Request By:
Kim Chasteen
165 Dreyfus Road
Berea, KY 40403Arno Norwell, Principal
Foley Middle School
211 Glades Road
Berea, KY 40403Patricia T. Bausch
Sturgill, Turner, Barker & Moloney
155 East Main Street
Lexington, KY 40507-1300
Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; James M. Ringo, Assistant Attorney General
Open Meetings Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether the Site Based Decision Making Council (SBDM) of Foley Middle School violated the Open Meetings Act by holding an unscheduled meeting without notice to the public in order to discuss an upcoming vote of the council. For the reasons that follow, we find that the actions of the agency constituted a procedural violation, but that because of the conflicting evidence presented, we are unable to resolve whether a violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred.
In a letter dated June 30, 2003, Kim Chasteen submitted a written complaint to Arno Norwell, Principal of Foley Middle School and Chairperson of its Site Based Decision Making Council, in which she alleged that a quorum of the SBDM Council held an informal meeting on May 12, 2003 before the May 12, 2003 scheduled Council meeting and discussed an upcoming vote on the revised standardized dress code. As a means of remedying the alleged violation, Ms. Chasteen proposed that "any action taken as a result of the May 12, 2003 meeting be null and void" and that "the council discuss the revised version of the standardized dress code at a future meeting and give adequate consideration to the proposal made by parents and possibly come to a compromise that will work well for everyone."
In support of her complaint, Ms. Chasteen attached a May 13, 2003 e-mail to her from Mike Banks, parent representative, that stated:
I'm sorry that you feel that way. It was made clear to me before the meeting that no one would second any proposal that I made. I told the members that I would not vote for the dress code. What I did was to agree to the majority of the council's wishes just as Coach Wall did. I respect your work as a parent and I will support you if you run for council. Respectfully, Mike Banks.
In a response dated July 7, 2003, Mr. Norwell advised, in relevant part:
Until the receipt of your letter, I was unaware of any informal meeting that may have taken place before the May 12th open meeting. I will investigate the matter as soon as possible.
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Also, I am unaware of how many members may have actually discussed the dress code before the formal open meetings, however, please be aware if there were less than a majority of the council present, there discussion would not appear to be in violation of KRS 61.810. I will let you know the results of my investigation as to the number and nature of any discussions that occurred before the May 12 meeting.
In a letter dated August 6, 2003 to this office, Ms. Chasteen advised that as of that date she had not received any word from Mr. Norwell regarding the findings of his investigation. As a result, she initiated the instant appeal.
After receipt of notification of the appeal and a copy of the letter of appeal, Madison County Board of Education Attorney Patricia T. Bausch provided this office with a response to the issues raised in the appeal. In her response, Ms. Bausch stated that the investigation was Mr. Norwell's offer of a remedy to Ms. Chasteen's claim and further explained, in part:
Furthermore, Mr. Norwell did investigate the matter, speaking separately with each of the Council members Ms. Chasteen identified as participating in the alleged meeting. After those inquiries, he concluded that there was no meeting or any other inappropriate discussions or polling of potential votes prior to the scheduled meeting on May 12, 2003.
We fully intended to notify Ms. Chasteen of these findings; however, the letter drafted for that purpose was never sent. The letter was written July 17, 2003. It is attached. Though there was no intent to be deceptive or uncooperative, we apologize to Ms. Chasteen for not following through with notification.
Even though there was no follow up to the original response, Mr. Norwell did timely respond to Ms. Chasteen's claim. He received the letter on July 1, 2003. KRS 61.846(1) allows three days, excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, for a response. After July 1, Mr. Norwell had three days excluding July 4 which was a legal holiday and July 5 and 6 which were a Saturday and Sunday respectively. His July 7 letter was within the three day period. Additionally, he conducted an investigation and concluded that there was no meeting in violation of the Open Meetings Act. Ms Chasteen was well within her rights to appeal Mr. Norwell's response to the Attorney General when she found the remedy offered--the investigation--inadequate. However, we maintain that Mr. Norwell did not violate the Open Meetings Act.
We begin by noting certain procedural irregularities in the agency's response. KRS 61.846(1) establishes the duties of a public agency in responding to an open meetings complaint. That statute provides:
The person shall submit a written complaint to the presiding officer of the public agency suspected of the violation of KRS 61.805 to 61.850. The complaint shall state the circumstances which constitute an alleged violation of KRS 61.805 to 61.850 and shall state what the public agency should do to remedy the alleged violation. The public agency shall determine within three (3) days, excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the receipt of the complaint whether to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint and shall notify in writing the person making the complaint, within the three (3) day period, of its decision. If the public agency makes efforts to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint, efforts to remedy the alleged violation shall not be admissible as evidence of wrongdoing in an administrative or judicial proceeding. An agency's response denying, in whole or in part, the complaint's requirements for remedying the alleged violation shall include a statement of the specific statute or statutes supporting the public agency's denial and a brief explanation of how the statute or statutes apply. The response shall be issued by the presiding officer, or under his authority, and shall constitute final agency action.
Although Mr. Norwell responded to Ms. Chasteen's within the three days stating that he would "investigate the matter as soon as possible," he did not provide her with a determination within three days after receipt of the complaint as to whether a violation of the Open Meetings Act had occurred and whether the agency would remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint, nor did he provide her with notification of such determination in writing, within the three (3) day period, of its decision.
Accordingly, we find that the response and actions of the SBDM did not meet the procedural requirements of KRS 61.846(1). In its supplemental response to this office, the SBDM advised it had drafted a July 17, 2003 letter, in response to Ms. Chasteen's June 30, 2003 letter of complaint, to notify her of the results of Mr. Norwell's investigation and his conclusion that the alleged meeting did not occur, but that the letter had inadvertently not been sent. Although the agency indicated that this oversight was unintentional, it still constituted a procedural violation of KRS 61.846(1).
Turning to the substantive issues in this appeal, we find that the conflicting evidence precludes us from resolving the issue as to whether the claimed violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred.
In his response, Mr. Norwell advised Ms. Chasteen that he had spoken with each of the council members that she had identified as participating in the alleged meeting and concluded that "there was no meeting or any other inappropriate discussions or polling of potential votes prior to the scheduled meeting on May 12, 2003."
In support of her claim that an illegal meeting took place, Ms. Chasteen provided this office with an e-mail to her from Mr. Banks, which stated, in relevant part:
It was made clear to me before the meeting that no one would second any proposal that I made. I told the members that I would not vote for the dress code. What I did was to agree to the majority of the council's wishes just as Coach Wall did.
There is sufficient ambiguity in the language of the e-mail to preclude us from making a factual determination as to whether a meeting of the quorum of the SBDM members met in an informal meeting to establish a violation of the Open Meetings Act. The divergent factual accounts presented by the parties with regard to this issue compel us to conclude that the record before us is insufficient to support the claimed violation. Thus, we are unable to resolve this factual dispute in either party's favor. See, for example, 03-OMD-178.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.