Opinion
Opinion By: Andy Beshear, Attorney General; Taylor Payne, Assistant Attorney General
Opinion of the Attorney General
Brad Schneider, Henderson County Judge/Executive, requested an opinion of this office on whether KRS 242.125(8) permits the county fiscal court of a moist county that contains a wet city to hold a local option election to establish the county as a wet county absent a valid petition. 1 We advise that KRS 242.125(8) does not authorize a fiscal court to call for a local option election without a valid petition.
The Kentucky Constitution requires the General Assembly to "provide a means whereby the sense of the people of any county, city, town, district or precinct may be taken, as to whether or not spirituous, vinous or malt liquors shall be sold, bartered or loaned therein, or the sale thereof regulated." KY. CONST. § 61. The General Assembly provided for this process in KRS 242.020-.1298, titled "Local Option Elections. " At issue here is the interpretation of KRS 242.125(8), which provides:
A dry or moist county containing a wet city may hold a local option election to take the sense of the county residents for establishing the county as a wet territory. If the majority of the votes are in favor of establishing the county as a wet territory, the whole county shall become wet territory by application of KRS 242.200.
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect." MPM Fin. Group, Inc. v. Morton, 289 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Ky. 2009) (citation omitted). To do this, "we first look at the language employed by the legislature itself[.]" Jefferson Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted). That language must be understood in context with the other relevant parts of the legislative enactment. Id . (citing Petitioner F. v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 85-86 (Ky.2010) (Statutory enactment must be read as a whole and in context with other parts of statute with "any language in the act ? read in light of the whole act."); Democratic Party of Ky. v. Graham, 976 S.W.2d 423, 429 (Ky.1998) (Court cannot focus on "a single sentence or member of a sentence but [must] look to the provisions of the whole.").
Viewed under these guidelines, KRS 242.125(8) is best understood as providing a condition (when a city in the county is wet) that would allow the county to hold a local option election upon a valid petition, rather than permitting the county to hold a local option election absent a valid petition. First, KRS 242.020, the opening statute in the Local Option Election enactment, details the process for voters of a territory to petition the county clerk for a local option election. In a sense, every statute that follows is premised on the concept that a valid petition has been filed with the county clerk. Second, KRS 242.125 is titled, "Separate vote to determine wet, moist or dry status in cities; right of city precincts to vote for separate dry status; dual status as both wet and moist. " Thus, the language in KRS 242.125(8) intends to describe a situation in which separate votes may occur within territories and the effect of those votes. Finally, KRS 242.125(8) does not expressly permit a county to forgo the petition process. Nor does any other statute speak to the occurrence of a local option election absent a valid petition.
Our opinion is consistent with the Kentucky Supreme Court's analysis of KRS 242.125(1), which, similar to subsection (8), allows separate votes in territories existing within a county. In Parrot v. Belcher, 84 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1994), a fourth class city held a local option election that resulted in a majority of votes against prohibition; however, a majority of votes within a specific precinct of the city voted otherwise. Id. at 634. A few months later, a new petition was filed to hold another election only within the specific precinct. Id . Appellant sought to enjoin county officials from holding the election pursuant to KRS 242.030(5), now KRS 242.030(3), "which prohibits local option elections in the same territory more often than once every three years." Id. at 635. In ruling in favor of Appellees, the Court held that the legislature intended KRS 242.125(1) to:
permit a city of one of the first four classes to separately determine whether it would be bound by prevailing county-wide prohibition; but it also authorized the voters of a single precinct within that city to deter mine whether they should be bound by the city-wide vote or whether they should have prohibition in the precinct, all without regard to the three-year moratorium.
Id. at 636. This analysis mirrors our interpretation of KRS 242.125(8): the legislature intended to permit separate votes within counties.
In sum, KRS 242.125(8) does not permit a county to hold a local option election absent a valid petition filed with the county clerk pursuant to KRS 242.020.
Footnotes
Footnotes