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Opinion

Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; Amye L. Bensenhaver, Assistant Attorney General

Open Meetings Decision

The question presented in this appeal is whether the Nortonville City Council violated the Open Meetings Act in failing to respond to Elbert Powell's November 21, 2003 complaint and in failing to comply with KRS 61.823(4)(b), relating to the posting of special meeting notices. For the reasons that follow, we find that the record on appeal supports neither of the claimed violations.

On November 22, 2003, 1 Mr. Powell mailed a complaint to Mayor James Noel in which he questioned the adequacy of the Council's efforts to comply with KRS 61.823(4)(b), requiring the posting of written notice of special meetings at least twenty-four hours before those meetings "in a conspicuous place in the building where the special meeting will take place and in a conspicuous place in the building which houses the headquarters of the agency." Mr. Powell complained that the Council "did not place the notice on the door that houses [sic] the City Council chambers," and that upon inquiry he learned that the notice was "in the Mayor's office on the bulletin board. " As a means of remedying the alleged violation, Mr. Powell proposed that the Council "post the notices out on the front door that houses [sic] the city offices including where the City Council meets . . . [so that] when the doors are locked at 4 pm in the evening, people can still see the notice. " Having received no response to his complaint, Mr. Powell initiated this appeal on December 2, 2003, challenging the Council's practice relative to the posting of notices of special meetings and its failure to respond to his complaint.

By letter dated December 12, 2003, Assistant City Attorney William M. Cox denied the allegations of Mr. Powell's complaint. He maintained that the Council complied with KRS 61.823(4)(b) by posting the written notice of the special meeting "on the bulletin board in the main offices of the city building, the building of both the location of the special called meeting and the headquarters of the City of Nortonville." Continuing, Mr. Cox observed:

It has long been the practice of the City of Nortonville to post all public notices on this bulletin board. While Mr. Powell is correct that one of the Mayor's desks is located in the same room as the bulletin board at issue, Mr. Powell fails to point out that this room also serves as the "office" and primary work area for the City Clerk and certain other City employees, as well as the primary location for members of the general public to transact business with the City of Nortonville. As such, the vast majority of members of the general public conducting business in City Hall have easy access to the information displayed on said bulletin board.

He rejected Mr. Powell's assertion that "the only 'conspicuous place' to post the written notice was on one or more of the outside doors of City Hall," noting that no authority was cited for this proposition and concluding that the Council "complied with the posting requirement of KRS 61.823(4)(b)." Mr. Cox did not respond to Mr. Powell's complaint that the Council failed to comply with KRS 61.846(1).

With regard to the latter allegation, we find insufficient proof in the record on appeal to support the claimed violation. KRS 61.846(1) provides, in relevant part:

The person shall submit a written complaint to the presiding officer of the public agency suspected of the violation of KRS 61.805 to 61.850. The complaint shall state the circumstances which constitute an alleged violation of KRS 61.805 to 61.850 and shall state what the public agency should do to remedy the alleged violation. The public agency shall determine within three (3) days, excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the receipt of the complaint whether to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint and shall notify in writing the person making the complaint, within the three (3) day period, of its decision. . . . An agency's response denying, in whole or in part, the complaint's requirements for remedying the alleged violation shall include a statement of the specific statute or statutes supporting the public agency's denial and a brief explanation of how the statute or statutes apply. The response shall be issued by the presiding officer, or under his authority, and shall constitute final agency action.

(Emphasis added.) Mr. Powell's complaint was placed in the mail on November 22, a Saturday. It presumably reached Mayor Noel on Monday or Tuesday of the following week. The City's offices were no doubt closed on Thursday and Friday, November 27 and 28, for the Thanksgiving holiday. Mr. Powell initiated this appeal on the following Tuesday, December 2, 2003, no more than three business days after his complaint reached the Mayor. Although Mr. Cox does not expressly state that the Mayor was in the process of preparing a written response to Mr. Powell's complaint, it is apparent that such a response could not have reached Mr. Powell by mail on December 2. His appeal was therefore premature, and we find no merit to his claim that the Council violated KRS 61.846(1).

Turning to the substance of Mr. Powell's original complaint, we find that although the question of the Council's compliance with KRS 61.823(4)(b) is a close one, existing legal authority, coupled with the record on appeal, does not support the claimed violation. Fundamental to our analysis of the propriety of the City Council's conduct under the Open Meetings Act is the legislative statement of policy codified at KRS 61.800:

The General Assembly finds and declares that the basic policy of KRS 61.805 to 61.850 is that the formation of public policy is public business and shall not be conducted in secret and the exceptions provided for by KRS 61.810 or otherwise provided for by law shall be strictly construed.

