Request By:
Honorable Anthea M. Boarman
Executive Director
Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government
Human Rights Commission
207 North Upper Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; William L. Davis, Assistant Attorney General
This will serve to acknowledge receipt of your letter to this Office requesting a formal opinion of the Attorney General. By a telephone conversation with you, you amended your written request for opinion by restricting the question to the following:
Whether the Fayette Urban County Government Human Rights Commission (hereinafter the Commission) is fully authorized to handle complaints against the state or its agencies when a state merit employee is involved?
First, it must be noted that KRS Chapter 18 was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS Chapter 18A effective July 15, 1982. Second, it must be noted that KRS Chapter 18 and KRS Chapter 18A contain no reference to any restrictions as to the bringing of a Civil Rights Complaint before the Commission.
Furthermore, civil rights are a group attended to citizenship. They belong to all persons and are not necessarily akin to rights which may emanate from the Merit Act of covered employees. (Compare
McNeal v. Armour and Company, Ky.App., S.W.2d, 30 K.L.S. 12, p. 1 (October 13, 1983).
Additionally, we must point out two important cardinal rules of statutory construction. A specific statute controls over a general statute.
Hollis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 61, 64 (1983);
Handley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 653 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1983). And, there is a presumption that the legislature was cognizant of preexisting statutes at the time they enacted the later statute.
Fiscal Court Commissioners of Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Judge/Executive, Ky.App., 614 S.W.2d 954, 958 (1981). In
Manning v. Kentucky Bd. of Dentistry, Ky.App., 657 S.W.2d 584 (1983), the Court stated the following:
The Court's function in the interpretation of statutes is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Grinstead v. Kirby, Ky., 110 S.W. 247 (1908);
Fiscal Court Commissioners of Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Judge/Executive, Ky.App., 614 S.W.2d 954 (1981). Where words in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written.
Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 456 (1970);
Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 566 S.W.2d 794 (1978). It is presumed that the legislature is acquainted with the law on the subjects on which it legislates and is informed of previous legislation and construction that it has previously received. Where it has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is not the province of a court to introduce an exception by construction.
Hawley Coal Company v. Bruce, Ky., 252 Ky. 455, 67 S.W.2d 703 (1934);
Button v. Hikes, Ky., 296 Ky. 163, 176 S.W.2d 112 (1943);
Commonwealth v. Boarman, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 922 (1980).
KRS Chapter 344 (The Kentucky Civil Rights Act) was enacted in 1966 and amended in 1980. KRS Chapter 18 (The Merit Act) was enacted in 1960, repealed and reenacted and amended as KRS Chapter 18A in 1982. The general purpose of KRS Chapter 18A is to establish for the state a system of personnel administration based on merit principles. On the other hand, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act was enacted with the specific purpose of preserving the federal civil rights law by providing for its execution within the state and of safeguarding all individuals within the state from discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, and age. KRS 18A .010; KRS 344.020; KRS 344.040;
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights vs. Kentucky Department for Human Resources, Ky.App., 564 S.W.2d 38 (1978);
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights vs. Fraser, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 852 (1981).
Moreover, in OAG 75-669 we concluded that the Kentucky Civil Rights Act clearly authorizes the Commission to exercise jurisdiction over complaints alleging that an agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Kentucky has committed or is committing civil rights violations in Fayette County. KRS 344.010; KRS 344.310.
In light of the above, it is the Opinion of this Office that the Commission is fully authorized to handle complaints against the state or its agencies concerning civil rights violations in Fayette County even though the complaining employee is a Merit employee of the state or its agencies.