Annotations for Statute

Action of the school board at a closed meeting could not be ratified at the open public meeting because no vote was taken during an open session and because consensus was not established. Webster County Bd. of Educ. v. Newell, 392 S.W.3d 431, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Bd. of Comm'rs of Danville v. Advocate Communs., 527 S.W.3d 803, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 501 (Ky. 2017).

City did not violate the Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.800 et seq., when it conducted settlement negotiations privately with the property owners regarding a zoning matter where the settlement agreement itself was voted on in an open meeting. Although the residents claimed that the private settlement negotiations violated that law, an exception in the Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.810(1)(c), allowed discussion regarding proposed or pending litigation to be conducted privately so long as the final settlement agreement itself was voted on in an open meeting. Cunningham v. Whalen, 373 S.W.3d 438, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 109 (Ky. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1158, 133 S. Ct. 1245, 185 L. Ed. 2d 179, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1105 (U.S. 2013).

County Board of Education violated Kentucky’s Open Meetings Act,  KRS 61.800- 61.850, by discussing in a closed session the resignation of the superintendent of schools and his appointment as a consultant to the school district. Neither the litigation exception in  KRS 61.810(l)(c) nor the personnel exception in  KRS 61.810(l)(f) applied; there was only a remote possibility of litigation, and the enumerated personnel topics did not include either an employee’s resignation or a contractor’s hiring.  Carter v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 66 (Ky. 2012).

County Board of Education’s negotiation of a consulting contract with a superintendent as an independent contractor during a closed session violated the Kentucky Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.800 et seq. Carter v. Smith, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 117 (Ky. Ct. App. June 25, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 366 S.W.3d 414, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 66 (Ky. 2012).

General Assembly declared that all citizens have a direct interest in public agencies’ compliance with the requirements of the Open Meetings Act, and the particularized injury arises from the agency’s violation of the Act itself, not specifically from the action taken; the rights accorded under the Act are not merely procedural but also grant the public at large a direct interest in its enforcement, and in other words, the violation of the Act itself constitutes the direct and personal injury. Lincoln Trail Grain Growers Ass'n v. Meade Cty. Fiscal Court, 632 S.W.3d 766, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).

Litigation exception to open public meetings was not applicable to the school board’s decision directing legal counsel to pursue a challenge to the petition to recall the board’s nickel tax because it was a “final action” of the board to authorize litigation. Webster County Bd. of Educ. v. Newell, 392 S.W.3d 431, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

School board ran afoul of the Kentucky Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.800 et. seq., when it negotiated the terms of a resignation and personal services contract with a superintendent for consulting services behind closed doors. Carter v. Smith, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 66 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2010), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 117 (Ky. Ct. App. June 25, 2010).

Trial court erred by dismissing a complaint for lack of standing because the Open Meetings Act permitted an association to recover attorney fees and costs, and the availability of the remedy met the redressability requirement for constitutional standing; because actions taken in violation of the Act were not void ab initio, third parties not involved in the allegedly unlawful conduct could be entitled to rely on the validity of the agreement executed by the county fiscal court and public board. Lincoln Trail Grain Growers Ass'n v. Meade Cty. Fiscal Court, 632 S.W.3d 766, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).

While the coverage of the Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.800, was broad enough to include a police captain’s termination hearing, the police captain did not follow the procedures in KRS 61.846 and 61.848, and so was not entitled to relief. Howard v. City of Independence, 199 S.W.3d 741, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 230 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005), abrogated in part, Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 998 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2011).