Request By:
Honorable Scott G. Miller, Jr.
Mayor, City of Versailles
Versailles, Kentucky 40383
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of May 4 in which you relate that in June, 1971 the Versailles City Council passed a motion requiring a first and second reading of all ordinances before a vote is taken, and you enclose a copy of the minutes so indicating. The question is raised whether or not the action on the part of the city council violates the statutory law covering the enactment of ordinances in cities of the fourth class.
Ordinances of cities of the fourth class are enacted pursuant to KRS 86.090. Under this statute we find no requirement that ordinances are to have more than one reading as is the case in certain other classes of cities. This would appear to mean that the statute as written requires only one reading and multiple readings would not be permitted by motion, resolution or ordinance since such would create a conflict with the statute by enlarging on its terms which cannot be permitted by law.
First referring to the case of
City of Harlan v. Scott, 290 Ky. 585, 162 S.W.2d 8 (1942), we quote the following excerpt:
". . . An ordinance may cover an authorized field of local laws not occupied by general laws but cannot forbid what a statute expressly permits and may not run counter to the public policy of the state as declared by the Legislature."
Reference is next made to McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 5, § 15.22, wherein the following general rule is stated:
"It has been stated broadly that no municipal ordinance can go beyond, be broader than, add to, subtract from, modify or affect, limit, amend, or change statutes, at least where the net result is one of conflict. . . ."
We also refer you to the case of
Boyle v. Campbell, Ky., 450 S.W.2d 265 (1970), involving a Sunday closing ordinance enacted by the city of Bowling Green which the court held invalid on the ground that it conflicted with the state statute. On the question of conflict, the court had this to say:
"Secondly, a municipal ordinance is invalid if it conflicts with a state statute. As stated in 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, Section 165 (page 787):
"'It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. '
* * *
". . . It is that the City of Bowling Green simply lacks the authority by local law to amend, modify, interpret or construe a state statute. . . ."
Finally, referring to the case of
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Commonwealth, Ky., 488 S.W.2d 329 (1972), we find the Court again expressed the following principle of law:
"A conflict exists between an ordinance and a statute when the ordinance permits conduct which is prohibited by statute or prohibits conduct which is permitted by the statute. . . ."
It would seem apparent that any attempt on the part of the city council to adopt a rule of procedure with respect to the enactment of ordinances to require them to have a second reading before a vote is taken would, in effect, add to, modify and change the clear intent of KRS 86.090 and would, as a consequence, be invalid.