation was committed. A public agency cannot produce that which it does not have nor is a public agency required to "prove a negative" in order to refute an unsubstantiated claim that additional records exist. See Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 172 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Ky. 2005); see also 07-ORD-188; 12-ORD-087; compare Eplion v. Burchett, 354 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Ky. App. 2011) (declaring that "when it is determined that an agency's records do not exist, the person requesting the records is entitled to a written explanation for their nonexistence"); 12-ORD-195. Under the circumstances presented, our duty is not "to conduct an investigation in order to locate records whose existence or custody is in dispute," 01-ORD-36, p. 2, nor is the Attorney General "empowered to substitute its judgment for that of a public agency in deciding which records are necessary to ensure full accountability." 08-ORD-206, p. 1; 12-ORD-231. Moreover, when some of the documents requested are disclosed, this office has generally declined to "adjudicate a dispute regarding a disparity, if any, between records for which inspection has already been permitted, and those sought but not provided." OAG 89-81, p. 4; 12-ORD-087.
The City issued a timely written response (albeit to Mr. Gray as discussed above) to Mr. Botts' August 18, 2015, request for the "letter/form" that a potential tenant of August Properties, LLC was asked to sign on or around August 6, 2015; the City enclosed a copy of that document, which it characterized as a "report." On appeal the City also provided another September 1, 2015, letter in which it explained the situation regarding the potential tenant of 207 Russell Street, confirming that Mr. Botts had already received a copy. Notwithstanding any dispute regarding whether Mr. Botts received the copy attached to his September 21, 2015, appeal directly in response to his request or first received it when the City responded to his appeal, the fact remains that he now possesses a copy of the only existing document responsive to his August 18, 2015, request. Accordingly, the issues regarding this request are moot per 40 KAR 1:030, Section 6. To the extent Mr. Botts is questioning the volume, content or value of this or any of the other documents produced in response to either August request, such an issue is not justiciable in this forum; rather, "questions relating to the verifiability, authenticity, or validity of records disclosed under the Open Records Act are not generally capable of resolution under the Act." 05-ORD-236, p. 3 (reporter questioned the validity of invoices produced in response to request and the Attorney General advised that the relief sought was unavailable under the Act); see 02-ORD-89; 09-ORD-101; 12-ORD-042.
With regard to any documents responsive to Mr. Botts' August 28, 2015, request, on appeal the City provided this office with a copy of its letter directed to Mr. Botts on September 1, 2015. It remains unclear why Mr. Botts did not include this letter and the other correspondence summarized above in filing his appeal per KRS 61.880(2)(a). Notwithstanding the City's nomenclature, i.e. , "question," the letter was directed to Mr. Botts within three business days and it addressed the items requested, i.e. , the lists of times August Properties, LLC was denied water service between January 1, 2015, and the date of the request, and times when payment was "demanded for any alleged past due water bills" from the same period, respectively. Although not clearly stated in Open Records nomenclature, the City advised Mr. Gray in a timely written response dated September 1, 2015, that it had previously released the "water bills due after the last appeal," enclosing a letter dated April 1, 2015, but had not issued any further bills in the interim period (meaning that no additional records would have been created). If not before, Mr. Botts received a copy of this correspondence, and the other documents, in response to his appeal. The City has provided Mr. Botts with a copy of the only existing responsive document (list of "water bills for collection" dated April 1, 2015) and cannot produce a nonexistent record for inspection or copying. As in past decisions, "the Attorney General finds that issues concerning the value of information contained in public records produced for inspection are not justiciable in this forum, and therefore declines to assign error on that basis." 12-ORD-087, p. 5.
Either party may appeal this decision by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court under KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 . Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.
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