Request By:
Mr. G. C. Garland
Superintendent
Laurel County Schools
1715 S. Main Street
London, Kentucky 40741
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; Robert L. Chenoweth, Deputy Attorney General
As the Superintendent of the Laurel County Schools you wrote to the Office of the Attorney General regarding an incident which occurred at the Laurel County Senior High School. You related that the agriculture department of the schools operates a paint room. In order to maintain beneficent ventilation, the door to the paint room is left partially open when painting tractors and other machinery. You stated there is a machinery court fenced off immediately outside the shop. Teachers normally park around the perimeter of this fence. You continued that cars believed to be parked too close are routinely moved.
The problem that has developed comes from an incident in mid-November when a tractor was being painted. During the process some of the spray was caught up in the wind and settled on four of the teachers' cars. You asked for answers to the following two questions:
1. Is the Board of Education legally liable for damages to these cars?
2. Can regular school funds be expended to have private garages remove this paint?
It is our opinion the board of education, as a corporate entity, may not be held liable for the damage. Also, school funds may not be expended to have the paint removed from the cars.
In support of our opinion, we refer you to the case of
Knott County Board of Education v. Mullins, Ky. App., 553 S.W.2d 852 (1977), copy attached. In Mullins, the Court of Appeals concluded, citing
Smiley v. Hart County Board of Education, Ky., 518 S.W.2d 785 (1974), that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes recovery against a board." Thus, the school district and local board of education as an entity enjoy sovereign immunity.
As to possible liability of the members of a local board of education, individually, the Court of Appeals, now
State Supreme Court, in Copley v. Board of Educ. of Hopkins County, Ky., 466 S.W.2d 952 (1971), pointed out that a public officer is subject to liability for his actions within the scope of his public employment if such actions produce damage (injury) by reason of the officer's personal fault, such as negligence or deliberate wrongdoing. School board members are state officers. Without knowing more detailed facts concerning the incident you described, there is no way to consider whether there exists potential liability against individual board members based upon a theory of negligent conduct by them, individually, as a contributive causation in the damage done to personal property of others, that is, the paint on the automobiles.
The greater potential for liability, but we certainly do not so conclude or even suggest that is the case in this situation, is against one or more school personnel members. School personnel may be held personally liable for his or her negligent acts, or the negligent failure to act; but the standard of negligence will be measured according to what a reasonable teacher or school administrator would do under the circumstances. Each case must be decided on its own facts. There are three elements which each must be met in order to support actionable negligence. (1) duty, (2) a breach thereof, (3) which is the proximate cause of an injury to another. See generally OAG 78-347 and OAG 74-883, copies attached.
We believe from a determination that the board of education cannot be liable for the damages to the automobiles, it must follow that school funds may not be expended to pay for having work done on the cars to remove the paint. The use of school funds for reparation benefits would be the same, legally, as concluding there could be liability against the school district. Again, sovereign immunity precludes such a possibility. We further believe to expend school monies for this purpose would be unconstitutional under the tenor of Section 186 of the Kentucky Constitution which mandates that school funds may be used solely for the maintenance of the public schools and for no other purposes.
We trust the above adequately responds to your questions. If we may be of further assistance to you, please contact us.