Request By:
Mr. David R. Choate
Clinton County Attorney
212 Washington Street
Albany, Kentucky 42602
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Your questions concern the recent action of the Fiscal Court of Clinton County as relates to the Clinton County Health Department.
For several meetings prior to the meeting of April 18, 1978, the fiscal court had discussed whether or not to place the Clinton County Health Department back into the Lake Cumberland Health District from which it had withdrawn some months previously, or to allow it to remain as an independent Health Department unconnected with the Health District.
In the meeting of April 18, 1978, the Fiscal Court of Clinton County had before it a motion which simply reads:
"To allow the Health Department to stay as it is."
This reminds us of the old popular song "Stay As Sweet As You Are." The point is how sweet is this person? Likewise, the point about this motion is precisely in what legal situation or condition was the Health District at the time of the motion.
Your question is: Since this motion was lacking in specificity, was it a valid motion to be voted on by the fiscal court?
It is our opinion that the motion was invalid for the lack of specificity. It is rather elementary that the motion must contain specific language to apprise the members of the legislative body of the nature and extent of the motion. This particular motion is too cryptic and wholly inadequate to inform the members of the fiscal court and the public generally as to precisely what the motion was intended to cover.
It is a general parliamentary rule that a subject must be brought up in the form of a motion embracing a specific proposal before it can be intelligently discussed by the legislative body. Robert's Rules of Order, p.p. 93-94. Even if the members understood the motion, it should have been made clear for the record and for the public generally. A fiscal court can only speak through its records, but when it speaks it must be so stated or articulated that it can be readily understood.
Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 428 S.W.2d 203 (1968) 207. This vague motion was just as if the motion had been in parol, i.e., a mere verbal session.
Fox v. Lantrip, 162 Ky. 178, 172 S.W. 133 (1915) 137.
In your letter you also state that there was a tie vote on the subject motion of April 18, 1978. You ask what the effect of the tie vote really was. The legal effect is that the motion, whether it is deemed to be valid or invalid, failed. And, of course, the tie breaking procedure set forth in KRS 67.040(4) does not apply.