Request By:
Honorable James M. Todd
Attorney at Law
219 North Upper Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of December 15 in which you raise the question as to whether or not an urban county government can pass an ordinance limiting campaign spending in urban county races.
Our response to your question would be in the negative since we believe that this field of law has been preempted by the state legislature by virtue of its enactment of the Corrupt Practices Act, KRS Ch. 121. This act regulates the field of campaign contributions and expenditures for and on behalf of all candidates for urban county office [KRS 121. 100] and, in effect, now permits unlimited expenditures by candidates whereas certain former provisions of the act restricted the amount of expenditures a candidate could make depending upon the type of office. In support of this conclusion, In support of this conclusion, we initially refer you to the case of City of Harlan v. Scott, 290 Ky. 585, 162 S.W.2d 8 (1942), we quote the following excerpt:
". . . An ordinance may cover an authorized field of local laws not occupied by general laws but cannot forbid what a statute expressly permits and may not run counter to the public policy of the state as declared by the Legislature."
Reference is next made to McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 5, § 15.22, wherein the following general rule is stated:
"It has been stated broadly that no municipal ordinance can go beyond, be broader than, add to, subtract from, modify or affect, limit, amend, or change statutes, at least where the net result is one of conflict. . . ."
We also refer you to the case of Boyle v. Campbell, Ky., 450 S.W.2d 265 (1970), involving a Sunday closing ordinance enacted by the city of Bowling Green which the court held invalid on the ground that it conflicted with the state statute. On the question of conflict, the court had this to say:
"Secondly, a municipal ordinance is invalid if it conflicts with a state statute. As stated in 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, Section 165 (page 787):
"'It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. '
* * *
". . . It is that the City of Bowling Green simply lacks the authority by local law to amend, modify, interpret or construe a state statute. . . ."
Finally, referring to the case of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Commonwealth, Ky., 488 S.W.2d 329 (1972), we find the Court again expressed the following principle of law:
"A conflict exists between an ordinance and a statute when the ordinance permits conduct which is prohibited by statute or prohibits conduct which is permitted by the statute. . . ."
Under the circumstances and as previously indicated, we believe that the state has [pursuant to Ch. 121 KRS] pre-empted the field of campaign expenditures by, in effect, authorizing unlimited expenditures by candidates for all offices, including urban county offices, and any local ordinance limiting such expenditures on behalf of urban county candidates would be invalid.