Request By:
Mr. Terry K. Stevens
Ballard County Attorney
Courthouse
Wickliffe, Kentucky 42087
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
As County Attorney for Ballard County, you request an opinion of this office on two questions:
(1) "Do the Board of Directors of an Ambulance Service District created pursuant to KRS 108.105 have the authority to borrow money for operating the ambulance district and to repay the loan from tax revenues received by the Board of Directors pursuant to the taxing authority of the fiscal court as contained in KRS 108.105?"
Under KRS 108.105(3), we assume that the fiscal court of your county has established the ambulance service district tax, not to exceed ten cents ($ .10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of full assessed valuation. Such tax must be used solely for the maintenance and operation of this county district ambulance service. Such district is a taxing district as permitted under § 157 of the Kentucky Constitution. See KRS 108.100(3). Thus the Board of Directors of the Ambulance Service District cannot become indebted for any purpose in an amount, in any year, exceeding the income and revenue provided for the district for such year.
The answer to question no. 1 is that the Board of Directors of the Ambulance Service District may borrow money for district purposes, as mentioned in KRS 108.140, provided that the total financial obligations of the particular year do not exceed the income and revenue available to the district for the particular year, including the subject district tax revenues. This is a pay-as-you-go principle. See
Payne v. Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938).
Question No. 2:
"If such an indebtedness is legal would that indebtedness prevent the question of abolishment of the district from being placed on the ballot due to KRS 108.160(4)?"
Pursuant to the express authority of KRS 108.160, such a district may be dissolved under the express terms and method outlined therein. However, the effecting of a dissolution cannot be done so long as contractual obligations assumed prior to the time of the passage of the resolution of the fiscal court authorizing the question of dissolution have not been met. See KRS 108.160(4); and