Request By:
Mr. W. R. Thomas
1231 Man O War Place
Apt. 14
Lexington, Kentucky 40504
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; Walter C. Herdman, Asst. Deputy Attorney General
This is in response to your letter of February 8 in which you seek our interpretation of the meaning of the constitutional section relating to the residential qualifications of the Office of Governor. You particularly desire to know whether or not this section requires that the candidate be a resident of the state for six years immediately preceding the election.
Section 72 of the Constitution concerning the qualifications for Office of the Governor reads as follows:
"He shall be at least thirty years of age, and have been a citizen and resident of Kentucky for at least six years next preceding his election. " (Emphasis added.)
The phrase "next preceding his election" means, in our opinion, that any candidate for this office must have resided in this state continually for six years immediately preceding the election. It is true the word "immediately" is not used. However, the phrase "next preceding, " in our opinion, means the same as the term "immediately."
In OAG 72-809, copy attached, the question was raised concerning the residency requirements of a county officer under Section 100 of the Constitution which contains the requirement that the candidate reside in the state two years and one year next preceding his election in the county and district in which he is a candidate. We construed this section of the Constitution as not requiring that both years be immediately preceding the election, but that one of the two years must be immediately preceding the date of the election. You will note the case of
Commonwealth v. McCall, 256 Ky. 526, 76 S.W.2d 594 (1934), cited in this opinion, relating to the office of city attorney where the statute simply requires the candidate be a practicing lawyer for two years before he is eligible to hold office. The court pointed out that by virtue of this statutory language there was no condition or restriction as to when the candidate must engage in the practice of law at a time before the election. This case illustrates to us the fact that the wording in Section 100 of the Constitution clearly indicates the necessity that the six years of residency be immediately preceding the election.
Also, the phrase "next preceding, " with reference to a required time span before an event such as an election, has consistently been held to mean the years nearest the event, or in this case the election. See
Cox v. Cox, 268 Ala. 572, 109 S.W.2d 703 and
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530. In the case of
People v. Sears, 344 Ill. 189, 176 N.E. 276, the court declared that the ordinary definition and use of the word "preceding" in a statute does not limit its application exclusively to a time immediately preceding it, as do the words "next preceding" or "immediately preceding" when such restricted application is intended.
In the case of
Grantz v. Grauman, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 364 (1957), in referring to certain rules used in the construction of constitutions, it was declared that where the language of the court leaves no doubt of the intended meaning of a section, courts may not employ rules of construction.
Under the circumstances, and as we have indicated above, we believe Section 100 of the Constitution requires all candidates for Office of Governor to have resided in the state six years nearest to or immediately preceding the date of the election.