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Request By:

Mr. William R. Thomas
Attorney at Law
33 East Broadway
Madisonville, Kentucky 42431

Opinion

Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Robert L. Chenoweth, Assistant Deputy Attorney General and Chief Counsel

You have asked the Office of the Attorney General to consider the interpretation of KRS 160.370 regarding the duties of a local superintendent of schools. That part of this section of school law of concern to you reads as follows:

"The superintendent shall be the executive agent of the board that appoints him and shall meet with the board except when his own tenure, salary, or the administration of his office is under consideration."

You have asked this office whether a local board of education is, in view of the above language, precluded from having the superintendent present when it discusses the superintendent's tenure, salary, or the administration of his office. We are of the opinion a local board of education may, by a concurring vote of a majority of the board [KRS 160.270(1)], waive its statutory prerogative of meeting out of the presence of the superintendent when the superintendent's tenure, salary or the administration of his office will be considered.

To the best of our knowledge, this office has not before been asked to consider the question you have raised. It is usually the converse question, that is, can the local board meet without the local superintendent being present it the superintendent's contract, salary or administration of his office is going to be discussed. Of course the statute itself clearly answers that question in the affirmative. See, e.g. OAG 78-274. As to your question, we see little reason why the portion of KRS 160.370 under consideration must be construed as mandating that the board is legally precluded from discussing matters specifically relating to the superintendent's tenure, salary or the administration of his office in the superintendent's presence. To this end then, we believe this language in KRS 160.370 is directory which means "that the statute gives directions which ought to be followed; but the power given is not so limited by the directions that it cannot be exercised without following the directions given." Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6 S.W. 457 (1888).

We trust the above will be of assistance to you. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Disclaimer:
The Sunshine Law Library is not exhaustive and may contain errors from source documents or the import process. Nothing on this website should be taken as legal advice. It is always best to consult with primary sources and appropriate counsel before taking any action.
Type:
Opinion
Lexis Citation:
1982 Ky. AG LEXIS 31
Cites:
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