Request By:
Reverend Louis Coleman
Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; Diane Schuler Fleming, Assistant Attorney General
Opinion of the Attorney General
The Reverend Louis Coleman has requested an opinion from this office concerning a unilateral decision of Louisville Board of Aldermen President Steve Magre, which has since been rescinded, to ban 12th Ward Alderman Paul Bather from chairing committees or presenting legislation to the Board unless the proposals have the support of six other aldermen.
Concerned that the actions have the effect of disenfranchising the 12th Ward, the Reverend Coleman presented questions for our consideration which we interpreted as follows: (1) Does the President of the Board of Aldermen, as a form of disciplinary sanction, have the power to prohibit an alderman from serving as chair of a committee?; (2) Can the Aldermanic President limit an alderman's ability to introduce legislation as a disciplinary sanction? ; and (3) Does the Mayor have authority to intervene in this matter?
The power to discipline or punish a member of the Board of Aldermen for disorderly conduct has been placed exclusively with the full Board pursuant to KRS 83.470. No power has been vested in the President which would enable him to take unilateral disciplinary action against any member. Thus, if President Magre's actions were intended to discipline Alderman Bather, he clearly lacked the authority to do so. Instead, the matter should have been placed before the full Board and analyzed in accordance with the Board's Code of Ethics and other principles of law that may be applicable. See, Louisville Code of Ordinances, Ordinance 261, Series 1994, Chapters 30 and 36.
It should be noted that this office is not making a finding that the actions of President Magre constituted "discipline" under KRS 83.470. Whether the actions of the President in fact were discipline is a matter better left to the courts that have the procedures and recognized authority to make such findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Finally, we turn to the question of whether the Mayor has the authority to intervene in this matter. In KRS 83.430 the General Assembly set forth the following mandate:
In each city of the first class there shall be a legislative, an executive, and a judicial department. None of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as permitted by law.
Pursuant to KRS 83.530, the executive power is vested in the mayor. Legislative power is granted to the Board of Aldermen. KRS 83.400. Thus we see that a strict separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government has been established for cities of the first class. This language mirrors that of Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution, which the Kentucky courts have consistently interpreted as providing for a separation of powers. See, Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907 (1984).
The power to discipline a member of the Board of Aldermen has specifically been granted to the legislative branch, that is, to the Board itself. KRS 83.470. Therefore, Mayor Abramson does not have the authority to discipline Alderman Bather or intervene in such matters before the Board. To do so would be an improper usurpation of power.