Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; Ryan M. Halloran, Assistant Attorney General
Open Meetings Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether the City of Shively violated the Open Meetings Act by conducting a meeting where public business was discussed without notice to the public, and by failing to respond to a complaint sent to the city about the meeting. For the reasons that follow, we find that the city violated the Open Meetings Act in both instances.
By letter dated January 10, 2003, Mr. Richard McDonald complained to the mayor of the City of Shively about a meeting that took place December 31, 2002, at Shively City Hall. Mr. McDonald complained that he believed city business was discussed at the meeting, and that the meeting had been "unpublished" and "unplanned". In his complaint he requested that the city council discuss the matter at the next council meeting to be held January 21, 2003. He also requests a listing of all persons present at the December 31st meeting, and that any action taken at the meeting be declared null and void. The city never responded to Mr. McDonald's complaint.
On January 23, 2003, Mr. McDonald filed an appeal with this office, again stating that he believed the meeting of December 31st was an illegal gathering of members of the city council. By letter dated January 27, 2003, Mr. Walter L. Cato, Jr., Special Counsel for the City of Shively replied. In Mr. Cato's letter, the city admitted that no response was made to Mr. McDonald's complaint, and that five of the six newly elected city council members had, after a swearing-in ceremony, been invited to the mayor's office. The mayor distributed to the council members a memorandum concerning city business and then made comments, lasting about ten minutes, to the council members regarding the points in the memorandum. It is the position of the city that the gathering of the council members in the mayor's office did not violate either the letter or the spirit of the Open Meetings Law. The city bases this on the fact that the mayor's comments were succinct, unilateral, and not delivered for the purpose of inviting discussion or debate; and that there was no action taken.
For the purposes of the Open Meetings law, "meeting" is defined as, "all gatherings of every kind, regardless of where the meeting is held, and whether regular or special and informational or casual gatherings held in anticipation of or in conjunction with a regular or special meeting." KRS 61.805. It is clear from the response of the city that there was a meeting. The purpose of the meeting is not relevant. The meeting was attended by five of the six members of the newly elected council. Where a quorum of a public agency meets and where public business is discussed, the meeting is to be open to the public. KRS 61.810(1). Here, the city contends that because the mayor's statements were unilateral and not delivered for the purpose of inviting discussion or debate the law was not violated. We do not think it is necessary for the council to have had discussion or debate for there to have been a discussion of public business as contemplated by the Act. The word "discuss" includes a presentation such as the mayor made when he distributed the memorandum to the council and made comments concerning the details of the memorandum. See, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed., s.v. "discuss." In matters of statutory interpretation words are to be given their ordinary meaning. KRS 446.015. Although the mayor's presentation may have been a one-sided discussion, it was, for the purposes of the Act, a discussion. Because the memorandum contained information on city business, its presentation to a quorum of the city council constituted a meeting where public business was discussed. The Open Meetings Law requires that meetings where public business is discussed be open to the public and that the public must have been given notice of the meeting. KRS 61.810(1), KRS 61.820, and KRS 61.823(3).
Regular meetings are noticed to the public through a schedule enacted by ordinance. KRS 61.820. Special meetings require notice of the agenda to be given to the public beforehand, and any discussion is limited to those items on the agenda. KRS 61.823(3). None of this was done in the present case because the city did not consider the December 31, 2002, gathering a "meeting." We find that it was a meeting at which public business was discussed and that the city violated the Open Meetings Act by having the meeting without notice to the public.
Finally, the city admits it never responded to Mr. McDonald's complaint about the meeting. The Act requires that complaints be acted upon within three (3) business days by notifying the complainant in writing of the agency's decision of whether it will remedy the alleged violation. KRS 61.848(1). We find the failure of the city to respond violated the Act.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.