Request By:
Mr. Don R. McCormick
Commissioner
Department of Fish & Wildlife Resources
#1 Game Farm Road
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General; Grant Winston, Assistant Attorney General
This is in response to your letter of 9 October 1989, in which you inquired as to the scope of law enforcement authority permitted to conservation officers under KRS 150.090(1). That subsection states:
Conservation officers appointed by the commissioner shall have full powers as peace officers for the enforcement of all of the laws of the Commonwealth, except that they shall not enforce laws other than this chapter and the administrative regulations issued thereunder or to serve process unless so directed by the commissioner in life threatening situations or when assistance is requested by another law enforcement agency.
You asked two specific questions about the authority of conservation officers under this law. They are:
1) Can the Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife issue a comprehensive directive authorizing Conservation Officers to exercise full powers as peace officers to enforce all laws of the Commonwealth in life threatening situations? (Who defines life threatening situation as it pertains to KRS 150.090(1)?)
2) Can another law enforcement agency make a comprehensive request to the Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife for Conservation Officers to assist them with full powers as peace officers to enforce all laws of the Commonwealth?
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
These questions call for statutory construction. When construing statutes, effect must be given to the intent of the Legislature. Wesley v. Board of Education of Nicholas County, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 28 (1966).
We begin our search for legislative intent at KRS 150.015, which states the purposes and policies of Chapter 150, Fish and Wildlife Resources. That statute explicitly refers to the purpose of the Act of the 1952 General Assembly which amended Kentucky's fish and wildlife laws and to the public policy of Kentucky as to wildlife. Paramount of the purpose of the 1952 Act and the policy of Kentucky is expectedly protection and conservation of wildlife. Other purposes and policies listed in KRS 150.015 are "to promote the general welfare of the Commonwealth," and "that an adequate and flexible system be installed to accomplish the aforesaid purposes." These have been both the intent of the Legislature and the public policy of Kentucky since 1948 when they were first enacted. Ky. Acts, 1948, Ch. 78 § 1. Therefore, the underlying rationale of the answers to the questions put to this office must include a bias toward "adequacy," "flexibility," and a "promotion of the general welfare of the Commonwealth."
KRS 150.015 concludes with a mandate that all of the provisions of the 1952 Act relating to game and fish (an earlier version of today's Chapter 150) "shall be liberally construed in such manner as most effectually to carry out its purposes and intent." However, this does not provide any guidance to the questions about KRS 150.090(1) now being considered because KRS 150.090(1) as it was in the 1952 Act strictly limited the authority of conservation officers to enforcement of Chapter 150. The language being considered is of much more recent vintage, having been enacted by the 1986 General Assembly. So liberal construction of the 1952 version of KRS 150.090(1) would be wasted effort.
We must, nevertheless, liberally construe today's version of KRS 150.090(1) for another statute tells us so. KRS 446.080(1) commands all constructionists to liberally construe all statutes of this state "with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the Legislature."
The judiciary, which is frequently asked to construe various statutes, provides guidance in that endeavor which is well kept in mind. The jurists, too, have adopted a policy of construing statutes to give effect to the will or intent of the Legislature. See: Wesley, supra, at 29; Manning v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry, Ky.App., 657 S.W.2d 584 (1983).
The courts have also decided that strict, literal, or any other statutory construction that would lead to absurd or unreasonable results is to be avoided. See: George v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., Ky., 421 S.W.2d 569 (1967); Wesley, supra, at 30. Let us then consider what interpretation of KRS 150.090(1) would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result.
Hamstringing the Commissioner by forbidding him to broaden the powers of conservation officers in life threatening situations except on a case-by-case basis would most certainly lead to an absurd and unreasonable result. The exigent circumstances of life threatening situations do not permit the involved conservation officers to take time out in order to gain an audience with the Commissioner, explain the situation, have the Commissioner deliberate and give the directive, and then return to the scene to take appropriate action. Passage of that length of time could very well see not only the end of the threat, but the end of the life that was being threatened as well.
The same holds true for an interpretation of the portion of KRS 150.090(1) allowing conservation officers broadened powers as peace officers when assistance is requested by another law enforcement agency. The need for an agency request for assistance will frequently arise out of emergency situations, but by the nature of emergencies would be impracticable to make on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, there is no limiting language in the clause of this subsection. It is stated simply and broadly. However, because other law enforcement agencies should not make requests to the Commissioner for conservation officers to act beyond the scope of their qualifications and training, the Commissioner can refuse any request that in his sound judgment calls for conservation officers to act beyond their qualifications and training and may also impose whatever restricting conditions in the directive that he feels to be warranted.
Therefore, we consider the purpose of Chapter 150 and the public policy of the Commonwealth, which include promotion of the general welfare and installation of an adequate and flexible system to accomplish that within KRS 150.090(1). We consider that under KRS 446.080(1) we are to liberally construe KRS 150.090(1) with a view to promoting its objects and giving effect to the Legislature's intent. We consider that the Legislature, by adding the conditional broadening of the power of conservation officers in KRS 150.090(1), clearly desired to move toward expanding, not contracting, their power; and a statute should be construed in favor of the remedy. Department of Revenue v. Derringer, Ky., 399 S.W.2d 482 (1966). We consider that the judiciary would frown upon a statutory interpretation of KRS 150.090(1) that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result. Considering all of the above, as has been done in this opinion, the only answer that can be given to both questions here put to this office is: yes. That, then, is the opinion of the Attorney General.
This office has also been asked for an opinion correlative to the first question here presented. That is, "Who defines life threatening situation as it relates to KRS 150.090(1)?" A life threatening situation for the purpose of this opinion arises for a conservation officer when he finds himself in a situation where human life clearly appears to be placed at imminent and grave risk by conduct of an intentional, negligent or wanton nature. This also is the opinion of the Attorney General.