Request By:
Mr. William E. Davis, Director
Administrative Office of the Courts
Route #8, Twilight Trail
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
You seek our interpretation of H.B. 8 [Ch. 11, 1976 Extraordinary Session], designated as KRS 454.350 by the Statutes Reviser, which relates to speedy judgments in civil actions. It reads:
"Section 1. A new section of KRS Chapter 454 is created to read as follows
"(1) Every circuit and district judge shall, when at all possible, issue a written judgment or order in all civil actions which have been submitted for final adjudication within ninety days from the date the action was taken under submission.
"(2) Where a report, findings, or recommendations of a commissioner or hearing officer are required by statute or rule as a prerequisite to an order or judgment by the circuit or district court the same shall be filed within ninety (90) days of the conclusion of the trial or hearing at which the commissioner or hearing officer presided.
"(3) Every circuit and district judge shall at the end of every month certify in writing to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court all cases which have been submitted for final adjudication for longer than ninety (90) days and have not been adjudicated and certify in writing to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the reason for the delay.
"(4) Any district or circuit judge who knowingly violates any of the provisions of this Act shall be subject to removal by the judicial retirement and removal commission."
Your specific question is to which cases the reporting requirements apply.
The thrust of this legislation is that the circuit and district judges of Kentucky must, if at all possible, issue a written judgment or order in all civil actions which have been submitted for final adjudication within ninety days from the date the action was taken under submission. The same 90 day principle applies to the filing of reports, findings or recommendations of a commissioner or hearing officer which are, by statute or rule, a prerequisite to an order or judgment by the circuit or district court. Such reports or findings must be filed within 90 days of the conclusion of the trial or hearing at which the commissioner or hearing officer presided. The legislation requires every circuit and district judge at the end of every month to certify in writing to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court all civil cases which have been submitted for final adjudication for longer than 90 days and have not been adjudicated, along with the reason for the delay.
House Bill 8 became law effective March 19, 1977, pursuant to the 90 day rule set out in § 55 of the Kentucky Constitution. No contrary date appears in the bill and no emergency clause was inserted. And there is no problem, as we see it, with retroactivity, since the statute does not expressly mention any retroactive application thereof, nor is it necessarily implied. KRS 446.080(3); and
Taylor v. Asher, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 895 (1958).
The problem here is one of integrating the time scheme of the statute with the effective date of the legislation, i.e., March 19, 1977. This procedural legislation hinges around the "base" dates. The base date, upon which the 90 day period operates, for the judge's judgment or order, is the date the action was taken under submission. (Emphasis added). The base date in connection with the filing of a report or findings of a commissioner or hearing officer, upon which the 90 day period operates, is the date of the conclusion of the trial or hearing at which the commissioner or hearing officer presided. (Emphasis added).
Keeping the base date in mind, it is our opinion, and we agree with you, that the statute as relates to the judges, applies to civil cases submitted for final adjudication on and after March 19, 1977, and does not apply to cases submitted for final adjudication before that date. The statute gives us no explicit direction in this regard. And since there is no retroactivity, the logic that the application of the statute must attach to the base dates [the starting points in the 90 day procedural rule] is indeed compelling. There is nothing persuasive in the statute supporting any other theory of analysis.
The statute [see KRS 454.350(4)] provides that any district or circuit judge who knowingly violates any of the provisions of this Act shall be subject to removal by the judicial retirement and removal commission.
Bearing in mind the purpose of the act in providing for the orderly and speedy adjudication of civil cases, and keeping in mind the strict burden of compliance placed upon judges, commissioners and hearing officers in Kentucky, it is our view that our analysis is reasonable, workable, and equitable, and promotes the purpose of the statute.
Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 293 Ky. 544, 169 S.W.2d 621 (1943). To take the base date back behind March 19, 1977, would be a departure from reason and equity, and would, in effect, constitute a retroactive application, when actually no provision is made for retroactive application of the statute.
Under this analysis, the statute, as it relates to the filing of reports and findings of commissioners and hearings officers, applies to civil cases the conclusion of the trial or hearing of which occurs on and after March 19, 1977.