Request By:
N. Scott Lilly, Esq.
First Assistant
Office of the Jefferson County Attorney
1001 Fiscal Court Building
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; Thomas R. Emerson, Assistant Attorney General
Herbert L. Segal, Esq., has appealed to the Attorney General pursuant to KRS 61.880 your partial denial of his request to inspect and copy certain records in the custody of Jefferson County.
In his letter to Jon Goldberg, Esq., dated May 28, 1987, Mr. Segal requested a copy of the names and addresses of all Jefferson County employees involved in units petitioned by AFSCME to be their collective bargaining representative. Mr. Segal made his request pursuant to "the Freedom and Information Act" and in support of the request he cited a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan State Employee's Association v. Michigan Department of Management and Budget (decision rendered October 6, 1986).
You responded on behalf of Jefferson County to Mr. Segal's letter in your letter to him dated June 3, 1987. You denied his request that he be furnished with the home addresses of the employees of the Jefferson County Government. Cited in support of your decision was an opinion of this office (OAG 76-717). For some time it has been the policy of Jefferson County not to release the home addresses of its employees as such information may be excluded from public inspection pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a). You declined to follow the decision reached by the Michigan Supreme Court and you stated that Mr. Segal had already received the names of the county employees in question.
In his letter of appeal to this office, Mr. Segal again refers to the 1986 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court to the effect that disclosing the home addresses of governmental employees is not an unwarranted invasion of privacy under Michigan's Freedom of Information Act.
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Among the public records in this state which may be excluded from public inspection in the absence of a court order authorizing inspection are those described in KRS 61.878(1)(a) as "Public records containing information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. "
The right of privacy has been defined in part in 62 Am. Jur.2d Privacy § 1 as follows:
"A judicially approved definition of the right of privacy is that it is the right to be freefrom the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. The right of privacy has also been defined as the right to be left alone, to be free from unwarranted publicity, and to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned . . ."
In 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 2 the following appears in part:
"It has been stated broadly that the right of privacy is designed to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern from being dragged into an undesirable and undeserved publicity, and to protect all persons from having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private made public against their will . . ."
The court, in Board of Education of Fayette County v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission, Ky.App., 625 S.W.2d 109, 111 (1981), said in part that in determining whether disclosure of information would involve an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the test to apply is the balancing of interests of the parties as well as those of the public measured by the standard of the reasonable man.
In an earlier case, Perry v. Moskins Stores, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 812, 813 (1952), the court said in part relative to the right of privacy:
". . . It is based on the right of an individual to be left alone, to be free from unwarranted publicity, and to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which it is not necessarily concerned. However, the right is not absolute. The rule defining the extent of the right is based on the premise that the standard by which the act is judged is that of a reasonable man. Since there is no hard and fast definition of the right, each case must turn on its own facts. Such a rule necessitates a balancing of the interests of the two parties in litigation, as well as those of the public." (citations omitted).
This office has recognized exceptions to public inspection on the basis of the provisions of KRS 61.878 (1) (a). We have also recognized that as a general proposition as many public records and documents as possible should be made available for public inspection. Thus, the situation here involves the right of governmental employees to privacy and the public's right to know. The right to protection against an invasion of personal privacy must be balanced against the public's right to know.
This office has consistently concluded that the public is entitled to know the names, positions, work stations and salaries of governmental employees. The public has an interest in such matters as governmental employees are carrying on the public's business at the public's expense.
However, as far back as 1976, in OAG 76-717, copy enclosed, this office concluded that a governmental employee is entitled to privacy as far as his personal life and off duty activities are concerned. This right to privacy extends to the governmental employee's home address. While the public has a right to know about that which is related to the governmental employee's public and work related activities, his home address normally would be unrelated to his official job activities.
In OAG 79-275, copy enclosed, at page four, we said that information such as home addresses, social security numbers and the marital status of governmental employees was of such a personal nature that it could be withheld from public inspection by the governmental agency. This kind of information presents situations where the public's right to knwo is not greater than the right of governmental employees to their privacy.
If the requesting party desires to correspond or make contact with governmental employees he can mail the information he has to their work addresses. He could announce that he will mail material to governmental employees at their home addresses if those employees voluntarily furnish their home addresses to him. Obviously other means of contact are also available.
There is no reported decision in this jurisdiction relative to the furnishing of the home addresses of governmental employees under the State Open Records Act. In the absence of such a court decision requiring the disclosure of the home addresses of governmental employees, it is the opinion of the Attorney General that a county government may adopt a policy whereby it refuses to disclose such information and, therefore, the Jefferson County government acted within the provisions of the Kentucky Open Records Act when it denied the request to furnish the home addresses of its employees to the requesting party.
As required by statute a copy of this opinion is being sent to the requesting party, Herbert L. Segal, Esq., who has the right to challenge it in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5).