Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; Ryan M. Halloran, Assistant Attorney General
Open Meetings Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether the Oak Grove City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by conducting a meeting by telephone for the purpose of discussing an ordinance to change the water and sewer ordinance. For the reasons that follow, we find that the record before us is insufficient to support the allegation that a quorum of the City Council participated in the telephone calls.
The complaint that an illegal meeting was conducted was sent by letter dated June 23, 2003 from Mr. Lawrence Rosser and directed to the Mayor. The complaint letter stated that at the June 17th, 2003 City Council meeting, the Council passed an amendment of the water and sewer ordinance, and that one member of the Council "has stated previously he's called council members to discuss the matters on the agenda prior to the meetings." Mr. Rosser also stated that he believed the discussions prior to the June 17, 2003 meeting "is a violation of KRS 61.810(1)." That statute states as follows:
All meetings of a quorum of the members of any public agency at which any public business is discussed or at which any action is taken by the agency, shall be public meetings, open to the public at all times[.]
KRS 61.810(1).
This provision of the statute makes it clear that any discussion of public business by a quorum of the public agency constitutes a public meeting. A public meeting must be held at a specified time and place convenient to the public in accordance with a schedule created, in the case of a city, by ordinance. See KRS 61.820. Although individual members of the City Council are allowed to discuss issues over the telephone without violating the law, telephone calls with a quorum participating, in order to evade the law and discuss public business without the knowledge of the public is illegal. See KRS 61.810(2).
In its response to Mr. Rosser's complaint dated June 25, 2003, the Mayor stated that she "acknowledge[d] the illegality of the acts which you allege," so there is no dispute that if what Mr. Rosser alleges happened, there was a violation of KRS 61.810(1) . To remedy the situation, Mr. Rosser requested "that the Council discuss at a future meeting, in an open and public session, those issues that were discussed at the June 17, 2003 meeting." In the City's response, the Mayor pointed out that the City had no evidence that the "meetings between council meetings have indeed occurred." The Mayor promised to address Mr. Rosser's complaint at the next regular City Council meeting. Mr. Rosser was not satisfied with this response, and by letter dated June 25, 2003, he appealed to this office.
In his appeal letter, Mr. Rosser states that during the June 17, 2003 meeting, a councilman "openly admitted to calling other members of the Council to get their opinions and thoughts on the issue. As a result, this possibly could have formed a positive vote for amending an ordinance that would drastically lower tap fees." Although the information in Mr. Rosser's letter of complaint to the City and his appeal letter to this office indicates there may have been a violation of the law, it is not clear that a quorum of the City Council were called.
Additionally, we are not sure that the City's response did not give Mr. Rosser what he asked. The City has promised to address Mr. Rosser's complaint at the next regular City Council meeting. If after the next meeting Mr. Rosser is still not satisfied, he may file an appeal with this office pursuant to KRS 61.846(3)(a). Accordingly, we decide that the evidentiary record is insufficient to support the allegation that an illegal public meeting occurred for the purposes of avoiding the requirements of KRS 61.810(1).
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.