Request By:
Gorman Bradley Jr., counsel for McCracken County Board of Education
Opinion
Opinion By: A. B. Chandler III; Ross T. Carter, Manager of the Opinions Branch
Opinion of the Attorney General
We have been asked whether a person appointed as acting superintendent of a public school district may be appointed to fill the office of superintendent for that district. This is an issue of first impression in Kentucky, and we provide this opinion pursuant to KRS 15.025(1) and (3). The answer is no.
The question arises because of ambiguity in KRS 160.350(1). That statute describes two situations in which a school board may appoint an acting superintendent. The situation applies to vacancies that occur in the period between a school board election and the qualification of the newly elected members. "When a vacancy occurs during this period," the statute says, "the position shall not be filled until the new members take office, but the board may appoint an acting superintendent to serve a term not to exceed six (6) months. This appointment may be renewed once for a period not to exceed three (3) months."
The same subsection provides for an acting superintendent to be appointed while the applicants are being screened: "If a vacancy occurs, a local board may also appoint an acting superintendent during the period the screening committee pursuant to KRS 160.352 conducts its business and prior to the actual appointment of the new superintendent. "
Sandwiched between these two excerpts is the following provision: "The person appointed to serve as acting superintendent shall not be an applicant for, nor be appointed to, the position of superintendent. " The question before us is whether this limitation applies to both types of appointments of acting superintendents, or only to the first.
Those who maintain that the limitation applies only to the first type of appointment argue that the sequence of sentences in the statute is controlling. Because the limitation appears before the language authorizing the second type of appointment rather than after it, the argument goes, the legislature is presumed to have intended that the limitation affect only that which precedes it.
Those who maintain that the limitation applies to both types of appointment point out that the statute does not explicitly direct the limitation to one type of appointment, implying that it applies to both.
The two arguments are equally logical. We believe that the solution lies in an examination of the legislative history.
KRS 160.350(1) did not provide for acting superintendents until 1984. The 1984 amendment stated that a school board could not appoint a superintendent during the period between a school board election and the assumption of office by new board members, but rather must appoint an acting superintendent for a term of six months.
In 1988 the legislature enacted some semantic amendments to the KRS 160.350, including the inappropriate substitution of therefore for thereafter.
In 1990 the legislature enacted KRS 160.352, which creates superintendent screening committees, and added the phrase "after considering the recommendations of a screening committee" to KRS 160.350(1).
In 1992, the legislature added this language to KRS 160.350(1):
The person appointed to serve as acting superintendent shall not be an applicant for nor be appointed to the position of superintendent. If a vacancy occurs, a local board may also appoint an acting superintendent during the period the screening committee pursuant to KRS 160.352 conducts its business and prior to the actual appointment of the new superintendent.
The legislative history of an enactment may provide relevant insight into the proper construction of a statute.
Howell v Collier, Ky, 282 SW 2d 327 (1955). "A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent." Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05 at 103 (Callaghan, 5th ed 1992). The 1992 amendment to KRS 160.355(1) was passed as a whole and is, like the enactment of an entire statute, animated by one general purpose and intent. It is difficult for us to believe that the legislature in one bill enacted the two sentences quoted above and yet intended that neither sentence have any relevance to the other.
Parts of a statute must be construed as being in harmony rather than in opposition.
Williams v Commonwealth, Ky App, 829 SW 2d 942, 945 (1992). A meaning cannot be inferred if it is not reasonably ascertainable from the language used.
Beckham v Board of Education of Jefferson County, Ky, 873 SW 2d 575, 577 (1994). Nothing in the language used in KRS 160.350(1) implies that the legislature intended to distinguish two types of appointment of acting superintendents.
"If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense." Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the theory of appellate decision and the rules or canons about how statutes are to be construed, 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395 (1950). We can discern no purpose or objective that would be served by disqualifying one set of acting superintendents from serving as superintendent while allowing another set to serve, with the only distinction between the two groups being the time of year in which the superintendent's office became vacant.
Therefore, we conclude that any acting superintendent appointed under KRS 160.350(1) may not be appointed superintendent.