Request By:
Honorable John R. Cummins
Attorney at Law
3300 First National Tower
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Your question concerns the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act and who is an adult thereunder [KRS Chapter 385]. Your specific question is whether the age of "21" mentioned in certain parts of the act [e.g., KRS 385.041(4) and 385.071(4)] governs or whether the age "18", mentioned in KRS 385.011(1) and (13), controls.
The general legislative policy on age is expressed in KRS 2.015, first enacted in 1964 [Ch. 21, Section 1]:
"Persons of the age of eighteen (18) years are of the age of majority for all purposes in this commonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic beverages and for purposes of care and treatment of handicapped children, for which twenty-one (21) years is the age of majority, all other statutes to the contrary notwithstanding."
In the same bill [S.B. 22, 1964, Ch. 21, Section 2] KRS 385.010 [definitional statute] was amended by substituting "18" for "21" in defining an "adult" . In 1966 [S.B. 52, Ch. 202] KRS 385.010 to 385.100 were repealed and new material enacted, including KRS 385.011, the definitional statute for the Kentucky Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. In Section 1 of the latter bill it defined an adult as 21 and a minor as being under 21. A 1976 amendment of KRS 385.011 [Ch. 16, Section 1] substituted "18" for "21".
The Court, in Commonwealth v. Hallahan, Ky., 391 S.W.2d 378 (1965), construed KRS 2.015 as applying "only where the statutes do not designate age in terms of a precise number of years." (Emphasis added). However this principle is not too helpful here since there are numbers in the Act, it is just a question of which number, 18 or 21, controls. Although the 1968 amendment [Ch. 100] to KRS 2.015 added the phrase, "all other statutes to the contrary notwithstanding," it is our view that such broad general language does not amend the subject statutes containing the numbers "21" by implication. Further, KRS 2.015 is oriented toward the concept of "adult" , "minor", "full age", "age of Majority" etc. And the 1968 amendment contains specific amendments to various statutes changing 21 to 18. If the legislature had intended to establish 18 as legal age for all purposes, why did it specifically amend various statutes as aforementioned? See OAG 69-248, copy enclosed. Judge Palmore in Commonwealth v. Hallahan, above, pointed out the difficulty and confusion arising out of KRS 2.015, which is an effort "to simplify something that is not simple."
As we mentioned above, KRS 385.041(4) provides for delivery of custodial property to the minor on his attaining 21. Similarly KRS 385.071(4) provides for appointment of a successor custodian before the minor reaches 21.
As you suggest, the legislature in the 1976 amendment might have intended to lower the age at which a donee obtains full property rights. However, we agree with you that the central factor here is the prefatory statement in KRS 385.011: "In KRS 385.011 to 385.101, unless the context otherwise requires. " (Emphasis added).
Regardless of the apparent intent of the legislature, the "21" provisions in KRS 385.041(4) and 385.071(4) were left intact. Thus under the literal language of the prefatory statement in the definitional statute, KRS 385.011, the context in the two subject statutory sections requires a number other than 18, namely, the figure 21. While this analysis makes the definition number of 18 useless, the prhase, "unless the context otherwise requires", must control. There is no way to rationalize 21 with 18. The only sense and order to be derived from this can come only from adopting the number used in the substantive textual provisions of the Act.
Although the court has said that when a statute defines words used therein it looks to the legislative definition rather than dictionaries or common usage, 1 such a broad principle cannot be applied here in the face of the legislative proviso: "unless the context otherwise requires."
A statutory definition ordinarily is to be used as a guide. 2 But the guide must give way to the context. See
Richard Bertram & Co. v. Green, Fla., 132 So.2d 24 (1961).
Justice Murphy, in Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 93 L. Ed. 611 (1949), wrote that while statutory definitions ordinarily control the meaning of statutory words, this rule does not apply where its application would involve obvious incongruities and a destruction of a major purpose of the statute.
There seems to be a general view that definitional statutes cannot be read in isolation from the entire context of the legislation.
Maguire v. State, Md., 65 A.2d 299 (1949) 303.
Thus the definitional statute cannot stand in the face of a context reflecting something repugnant to the definitional statute or a context reflecting an irreconcilable conflict, which is precisely the case at hand. See
Pacific Discount Co. v. Jackson, 37 N.J. 169, 179 A.2d 745 (1962) 747; and
Town of Kewanna Water Wks. v. Indiana Enp. Sec. Bd., Ind., 171 N.E.2d 262 (1961).
A New York case 3 held that although the definitional part of a statute did not control where the context indicated a different meaning, the necessity for applying a different definition must clearly appear. Here the specific statutes in Chapter 385 containing the term "21" are wholly irreconcilable with the definitional "18". Further, the specific use of "21" in KRS 385.041(4) and 385.071(4) must control over the general proposition of "18" given in the definitional statute. Thus the specific prevails over the general.
City of Bowling Green v. Board of Education, Ky., 443 S.W.2d 243 (1969) 247. We think the case for applying a definition other than that given in KRS 385.011 clearly appears in the instant situation.
In summary, it is our opinion that the "21" provisions in KRS 385.041(4) and 385.071(4) control, instead of the "18" provision in the definitional statute.
Footnotes
Footnotes
1 George Wahrley, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Rev., Ky., 495 S.W.2d 173 (1973) 174.
2 Rebertson v. Western Baptist Hospital, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 395 (1954).
3 Southbridge Finishing Company v. Golding, 2 A.D.2d 430, 156 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1956) 545.