Request By:
Honorable Joseph T. Condit
City Solicitor
City of Covington
906 City-County Building
Covington, Kentucky 41011
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of January 22 in which you relate that a problem has arisen in the city of Covington whereby it has become necessary for the city to order dilapidated houses demolished when the owner has refused to bring them up to building code standards thereby leaving vacant lots which are contributing to blighted areas. The city would like to acquire these properties by condemnation and then convey them to someone willing to bring the property up to code standards. Under the circumstances, your raise the following question:
"The question that we would like your office to help us with is whether or not the City of Covington can utilize the procedures as outlined in KRS 99.330 et seq and specifically KRS 99.420 to acquire these individual lots through eminent domain proceedings. In reading the statute, most of the language refers to Urban Renewal 'Areas', could we declare a particular City block as an urban renewal area and then condemn one lot within that area for the purpose of eliminating blight?"
In order for a city to utilize the condemnation authority found in KRS 99.420, it must elect to establish an urban renewal agency as prescribed in KRS 99.330 to 99.510. Operating under this act also requires the adoption of a development plan as prescribed by KRS 99.370, pursuant to which you will note that no urban development agency may acquire title to any land unless certain conditions are met. You will also note that the legislative purpose of operating under this act is to eliminate blighted areas and prepare such areas for development or redevelopment which constitutes the expenditure of public money for a public purpose.
This brings us to the city's general authority of eminent domain authorized pursuant to KRS 84.150 (1) (g), however, the use of this authority is contingent on the fact that the property to be condemned is for public use. See
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. City of Louisville, 131 Ky. 108, 114 S.W. 743 (1908); and
Natcher v. City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936). See also KRS 416.540 (1) pertaining to proceedings for eminent domain.
It would appear therefore that the city of Covington could not acquire title to the subject property for private disposition by its general condemnation authority or by utilizing the condemnation authority under the urban renewal act unless it elects to operate thereunder.