Request By:
Mr. Arthur Hatterick, Jr.
Executive Director
Kentucky Personnel Board
Room 372, Capitol Annex
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; By: Kevin M. Noland, General Counsel
On behalf of the Personnel Board, you have requested an opinion of this office regarding the constitutionality of KRS 163.032, enacted as Senate Bill 299 by the 1980 General Assembly. More specifically, you want to know whether KRS 163.032 constitutes special legislation and is thereby unconstitutional under the provisions of §§ 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution.
We recognize that this inquiry is relevant to the statutory responsibility of the Personnel Board to approve compensation plans for the state's service, pursuant to KRS 18A.075 and KRS 18A.110. Teachers in state-supported vocational schools, the Kentucky School for the Deaf, and the Kentucky School for the Blind are employees within the classified service as defined in KRS Chapter 18A. However, KRS 163.032 states:
"(1) The Kentucky department of education, with assistance from the Kentucky department of personnel, shall develop a salary structure that will enable teachers in the state-supported vocational schools, the Kentucky school for the deaf, and the Kentucky school for the blind to be initially employed at a starting salary that is not lower than the average salary paid to beginning classroom teachers by all schools in that vocational region for personnel with comparable qualifications and experience. The salary schedules shall be computed prior to July 1 of each year and shall be based on the regular 185 day school year. Salaries for extended employment shall be computed at the same rate as the regular pay.
"(2) Schedules for the 1980-81 school year shall be developed by August 1, 1980, and shall be initiated at the beginning of the 1980-81 school year. "
To determine whether KRS 163.032 violates §§ 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution, we first turn to the requirements of those provisions. Section 59 provides that the General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts in any case where a general law can be made applicable. Section 60 of the Constitution of Kentucky provides that the General Assembly shall not indirectly enact any special or local act by exempting from the operations of a general act any city, town, district or county.
"Special" or "local" legislation as defined in Board of Education of Jefferson County v. Board of Education of Louisville, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 496 (1971), at 498 is as follows:
"A local act is one confined to territorial limits, other than that of the whole state or one which is applicable to some political subdivision and not to others. A special law is legislation which arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification discriminates against some persons or objects and favors others."
Since KRS 163.032 does not involve a geographical limitation less than the whole state, we are not concerned here with local legislation, but rather with whether KRS 163.032 constitutes special legislation.
The long and well-established rule is that a classification based upon a reasonable and natural distinction will not be voided. See, Williams v. City of Bowling Green, 254 Ky. 11, 70 S.W.2d 967 (1934), in which the Court states at 968:
"The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of certain classes does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it."
Given the applicable law, we must now turn to considering whether there is any reasonable distinction to support the fact that the 1980 General Assembly chose to provide through KRS 163.032 a salary structure for beginning teachers in the state-supported vocational schools, the state school for the deaf, and the state school for the blind that is apart from the plan of compensation provided other employees within the classified service.
First, it is apparent that it is most difficult to equate state employees, employed in a system which is conducive to twelve month employment, to a work environment (teaching) which is conducive to a nine and one-fourth month school year.
Secondly, the state-supported vocational schools are forced by the nature of their operations to coordinate and work very closely with local high schools in each vocational education region. The high school teachers are employed by the local school districts, each of which has its own separate salary schedule. A close relationship between the local schools and the state-supported vocational schools most likely creates an atmosphere of healthy competition between those state employees and local school district employees.
Finally, each year there is a need to fill vacancies in teacher positions in the state-supported vocational schools, the state school for the deaf, and the state school for the blind. These schools are in direct competition with the local school districts in Kentucky in recruiting qualified teacher applicants. KRS 163.032 confronts salary problems in recruiting beginning teachers in these state schools by mandating a starting salary that is not lower than the average salary paid to beginning classroom teachers by all schools in that vocational region for personnel with comparable qualifications and experience. Obviously, the salary to be paid is an important factor to one considering employment. KRS 163.032 allows the state to be competitive with local school district salaries and thus more likely to be able to fill teaching position vacancies.
In sum, there is a reasonable distinction which justifies the separate treatment given by KRS 163.032 to the salaries of beginning teachers in the state-supported vocational schools, the state school for the deaf, and the state school for the blind, and therefore it is our opinion that KRS 163.032 is not "special" legislation in violation of either § 59 or § 60 of the Kentucky Constitution.
While one may believe that the legislature could have used a "more reasonable" classification, it is well-established that it is not appropriate for courts to review the "wisdom" of legislation and its classification. See Holsclaw v. Stephens, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 462 (1974), and U.S. v. Kras, 408 U.S. 434, 93 S. Ct. 631, 34 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1973). Furthermore, any doubt as to the constitutionality of legislation must be resolved in favor of the statute. See, Fann v. McGuffey, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 770 (1975), and Chapman v. Eastern Coal Company, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 390 (1975).
We hope this adequately responds to your request.