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Request By:

Mr. David H. Bland
Kentucky Jailers Association
Route #2, McCowans Ferry Rd.
Versailles, Kentucky 40383

Opinion

Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General

On behalf of the Kentucky Jailers Associations, you present questions concerning dieting fees involving the detention of juveniles.

Your letter reads in part:

"The Campbell County Fiscal Court has been advised by the Executive Department of Finance and Administration that the Campbell County Jailer is not eligible to be reimbursed for dieting and keeping of juveniles charged with a public offense. They take this position even though the jailer staffs the facility and fees the juvenile residents from the jail budget. It appears that the Department has taken this position simply because Campbell County has choson to more fully comply with the 'sight and sound' separation by housing the juveniles in a building separate from the jail. "

Your question is whether or not the state must pay the dieting fee, mentioned in KRS 64.150, for the dieting and keeping of juveniles charged with a public offense, and which juveniles are detained in a detention facility of the county in a location other than the "county jail" .

In OAG 78-760, which you mentioned, we concluded that the state must pay for the dieting fees relating to the detention of juveniles.

Apparently you and the County Fee Systems, Department of Finance, would like clarification of OAG 78-760 in terms of whether or not the state must pay the dieting fees for all juvenile prisoners; and whether or not the state must pay the dieting fees in connection with juveniles detained in a building furnished by the county under KRS 208.130, but which is a building entirely and physically separate from the adult county jail building.

As relates to prisoners confined to the "county jail" building, the literal language of KRS 64.150 makes it clear that where the prisoner is actually charged with or is convicted of violating a state statute, the state must pay the jailer's dieting fee. Thus the Canons of statutory construction should not be invoked, since the language of the statute is clear. The legislative intent is clearly evidenced by the plain and precise words used by it in enacting the statute. H. O. Hurley Co. v. Martin, 267 Ky. 182, 101 S.W.2d 657 (1937) 660.

It is our opinion that it is equally clear that where a juvenile is placed in the "county jail" building, though being maintained separate from adult prisoners, and such juvenile is charged with or is convicted of violating a state statute, the state must pay the dieting fee. This includes "delinquency" actions and "status" actions, pursuant to KRS 208.020(1)(a)(b) and (c).

Each county is required, under KRS 208.130, to provide for suitable facilities for the care and custody of children held in custody pending disposition of their cases by the juvenile session of district court, and may employ necessary personnel therefor. Subsection (2) of that statute provides that in counties containing a first or second class city, the fiscal court must provide a permanent detention home, which may be directly operated by the county. Each child detained in such facility shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile session of the district court before which his case is pending. Subsection (5) of the statute provides that the Department for Human Resources may assist the counties in the "acquisition, development and furnishing of detention facilities, and may employ available funds for that purpose."

The county jailer has the custody, rule and charge of the "jail" in his county. KRS 71.020. He is required to receive and keep in the "jail" all persons who are lawfully committed thereto, until they are lawfully discharged. KRS 71.040.

The remaining question is whether or not a county owned detention center, as called for in KRS 208.130, which is operated as a county institution (which we assume is the case here), comes under the term "county jail" , such as to vest in the county jailer the prime custodial responsibility for juveniles detained under charge of violating a state statute spelling out a public offense.

A county jail is a county institution designed to detain persons charged with or convicted or violating statutes setting out public offenses. See Denham v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 508, 84 S.W. 538 (1905) 539; and Briskman v. Central State Hospital, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 270 (1954) 272.

In McArthur v. Campbell, Ark., 280 S.W.2d 219 (1955), the court noted that the Arkansas law requires that juveniles be kept from adult prisoners. The county had proposed the construction of a separate jail for the detention of juveniles. The court wrote this in ruling that such building would be a part of the county jail system, at page 220:

"Webster's Dictionary defines a jail (among other definitions) 'as a building for the confinement of persons held in lawful custody' . A county jail, whether for adults or juveniles, in the common acceptation of the term is a place for the legal detention of all persons, who come within the provisions of our laws which authorizes our law enforcement officers to detain them."

In connection with the concept of "jail time" , the Court of Appeals of New York, in Kalamis v. Smith, 42 N.Y.2d 191, 397 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1977) 693, observed that "As a general rule then a person who has been held in local custody, on a certain charge, prior to the formal commencement of his sentence on that charge, is entitled to credit the time previously spent in the local facility before and after sentence was pronoanced."

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Grab v. Lucas, Wis., 146 N.W. 504 (1914) 505, pointed out that:

"While the primary function of a jail is a place of detention for persons committed thereto, under sentence of a court, they are also the proper and usual places where persons under arrest or awaiting trial are kept till they appear in court and the charge against them is disposed of."

The Court of Appeals of Michigan, in People v. Little, 58 Mich. App. 9, 226 N.W.2d 734 (1975) 735, held that a juvenile detention facility is a "jail" within a statute providing that a person who has served any time in jail prior to sentencing shall receive credit for such jail time against the sentence.

It is our opinion that the county owned detention facility (provided under KRS 208.130), and which is operated directly as a county institution, is a "county jail" for the purpose of imposing upon the county jailer the prime custodial responsibility for juveniles placed properly in that detention facility. You have indicated that the county jailer has accepted that responsibility; and he has provided the staff for the detention facility. See KRS 71.020, 71.040 and 208.130(2). However, the jailer's dieting fee should be paid by the state only where the juvenile has been charged with or convicted of violating a statute.

CONCLUSIONS

Under the above analysis, we draw the following conclusions:

1. Where a prisoner in county jail is charged with or is convicted of violating a state statute, the state must pay the jailer's dieting fee, which includes delinquency and status actions.

2. Where a juvenile is placed in the adult county jail building, though he is detained separate from adult prisoners, and who is charged with or is convicted of violating a state statute, the state must pay the jailer's dieting fee, which includes delinquency and status actions.

3. Where the juvenile detained in the county jail or a detention facility pursuant to KRS 208.130(2) is not charged with or is not convicted of violating a state statute, the state does not pay the dieting fee.

4. A county owned detention facility for juveniles provided under KRS 208.130(2) and which is operated directly as a county institution is a "county jail" for the purpose of imposing upon the elected county jailer (Ky. Const., § 99) the prime custodial responsibility for juveniles properly detained in that facility. However, the jailer's dieting fee should be paid by the state only where the juvenile detained has been charged with or convicted of violating a statute.

Disclaimer:
The Sunshine Law Library is not exhaustive and may contain errors from source documents or the import process. Nothing on this website should be taken as legal advice. It is always best to consult with primary sources and appropriate counsel before taking any action.
Type:
Opinion
Lexis Citation:
1981 Ky. AG LEXIS 259
Cites:
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