Request By:
The Honorable Gerta Bendl
2403 Newburg Road
Louisville, Kentucky 40205
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; William H. Mohr, Assistant Attorney General
In your recent letter to the Attorney General you point out a possible conflict in the application of the 1974 Landlord Tenant Act. The apparently conflicting provisions are as follows:
KRS 383.530 Territorial Application (§ 7 of HB 125)
This act applies to, regulates, and determines rights, obligations, and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state.
KRS 383.715(1) Applicability (§ 46 of HB 125)
The provisions of this act shall apply only to counties containing cities of the first class and urban-county governments.
This apparent conflict is resolved, however, by consulting the legislative history of the Act as it appears in the House and Senate journals.
When the Landlord Tenant Act was initially introduced, it was proposed for statewide applicability. Section 7, now KRS 383.530, was part of this original draft; § 46, KRS 383.715, was not. Section 46 was added to the bill as a floor amendment on February 27, 1974. In fact, this floor amendment proposed that the Act should apply to counties with cities of either the first or second class as well as urban-county governments.
In the Senate, HB 125 was passed on March 19, 1974, with a committee amendment deleting "second," thus further narrowing the ambit of the Act. This amendment received the concurrence of the House on March 20, 1974.
A reliable canon of statutory construction declares that action of a legislative body upon an amendment is often a clear indication of an intent to change or modify the ambit of legislation. In
City of Covington v. State Tax Commission, 257 Ky. 84, 77 S.W.2d 386, 390 (1935) this canon of construction was endorsed by the remark, applicable herein, that:
"In this manner the statute as passed was turned around, so to speak, from the position it occupied when introduced, but without amending some of its sections or parts so as to harmonize with the newly assumed positions, and which produced the ambiguities encountered."
It is, therefore, the opinion of this office that § 46, KRS 383.715(1), must be given controlling weight over § 7, KRS 383.530, as the latter, and thus determinative, statement of legislative intent. KRS 383.530 must not be construed so as to extend the applicability of the Landlord Tenant Act beyond rental properties located in Jefferson and Fayette Counties.