Request By:
Honorable Mark W. Dobbins
Assistant Director of Law
City of Louisville Department of Law
Room 200, City Hall
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-2771
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; By: Cicely D. Jaracz, Assistant Attorney General
As you are aware, Ms. Kimberly K. Greene, on behalf of The Courier-Journal and reporter Hunt Helm, has appealed to the Attorney General pursuant to KRS 61.880 your denial of Mr. Helm's request to inspect "all financial disclosure forms and ethics pledges filed by John Rowe with the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Ethics. "
Your denied Mr. Helm's request with regard to the financial disclosure forms pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a) and an executive order of the Mayor which states that these forms are not public records.
Your denial did not mention the ethics pledges. You have since informed this Office that the ethics pledges requested by Mr. Helm are public records available for public inspection. This opinion will therefore be restricted to the availability of the financial disclosure forms.
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
It is the Opinion of the Attorney General that your denial was improper under the Open Records Law.
It appears that the financial disclosure forms are public records as defined by KRS 61.870(2) because they are ". . . papers . . . which are prepared, owned, used, in the possession of or retained by a public agency. " The public agency herein is the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Ethics, created by the Mayor pursuant to KRS 83.590(2).
As public records, these forms must be open to public inspection unless exempted by KRS 61.878. It is our opinion, however, that none of the provisions in KRS 61.878 apply to exempt the financial disclosure forms from public inspection.
KRS 61.878(1)(a), which excludes from public inspection any documents the disclosure of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, is inapplicable herein for several reasons. The privacy exemption applies when a specific individual is identified and the requested document contains vast amounts of personal data the disclosure of which could possibly be harmful to the named individual. While it is true that a specific individual is named on the financial disclosure form, the form itself does not appear to request information of a highly personal nature which could ostensibly harm the named individual. For example, the form requires a listing of all stocks, bonds, real estate, and credit interests valued over $1000 which are owned by the respondent. However, stocks, bonds and credit interests are only to be listed by description of the business and types of products and services and not by name. Real estate is listed by address, but this information is readily available from other sources. A listing of offices, directorships, employments, and compensated services is also to be listed by nature of business and types of products or services, but not by name. Additionally, the respondent is not required to put a value figure on these varied interests. The only concern is if the value is greater than $1000. Thus the only available information is the type of interest, the type of business, and the fact that the interest is valued over $1000.
The form also requires a listing of the same interests for the respondent's spouse, dependents, and anyone with whom the respondent maintains a close economic or personal association. KRS 61.878(1)(a) also does not exclude this information for two reasons. First, the interests are, as above, not specifically named. Second, the respondent's dependents and close associates are not named and therefore no privacy right arises. Although the form does require the name and address of the respondent's spouse, no privacy right is invoked as in the respondent's case because the interests are not specifically identified.
Your denial also relied on an executive order of the Mayor which held these forms not to be public records. As we stated above, the financial disclosure forms appear to be public records pursuant to KRS 61.870(2). The Open Records law does not contain any provision which allows a public agency to declare that a record is not a public record. A record can only be withheld if it falls within one of the discretionary exemptions of KRS 61.878. None of these exemptions apply herein.
It is therefore the opinion of the Attorney General that your denial was improper under the Open Records law. The financial disclosure forms constitute public records which are open to public inspection due to the inapplicability of the KRS 61.878 exemptions.
As directed by statute, a copy of this Opinion is being sent the requestor. Should you decide not to comply with this Opinion, you may initiate further proceedings pursuant to KRS 61.880(5).