Request By:
Mr. R. C. Hentchel, Manager
Harlan County Landfill
Cumberland, Kentucky 40823
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of June 18 in which you raise the following question:
". . . May an individual run for the office of magistrate, and legally serve, if he is already employed by the county on a month to month basis. The individual who wishes to run for this office collects funds for the county and writes all the expense checks including the monthly salary check. The position in question is manager or superintendent of the Harlan County Landfill."
In response to your question there would be no constitutional or statutory restriction on the right of the individual employed on a month to month basis by the county from running for the office of magistrate; however, if elected, we do not believe he could continue in his employment and receive money from the county appropriated by the fiscal court and at the same time serve as a magistrate of that court in view of the provisions of KRS 61.210 and 61.220 prohibiting fiscal court members from being interested in any claim against the county. Also, the common law principle involving conflict of interest would apply as expressed in McQuillin, Mun. Corps., Vol. 10, § 29.97, as follows:
". . . it is generally held that whenever a public officer enters into a contract the execution of which may make it possible for his personal interests to become antagonistic to his faithful discharge of a public duty, such contract will be held void as against public policy. . . ."
Also, see the case of Commonwealth v. Withers, 266 Ky. 29, 98 S.W.2d 24 (1936), from which we quote the following:
"It is a salutary doctrine that he who is intrusted with the business of others cannot be allowed to make such business an object of profit to himself. This is based upon principles of reason, of morality, and of public policy. These are principles of the common law and of equity which have been supplemented and made more emphatic by the foregoing and other statutory enactments. Nunemacher v. City of Louisville, 98 Ky. 334, 32 S.W. 1091, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 933. In their application and operation it is impossible to lay down any definite rules defining the nature of the interest of the officer, or indicating the line between that which is proper and that which is unlawful. In general, the disqualifying interest must be pecuniary or proprietary by which he stands to gain or lose something. . . ."
In addition, see the case of Arms v. Denton, 212 Ky. 43, 278 S.W. 158 (1925).