Request By:
Mr. Doug Rigsby
Public Administration Specialist
Bluegrass Area Development District, Inc.
3220 Nicholasville Road
Southpark Center
Lexington, Kentucky 40503
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
The authority of deputy sheriffs is involved in your request for an opinion of this office. Your letter reads:
"In my role as a Public Administration Specialist for an Area Development District, I am often called upon by county and city governments to provide copies of Attorney General's Opinions that have been issued on a broad range of topics. I am unable to locate an opinion that covers the situation outlined below, and would appreciate a formal opinion as to the legality of the practice.
"The Lincoln County Board of Education pays the salary of a deputy sheriff who works exclusively as a security officer at the County High School. This person carries a weapon and writes parking tickets for vehicles on school property. The fiscal court has not adopted any ordinances dealing with parking on school grounds or elsewhere in the county. It appears that this deputy is enforcing only those parking regulations of the Board of Education. Also, this person does not work out of the sheriff's office and appears to be under the direct control of the schools.
"Question No. 1:
"May a deputy sheriff, or a person so deputized, work exclusively for, and be paid by, a County Board of Education?
"Question No. 2:
"May such a person issue parking tickets for the school board in the absence of a county ordinance regulating parking? "
In response to Question No. 1, assuming that this deputy sheriff is a regular deputy appointed by the sheriff pursuant to KRS 70.030 and KRS 64.530, he cannot maintain a full time schedule with the school board, unless he does so during his off-hours from the sheriff's office, i.e., during hours other than regular or scheduled duty hours in the sheriff's office. If he performs regular duties each day and night with the sheriff's office and school board, he would have no time for sleep, and thus could not long survive such an arduous course of action. In any event, he would be required to perform each job with care and ability, otherwise the functions are incompatible. See
Hermann v. Lampe, 175 Ky. 109, 194 S.W. 122 (1917).
If this person works exclusively for the school board, then he is not a deputy sheriff. A deputy sheriff is either a regular deputy, who works on a full schedule for the sheriff's office, and is appointed pursuant to KRS 70.030 and KRS 64.530, or a special deputy sheriff, appointed under KRS 70.045 to assist, without pay, the sheriff in preparation for or during an emergency situation, such as fire, flood, tornado, storm, etc. A special deputy badge and function outside of the emergency situation is meaningless. It would appear that under the broad powers of a school board, pursuant to KRS 160.160 and 160.290, it could employ a security guard to look after its properties.
Earle v. Harrison County Bd. of Educ., Ky.App., 404 S.W.2d 455 (1966).
Such security guard, to be effective, should be a special local peace officer commissioned according to KRS 61.360. As a security guard, he would be a school board employee and may be paid for his services. See OAG 75-631, copy attached. See KRS 61.360, relating to the qualifications, duties and specific authorities of such security guard appointed under that statute.
As concerns Question No. 2, if this so called deputy sheriff is in reality just a private citizen, he has no authority to carry a concealed weapon or pretend that he is a deputy sheriff. Each Board of Education has the control and management of all public school property; and it may make and adopt rules or regulations relating to such property.
However, we are not aware of any statutory authority for a school board to make regulations concerning parking on school property, which would be statutorily enforcible against the public generally. The school board regulations could deal with student parking on school property; and the students would be subject to applicable rules of school discipline. As the court wrote in Earle v. Harrison County Board of Education, above, "The conduct of a public school system is committed to the discretion of the school board. " This suggest a basic internal function not geared to the regulatory control of persons outside of the system. We construe school parking lots to fall within the "approaches" section of the definition in KRS 189.010(3), and conclude that peace officers (as defined in KRS 446.010(24)) are authorized to enforce traffic regulations as contained in KRS 189.290, 189.390 (speed and parking) and KRS 189.505.
As we said above, a school board may, under KRS 160.290, by regulation establish reasonable rules and policies affecting the use of motor vehicles by students and school employees on school grounds and in school-related activities. However, there has been no authority delegated by the General Assembly to school boards under which such boards may create and punish public offenses either in the area of traffic regulation or parking.