Request By:
[NO REQUESTBY IN ORIGINAL]
Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; James M. Ringo, Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Decision
This matter is before the Attorney General on appeal from the actions of the City of Monticello in response to Joel D. Catron's open records request to inspect the audio tapes of phone calls coming into and going out of the 911 dispatch center from April 1, 1999 through June 14, 1999.
Gordon T. Germain, Attorney, responding on behalf of the City, denied Mr. Catron's request in part, stating:
We respectfully decline to make all of those [audio tapes] available to you. If you will specify the particular call or the individuals connected with particular calls, or the time periods of particular calls, we will make those available to you after reviewing same to make sure we are not violating privacy rights or releasing sensitive or confidential information relating to any ongoing investigations.
In his letter of appeal, Mr. Catron argues, in relevant part:
The City states they wish specific conversations and specific dates and times, if this be the case these are not open records but rather controlled records. It is my belief that these are open records and are subject for public review (under the laws of the Commonwealth) and not subject to the review of City officials to determine whether or not the items in question exist or whether or not the City chooses to release the same.
The question presented in this appeal is whether the City violated the Open Records Act in its response denying Mr. Catron's request to inspect all the 911 audio tapes within the requested period. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the City improperly denied the request by failing to set forth a sufficient basis for withholding access to all the tapes and must make them available for inspection.
In 94-ORD-133, this office engaged in a lengthy analysis of a 911 dispatch center's blanket policy of denying access to its dispatch log on the basis of either KRS 61.878(1)(a) or (h). There we held that a generic determination that certain categories of information are excluded from the application of the Open Records Law under these exceptions, or any other exception, does not satisfy the requirements of the law. Exclusion of particular entries on a dispatch log, we concluded, must instead be articulated in terms of the requirements of the statute such as KRS 61.878(1)(a) or (h). In 94-ORD-144, we extended this holding to audio tapes of 911 calls. Although we recognized that an agency might assign greater weight to the privacy interests of a caller whose voice appears on the tape, since his or her identity might be determined through voice identification and therefore cannot be protected, we again held that a policy of blanket denial of access to 911 tapes was improper. We concluded that "refusal of inspection of any portion of the tapes must be justified with specificity and with reference to the particular statutory exemption upon which the agency relies." 94-ORD-144, p. 4. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General expressly held that a city police department failed to articulate a sufficient legal basis for its denial of a request for the 911 tape for a one and one-half hour period on a specific date. 90-ORD-150. See also 98-ORD-31 (holding that Lexington Fayette Urban County Government improperly withheld tape containing conversation between Division of Fire and Emergency Services employee and another employee on a telephone line dedicated to public use for 911 emergency calls).
In the instant appeal, the City denied Mr. Catron's request to make all the 911 audio tapes from April 1, 1999 through June 14, 1999 available for inspection, but offered to make available to him particular tapes if he would "specify the particular call or the individuals connected to particular calls, or the time periods of particular calls," after reviewing the requested tapes to ensure the City was not "violating privacy rights or releasing sensitive or confidential information relating to any ongoing investigations."
Although the City's denial was not a blanket denial, it amounted to one. The City did not deny access to any particular document, but required Mr. Catron to identify particular calls, persons, or time periods, if he wanted to inspect any of the audio tapes during the relevant period. No basis was set forth by the City for denying inspection of all the tapes during the period. Refusal of inspection of any portion of the tapes must be justified with specificity and with reference to the particular statutory exemption upon which the agency relies. 94-ORD-144.
For example, under KRS 61.872(6), the burden is on the public agency to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence the burdensomeness of a request. Here, no evidence was presented by the City showing that to allow inspection of all the tapes or to require it to review the tapes to separate exempt from nonexempt materials prior to production of all the tapes would place an unreasonable burden on the City.
Accordingly, we conclude that the City's denial of the request to inspect all the 911 audio tapes within the specified time period was a violation of the Open Records Act. This is not to say that the City may not have an appropriate basis to deny inspection of portions of the 911 audio tapes during the requested period under one of the exceptions codified at KRS 61.878(1), but that it has failed to set forth a proper basis for such action in this instance.
It is the decision of this office that the 911 audio tapes during the specified time period should be made available for Mr. Catron's inspection. If the tapes contain both excepted and nonexcepted material, the City may, pursuant to KRS 61.878(4), separate the excepted material and make the nonexcepted material available. For the withheld portions, the City should cite the specific exception which authorizes the nondisclosure and a brief explanation of how the cited exception applies to the portion of the tapes withheld.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.