24-ORD-112
May 1, 2024
In re: Stephen Bratcher/Department of Juvenile Justice
Summary: The Department of Juvenile Justice (“the Department”) did
not violate the Open Records Act (“the Act”) when it conducted an
adequate search for records, provided records that were responsive, and
denied the request to the extent it sought additional records because it
lacked adequate specificity.
Open Records Decision
On February 13, 2024, Stephen Bratcher (“the Appellant”) emailed a request
to the Department for the “complete personnel files and related records” for eight
former or current employees, including “disciplinary records, training records,
internal affair records, complaints . . . or commendations, previous law
enforcement/corrections related employers, [and] records relating to the report,
investigation, or findings of” three types of “incidents.” Specifically, those “incidents”
included: an incident involving the discharge of a firearm, Taser, or OC spray at a
person; “an incident in which the use of force against a person resulted in the
treatment of any known or possible injury”; and an “incident in which a sustained
finding was made by any law enforcement agency, oversight agency, investigative
personnel . . . or supervisor” reflecting dishonesty in the course of an investigation or
prosecution of a crime, including “perjury, false statements, filing false reports, or
destruction, falsifying, or concealing of evidence.” The Appellant also sought “records
involving any disciplinary action including but not limited to termination, resignation
. . . or demotion” and “any communication regarding these actions whether in hard
copy or electronic form.”
In a timely response on February 20, 2024, the Department stated the request
implicated more than 5,500 pages of records, and it still needed to compile additional
records from “different branches within the agency.” The Department therefore
invoked KRS 61.872(5), claimed the records were “not otherwise available,” and
stated the records would be available on or before April 1, 2024, after it has completed
its search and performed all necessary redactions. Additionally, the Departmentadvised that, to the extent the Appellant sought “any communication” in “hard copy
or electronic form” regarding “any disciplinary actions” of multiple employees without
any limitation in temporal scope, his request failed to “precisely describe” the records
sought, as required under KRS 61.872(3)(b).
While the Department searched for records in advance of its April 1 deadline,
the Appellant submitted two new requests, on February 21 and March 11, in an effort
to narrow the scope of his request for “any communications” related to disciplinary
actions. Ultimately, the Department issued its final response to the Appellant’s
original February 13 request on April 1, 2024. The Appellant then initiated this
appeal, stating he wanted to “formally appeal the response and decision [he] received
on April 1, 2024.” Specifically, he challenges the Department’s claim that he failed to
precisely describe the additional communications he sought.
Before turning to the merits of the appeal, the Office notes that the Appellant
has provided the documents necessary to invoke the Attorney General’s review of only
one of the Department’s denials. The Appellant has provided to the Office copies of
his February 13 request that the Department styled as “ORR 24-13”; the
Department’s initial response to it, dated February 20, in which the Department
sought additional time to produce the records; and the Department’s final disposition
of the request on April 1, 2024.1 Under KRS 61.880(2)(a), a person seeking the
Attorney General’s review of a denial of a request to inspect records must provide a
copy of his original request and the agency’s denial. Here, although the Appellant has
provided copies of the requests he submitted on February 21 and March 11, he did
not provide copies of the Department’s responses to those requests, which the
Department issued on March 8 and March 18, respectfully. Instead, the Appellant
provided the Office with encrypted emails he received from the Department, which
were inaccessible. After the Department responded to this appeal and noted the
Appellant did not provide copies of its March 8 and March 18 responses, the Appellant
offered to supplement his appeal by providing copies of those responses.2 However,
the Appellant initiated this appeal by stating he sought to “formally appeal the
response and decision [he] received on April 1, 2024.” He did not indicate he intended
1
The Appellant also allegedly submitted a second request on February 13 seeking similar
information with respect to four other employees, but the Appellant did not provide the Office with a
copy of that request. The Department identified the requests as “ORR 24-13” and “ORR 24-14” and
issued a timely, consolidated response on February 20, 2024. However, because the Appellant did not
provide a copy of his request identified as ORR 24-14, any dispute regarding that request is not
properly before the Office.
2
On April 29, 2024, shortly before the Office’s deadline under KRS 61.880(2)(a) to issue a decision
in this matter, the Appellant attempted to supplement his appeal by providing a copy of the
Department’s March 8 response. The Appellant’s late supplementation, however, does not afford the
Office sufficient time to consider the merits of any dispute regarding the Appellant’s February 21
request and the Department’s March 8 response to it. Should the Appellant seek the Office’s review of
any dispute involving that request and the Department’s response, he may submit a new appeal by
providing all necessary documents in the first instance.to appeal the Department’s March 11 and March 18 responses, and the Office will not
consider any dispute regarding the Appellant’s subsequent requests or the
Department’s response to those subsequent requests in this appeal. If the Appellant
seeks the Office’s review of the Department’s responses to his subsequent requests,
he may initiate a new appeal by providing the documents required under
KRS 61.880(2)(a).
Turning to the merits of the issue that is currently before it, the Office
concludes the Department did not violate the Act. Under KRS 61.872(3)(b), “[t]he
public agency shall mail copies of the public records to a person . . . after he or she
precisely describes the public records which are readily available within the public
agency.” A description is precise “if it describes the records in definite, specific, and
unequivocal terms.” 98-ORD-17 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard
may not be met when a request does not “describe records by type, origin, county, or
any identifier other than relation to a subject.” 20-ORD-017 (quoting 13-ORD-077).
In particular, requests for any and all records “related to a broad and ill-defined topic”
generally fail to precisely describe the records. 22-ORD-182; see, e.g., 21-ORD-034
(finding a request for any and all records relating to “change of duties,” “freedom of
speech,” or “usage of signs” did not precisely describe the records).
Here, the thrust of the Appellant’s request sought the personnel files of
multiple employees and any disciplinary actions taken against them as it relates to
three different types of incidents, i.e., the use of force, the use of force using specific
types of equipment, and allegations of dishonesty. The Department provided the
Appellant with all records responsive to that aspect of his request. Further, the
Department noted that any communications related to disciplinary actions taken
against the employees were contained in their personnel files. To the extent the
Appellant sought other communications about disciplinary actions taken against the
employees that were not contained in their personnel files, he failed to limit his
original request by temporal scope. The Department discharged its duty by searching
in the location where responsive communications would likely exist—the personnel
files of the employees—and providing all responsive records. If the Appellant
discovers something in the records he has received that document a specific type of
disciplinary action against a specific employee at a certain time, he could submit a
new request to the Department for communications related to that incident. But
unlike a request for emails containing specific keywords, which can easily be
searched, see, e.g., 24-ORD-048, a request for “any records involving any disciplinary
action” regarding multiple employees, without any limitation in temporal scope, is an
“any-and-all records” type of request related to a “broad and ill-defined topic.” See,
e.g., 21-ORD-034. Accordingly, the Department did not violate the Act by producing
records it located and inviting the Appellant to narrow the scope of his request.A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ Marc Manley
Marc Manley
Assistant Attorney General
#180
Distributed to:
Stephen Bratcher
Michelle Harrison
Wilda Willis Caudle