Request By:
Colonel Richard K. Dahlinger
Staff Judge Advocate
HQ U.S. Army Armor Center
and Fort Knox
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; William L. Davis, Assistant Attorney General
This is in response to your letter dated December 16, 1982. You stated that OAG 82-591 prompted further inquiry. In OAG 82-591, we stated that Kentucky law does not permit commissioned officers or enlisted personnel to take acknowledgments or perform other notarial acts for spouses or other dependents of military personnel who are within the limits of Kentucky based upon the language of KRS 423.110(4). However, we also stated that commissioned officers and enlisted personnel may be appointed as notaries public by the Kentucky Secretary of State if they meet the requirements of KRS 423.010. In regard to the above, you stated, "For this limited purpose of notarizing for civilian dependents, shouldn't the federal military reservation of Fort Knox be considered 'outside the Commonwealth.'"
KRS 3.030 states the following:
3.030. Jurisdiction over military post (Fort Knox) at West Point ceded. -- Kentucky cedes to the United States all the rights and jurisdiction which she now possesses over the land and premises in the vicinity of West Point, Kentucky, conveyed or to be conveyed to the United States for the purpose of establishing a permanent camp of instruction and military post, so long as the same shall remain the property of the United States. (2376d-1.)
Residents of areas subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction have in the past been considered to be "stateless" in many respects. Frequently, they were denied the right to vote in state elections, receive relief benefits for the poor, hold local office, attend state schools, use state courts when domicile in the state was required by jurisdiction, and other state benefits. These areas were not considered part of the state. The current judicial trend grants federal enclave residents rights that are based on state laws. The current cases attempt to accommodate the federal and state interests within the federal enclave and in so doing suggest that state jurisdiction continues within the area provided the exercise of that jurisdiction does not involve interference with Federal activities. In other words, the "fiction of a state within a state" has been laid to rest and cannot be resurrected.
Howard v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 73 S. Ct. 465, 97 L. Ed. 617 (1953);
First Hardin National Bank v. Fort Knox National Bank, 361 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1966);
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 99 S. Ct. 383, 58 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1978);
Evans v. Cornman, 389 U.S. 419, 90 S. Ct. 1752, 26 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1970). As a matter of fact, the Sixth Circuit in First Hardin National Bank, supra, stated the following:
The principle has been well established that a military reservation within a state remains a geographical part of the city, county and state of which it was part at the time of acquisition by the United States. In
Howard v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 73 S. Ct. 465, 97 L. Ed. 617 (1953), the City of Louisville, Kentucky annexed certain federally owned land on which a naval ordnance plant was located. The Appellants in that case argued that the City could not annex this federal area because it had ceased to be a part of Kentucky when the United States assumed exclusive jurisdiction over it. In holding that the geographical structure of Kentucky remained the same, the Supreme Court stated:
"When the United States, with the consent of Kentucky, acquired the property upon which the Ordnance Plant is located, the property did not cease to be a part of Kentucky. The geographical structure of Kentucky remained the same. In rearranging the structural divisions of the Commonwealth, in accordance with the state law, the area became a part of the City of Louisville, just as it remained a part of the County of Jefferson and the Commonwealth of Kentucky."
In the instant case, upon conveyance to the United States, the State of Kentucky relinquished its jurisdiction over the area conveyed. Under the terms of the conveyance, the loss of jurisdiction was not absolute. The interest of Kentucky in the land conveyed became dormant, and will remain dormant so long as the land conveyed remains the property of the United States. When the United States ceases to own the land conveyed, jurisdicton will be reactivated in the State of Kentucky. The geographical structure of the State of Kentucky not only remains the same, but the State retains a dormant jurisdiction over the land.
Furthermore, a careful analysis of KRS 423.110 reveals that the exercise of the state jurisdiction in the area of notarial acts as to Fort Knox does not involve interference with federal activities.
Based upon the foregoing, it is our opinion that Fort Knox did not cease to be part of Kentucky simply because the United States assumed exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, it must be considered within the limits of Kentucky for at least the limited purpose of applying KRS 423.110(4).
Please do not hesitate to contact us if we may be of further assistance.