Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; Amye L. Bensenhaver, Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether Cumberland High School violated the Open Records Act in the disposition of David H. Dixon's November 28, 2000, request for "a list of all students according to the P.A.-2 form for each homeroom for the school year 1999-2000." Mr. Dixon indicated that he was only interested in the transportation codes appearing on these forms, "the students hav[ing] already been identified as . . . students of Cumberland High School according to the school's Redskin Yearbook, 2000." In a response dated November 30, 2000, Principal Edward G. Clem denied Mr. Dixon's request explaining that the P.A.-2's contain students' names, social security numbers, transportation codes, and monthly attendance figures. For the reasons that follow, we find that, although its response was procedurally deficient, the high school properly disposed of Mr. Dixon's request.
We begin by noting that Mr. Dixon's appeal to this office was premature. He submitted the appeal on December 1, 2000, the Sunday following delivery of his Thursday, November 28, request. Pursuant to KRS 446.030(1)(a), 1 the three day deadline for agency response to an open records request excludes the day the request was submitted. 96-ORD-207. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(1), the three day response time excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays that follow receipt of the request. Based on these provisions, we calculate that the high school's response was actually due to be issued on Monday, December 4, 2000. Although the response was deficient in other respects, it was timely. No basis existed for the initiation of an open records appeal on December 1, 2000. We remind Mr. Dixon of the admonition, contained in a footnote in a previous open records decision to which he was a party, that he "await agency response to his separate requests before initiating appeals" in the interest of promoting clarity, as well as fairness to the agency. 00-ORD-148, p. 3.
As noted, the high school's response did not conform with the other procedural requirements of the Act codified at KRS 61.880(1). That statute provides:
Each public agency, upon any request for records made under KRS 61.870 to 61.884, shall determine within three (3) days, excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with the request and shall notify in writing the person making the request, within the three (3) day period, of its decision. An agency response denying, in whole or in part, inspection of any record shall include a statement of the specific exception authorizing the withholding of the record and a brief explanation of how the exception applies to the record withheld. The response shall be issued by the official custodian or under his authority, and it shall constitute final agency action.
(Emphasis added.) In 00-ORD-148, cited above, the Attorney General commented on a number of procedural irregularities in the Harlan County School System's response to a request filed by Mr. Dixon, and in particular, its failure to "provide particular and detailed information in response to a request for documents."
Edmondson v. Alig, Ky. App., 926 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1996). Here, as in 00-ORD-148, we find that Cumberland High School erred in failing to cite the exception or exceptions authorizing nondisclosure, and to explain their application to the records withheld.
At page 4 of 00-ORD-148, the Attorney General observed:
In Edmondson, the court recognized that despite undeniable deficiencies in the agency's response, the circuit court improperly ordered disclosure of the records, "presumably as the only sanction available . . . ." Edmondson at 859. Continuing, the court held that "it is incumbent upon the circuit court to examine this material and to make a determination as to whether it is substantively exempt from disclosure" lest the agency's error be compounded by releasing records intended to be protected from public scrutiny. Id. Although the Court of Appeals did not extend its holding to the Office of the Attorney General, which acts in a quasi-adjudicative role in resolving open records disputes pursuant to KRS 61.880(2) , and this office rarely assays to invade the circuit courts' prerogative, the appeal before us has far reaching policy implications for local school boards which compel us to undertake a substantive analysis of the disputed records. Our analysis leads us to conclude that those records must be characterized as "education records," within the scope and meaning of the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (FERPA), and its state counterpart, KRS 160.700 (KFERPA), and that they are excluded from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Open Records Act by operation of KRS 61.878(1)(k) and (l).
This reasoning also applies to the appeal before us, as does the analysis of the scope and application of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and its state counterpart, the Kentucky Education Rights and Privacy Act. A copy of 00-ORD-148 is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
In 00-ORD-148, this office held that attendance records, records reflecting the identities of students at Cumberland High School who had obtained parking permits, and records reflecting student assignments at bus stops, qualified as education records within the scope and meaning of FERPA and KFERPA, although they did not relate to academic matters. We reasoned:
As long as the records contain information directly related to a student, and are maintained by an educational agency or institution, they fall within the parameters of the federal act, and unauthorized disclosure may result in the forfeiture of federal funds. 20 USC § 1232g(a)(4)(A). Given the similarity of this definition of "education record" to the definition of the term found at KRS 160.700(3) of the Kentucky Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, we deem them to be equally expansive.
In light of the federal district court's ruling in
Doe v. Knox County Board of Education, 918 F.Supp. 101 (E.D. Ky., 1996), holding that a violation of FERPA may be the basis for a civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983, school officials are well-advised to proceed with caution in the disclosure of education records such as those at issue in 00-ORD-148.
The records at issue in this decision, namely P.A.-2's disclosing student transportation codes, also fall within the expansive definition of an education record under state and federal law, and may not be disclosed absent parental consent. Although they are non-academic, in the traditional sense of that term, they identify students by name and are correlated to the mode of student transport to and from school. The same considerations that compelled us to affirm the Harlan County School System's denial of Mr. Dixon's earlier request, compel us to affirm Cumberland High School's denial of his request in the instant appeal. Although he did not ask for the remaining information that appears on the P.A.-2, it is apparent that that information also enjoys protection inasmuch as it consists of student social security numbers and attendance records. Accordingly, we find no error in Cumberland High School's denial of Mr. Dixon's request, but urge the high school to review KRS 61.880(1), and to work with the school board attorney in formulating open records responses, to insure that those responses conform in all particulars with the procedural requirements of the Open Records Act. Additionally, we remind Mr. Dixon that although records relating to the daily operations of the Harlan County School System and Cumberland High School, as well as its officials and employees, are largely available for public inspection, both federal and state law narrowly circumscribe his right of access to records relating to students enrolled in the school system that are maintained by the school system, and that the likelihood of success on appeal of an issue involving denial of student education records is virtually nil.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings.
Footnotes
Footnotes
1 KRS 446.030(1)(a) thus provides:
In computing any period of time prescribed by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.
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