Request By:
Mr. Frank Smith
Box 222
Star Route
Shepherdsville, Kentucky 40165
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of March 28 in which you seek an interpretation of the phrase "polling place" as used in subsection (3) of KRS 117.235, which reads as follows:
"(3) No person shall do any electioneering at the polling place on election day unless the fiscal court or legislative body of an urban-county government specifically authorizes by ordinance on a county wide basis electioneering and establishes the distance from the polling place where such electioneering may be permitted, but in no case shall electioneering be allowed within fifty feet of the polls."
So far as we can find, the Supreme Court has never directly defined the term "polling place" . However the Court has referred to the term in general with respect to the fifty (50) foot provision as being fifty (50) feet from the door of the polling place or voting room. Referring to the case of
Adams v. Wakefield, 301 Ky. 35, 190 S.W.2d 701 (1945), we find the question raised as to whether or not there was a violation of the above referred to statute where some wet workers in a local option election used a building whose entrance was thirty-five (35) feet from the door of a barbershop used as the polling place. There was also evidence that a woman working for the anti-prohibitionists sat most of the day right beside the door of the polls. The Court held that though the fifty-foot law found under KRS 118.330 [117.235] had been violated, such violation to be effective must result in something that changes the outcome of the election.
For your information, we are also enclosing copies of two opinions interpreting the term "electioneering" , which may be of interest to you, namely OAG 75-627 and OAG 74-773.