Request By:
John Riley
Spencer County Judge Executive
Opinion
Opinion By: Daniel Cameron,ATTORNEY GENERAL;Brett R. Nolan,Charles A. English,Assistant Attorneys General
Opinion of the Attorney General
John Riley, Spencer County Judge Executive, asks for this Office's opinion on whether KRS 70.280 allows court security officers to transport newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville. For the reasons that follow, the Attorney General concludes that the Spencer County Sheriff, if designated as the transportation officer under KRS 441.510(4)(c), may appoint court security officers to assist in transporting newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville.
Background . Spencer County does not have a jail, which means that KRS 441.510(4) governs prisoner transport. Under KRS 441.510(4), the fiscal court must adopt a transportation plan that "establishes the party responsible for transporting prisoners as necessary." Id. The fiscal court can require that the jailer or sheriff serve as the transportation officer, see KRS 441.510(4)(a), (b), or it can "adopt any reasonable transportation plan so long as the party responsible for transporting prisoners is specified," KRS 441.510(4)(c). According to Spencer County Attorney Kenneth S. Jones, the Spencer County Fiscal Court adopted a transportation plan designating the sheriff as the transportation officer. The Office of the Attorney General does not have a copy of the plan, and so it will assume for the purpose of this Opinion that the Fiscal Court has designated the sheriff as the transportation officer under KRS 441.510(4)(c).
Analysis . Kentucky law allows the sheriff to use court security officers for transporting prisoners. One of the statutory duties of a court security officer is "[t]ransporting prisoners," KRS 70.280(1)(f), and the sheriff is authorized under KRS 70.030(2) to "appoint his or her own certified court security officers" to assist in performing his or her duties. So if Spencer County has designated the sheriff as the "party responsible for transporting prisoners," KRS 441.510(4)(c), the sheriff can lawfully appoint court security officers to assist in this duty under KRS 70.030(2) and KRS 70.280(1)(f).
The more difficult issue, however, is whether a court security officer is permitted to transport prisoners for reasons unrelated to a court proceeding-- e.g. , transporting a newly arrested prisoner from the sheriff's office to a detention facility. We conclude that court security officers are permitted to transport prisoners regardless of whether the transportation relates to an ongoing court proceeding.
We start first with the text because "the text of the statute is supreme." Owen v. Univ. of Ky. , 486 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Ky. 2016) (citing Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 56 (2012)). Here, the text of KRS 70.280(1)(f) provides simply that one duty of a court security officer is "[t]ransporting prisoners." The statute does not impose any limit on the circumstances in which a court security officer can perform this duty. Absent such limiting language, we cannot interpret the statute "to impose a constraint . . . unexpressed by the General Assembly."
Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein , 532 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Ky. 2017). Rather, we must "assume that the Legislature meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant."
Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel , 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Stone v. Pryor , 45 S.W. 1136, 1142 (1898) (Waddle, S. J., dissenting)). And in this case, the General Assembly did not say that court security officers may only transport prisoners for court proceedings.
Adding further support to our interpretation, other provisions of KRS 70.280 include exactly the kind of limitation that is absent from subsection (1)(f). Court security officers, for example, are authorized to "serv[e] warrants and other court papers"--but only on "individuals physically present in the courtroom." KRS 70.280(1)(e). Similarly, court security officers are charged with "[g]uarding prisoners"--but again, only "during court appearances." KRS 70.280(1)(d). These provisions leave no doubt that the General Assembly knows how to draft limits on the circumstances in which a court security officer exercises his or her duties, but chose not to do so when providing the duty of "[t]ransporting prisoners." See
Staples v. Commonwealth , 454 S.W.3d 803, 816-17 (Ky. 2014). The only reasonable conclusion is that KRS 70.280(1)(f) does not impose any such limits.
Thus, if designated as the transportation officer under KRS 441.510(4)(c), the Spencer County Sheriff may appoint court security officers to assist in transporting newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville.