Request By:
Mr. Jack C. Goins
Franklin County Judge/Executive
Courthouse
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Under the old KRS 25.270 the regular county judge in every county was entitled to a vacation with pay of two (2) weeks in each year. The regular county judge in counties having a circuit court of continuous session was entitled to a vacation with pay of one (1) month in each year. The statute was repealed in the Extraordinary Session of 1976 [Ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978].
Your question: Are there any statutory provisions relating to a vacation for the county judge executives?
KRS 68.005 provides that the fiscal court shall adopt a county administrative code which includes, inter alia, the general administration of the office of county judge executive, and personnel administration. See also KRS 67.080(1)(e), relating to fiscal court's exercising all the corporate powers of the county. KRS 67.710(2) provides that the administrative code shall incorporate the details of administrative procedure for the operation of the county.
It is our opinion that implicit in the above statutes is the authority for the fiscal court to establish in the administrative code a reasonable provision for the county judge executive's vacation with pay. "Vacation with pay" is a deeply rooted administrative device found in private enterprise and government and is considered a fringe benefit. The benefit is extended to such public officers and employees in consideration of their services rendered the government. See § 3, Kentucky Constitution.
We think the above statutory treatment of "administrative procedure" is sufficiently descriptive to meet the test of an expressly delegated authority to fiscal courts, as laid down in Fiscal Court, Etc. v. City of Louisville, Ky., 559 S.W.2d 478 (1977) 482. In Miller v. Robertson, 306 Ky. 653, 208 S.W.2d 977 (1948) 980, the court in effect held that § 3 of the Constitution does not preclude a public officer from receiving his pay while on vacation or while he is ill. See United States v. Andrews, 240 U.S. 90, 60 L. Ed. 541, 36 S. Ct. 349 (1915), holding that the right of an army officer to half pay while on leave of absence, as expressly conferred by federal statute, could not be defeated by action of the military authorities. See annotation on the subject of paid vacations of public officers or employees at 134 A.L.R. 195. Chief Justice White, in Andrews, above, wrote in effect that the officer had a right to rely upon the statute.