In interpreting this provision, Kentucky's courts have recognized that "the failure to comply with the strict letter of the law in conducting meetings of a public agency violates the public good,"

E. W. Scripps Co. v. City of Maysville, Ky. App., 750 S.W.2d 450 (1990) cited in

Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 921, 923 (1997), and that the "express purpose" of the Open Meetings Act is "to maximize notice of public meetings and actions." Id. at 923.

To facilitate implementation of the legislative mandate, KRS 61.823 establishes requirements for conducting a special meeting which include the following:

(3) The public agency shall provide written notice of the special meeting. The notice shall consist of the date, time, and place of the special meeting and the agenda. Discussions and action at the meeting shall be limited to items listed on the agenda in the notice.

(4) (a) As soon as possible, written notice shall be delivered personally, transmitted by facsimile machine, or mailed to every member of the public agency as well as each media organization which has filed a written request, including a mailing address, to receive notice of special meetings. The notice shall be calculated so that it shall be received at least twenty-four (24) hours before the special meeting. . . .

(b) As soon as possible, written notice shall also be posted in a conspicuous place in the building where the special meeting will take place and in a conspicuous place in the building which houses the headquarters of the agency. The notice shall be calculated so that it shall be posted at least twenty-four (24) hours before the special meeting.

It is the latter requirement which gives rise to this appeal.

Mr. Powell maintains that the City Council violated KRS 61.823(4)(b) when it failed to post the notice of its special meeting on the door of the building where the meeting was held and the door of the building which houses the City Council's headquarters, which in this case are one and the same, to insure that the notice was accessible to the public for the twenty-four hours preceding the meeting. The City Council responds that it is an established practice to post all notices on the bulletin board in the main office of the city building which serves as "the primary location for members of the general public to transact business with the City of Nortonville." This practice is, in the City Council's view, consistent with the statutory requirement. While there are, no doubt, more conspicuous places where notice of special meeting of the City Council might be posted, we must agree with the Council.

The Kentucky General Assembly has not particularized a place on which notice of special meetings must be posted, and, absent proof of an attempt to conceal such notices, we believe that discretion rests with the public agency to determine what constitutes a conspicuous place. 2 The term "conspicuous" is variously defined as "obvious" "attracting attention," "noticeable," The American Heritage Dictionary 187 (3d ed. 1994) and "easy to see or perceive," and "attracting attention . . . ." Webster's New World Dictionary 304 (2d ed. 1974). A bulletin board located in that area of City Hall set aside for the transaction of public business satisfies these definitions. Accord, 00-OMD-142 (posting of written notice of special meeting on public bulletin board at city hall "complied in all particulars with the requirements found at KRS 61.823 . . . .").

Until such time as the General Assembly declares that special meeting notices must be posted on the doors of the buildings in which special meetings will be held and the buildings that house the agencies' headquarters, reasonable discretion must be said to reside with public agencies in making this determination. A bulletin board that is accessible to the public is "conspicuous, " as that term is commonly interpreted, 3 notwithstanding the fact that more conspicuous places may be available or the fact that it may not be conspicuous to the public for the full twenty-four hours preceding the special meeting. As noted above, absent evidence of an intent to conceal the special meeting notice in contravention of KRS 61.823(3)(b), we find no error in the City Council's decision to post its special meeting notice on the public bulletin board located in City Hall.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings.

Elbert A. Powell116 South Hopkinsville StreetP.O. Box 601Nortonville, KY 42442

James L. Noel, Mayor199 South Main StreetNortonville, KY 42442

John C. Whitfield, City AttorneyWilliam M. Cox, Jr.Assistant City AttorneyCity of Nortonville29 East Center StreetMadisonville, KY 42431

Footnotes

Footnotes

1 Mr. Powell provided this office with a copy of his November 21 complaint on which the handwritten notation appears: "Mailed on 22 Nov."

2 With regard to the requirement that agencies adopt rules and regulations governing access to public records, KRS 61.876(2) provides that such rules and regulations "shall be displayed . . . in a prominent location accessible to the public" but does not specify a particular location.

3 In matters of statutory construction, words must be "construed according to the common and approved usage of language." KRS 446.080(4).

Disclaimer:
The Sunshine Law Library is not exhaustive and may contain errors from source documents or the import process. Nothing on this website should be taken as legal advice. It is always best to consult with primary sources and appropriate counsel before taking any action.
Requested By:
Elbert Powell
Agency:
Nortonville City Council
Type:
Open Meetings Decision
Lexis Citation:
2003 Ky. AG LEXIS 273
Cites:
Forward Citations:
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