Request By:
Honorable Lawrence R. Webster
Attorney at Law
Pikeville, Kentucky 41501
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of June 6 in which you request an opinion concerning the following:
"As the City Attorney of Pikeville it has come to my attention that there is no provision in KRS which allows a city to publish a list of delinquent ad valorem taxpayers. KRS 424.330 is limited to the county.
"I would appreciate an attorney general's opinion on whether a city can publish a list of delinquent ad valorem taxpayers."
In response to your question we find no statutory requirement that cities of the fourth class publish a list of delinquent taxpayers. We agree that the publication requirements of KRS 424.330 are not applicable to delinquent city taxes.
As you know, public notice of city taxes due and the delinquent date is required to be given all taxpayers collectively pursuant to the publication requirement under Ch. 424 KRS in accordance with KRS 92.480. Also, as you know, individual delinquent taxpayers must be given notice of any sale of real property for tax purposes pursuant to KRS 92.690. As a consequence, taxpayers individually and collectively are given due notice of when their taxes are due as well as when they become delinquent.
Thus, we do not believe in the absence of specific authorization to publish a list of delinquent taxpayers that the city has any authority to do so under the principles expressed in the case of Juett v. Town of Williamstown, 248 Ky. 235, 58 S.W.2d 411 (1933). In this case the Court points out that all cities are limited to those powers specifically granted or implied from some specific grant. For your information we quote the following excerpt from said case.
". . . Municipal corporations possess only such powers as are expressly given, or necessarily implied, in statutes constitutionally enacted, and, if there be a fair and reasonable doubt of the existence of the power, it should be resolved against the municipality. Barrow v. Bradley, 190 Ky. 480, 227 S.W. 1016; Board of Education City of Newport v. Scott, 189 Ky. 225, 224 S.W. 680; District of Clifton v. Cummins, 165 Ky. 526, 177 S.W. 432; Simrall v. City of Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14 S.W. 369, 9 L.R.A. 556, 29 Am. St. Rep. 398; Henderson v. City of Covington, 14 Bush, 312.
"The general rule is stated thus in South Covington & Cincinnati St. Railway Company v. Berry, 93 Ky. 43, 18 S.W. 1026, 15 L.R.A. 604, 40 Am. St. Rep. 161:
"'The powers of a municipality are confined to those expressly granted, or those essential to the execution of those so granted. They are mere agencies of the sovereign authority of the state, and can therefore exercise no powers except those expressly conferred, or those essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of the incorporation. They must be either expressly granted, or necessarily implied as incident to those so granted, or essential to the object and purposes of the corporation.'" (Emphasis added).